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ABSTRACT
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is the name given to individuals or groups
who write malicious software (malware) and who have the intent to perform actions 
detrimental to the victim or the victims' organisation. This thesis investigates ways in 
which it is possible to treat APTs before, during and after the malware has been laid
down on the victim's computer. The scope of the thesis is restricted to desktop and 
laptop computers with hard disk drives. APTs have different motivations for their 
work and this thesis is agnostic towards their origin and intent.
Anti-malware companies freely present the work of APTs in many ways but 
summarise mainly in the form of white papers. Individually, pieces of these works 
give an incomplete picture of an APT but in aggregate it is possible to construct a 
view of APT families and pan-APT commonalities by comparing and contrasting the 
work of many anti-malware companies; it as if there are alot of the pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle but there is no box lid available with the complete picture. In addition, 
academic papers provide proof of concept attacks and observations, some of which 
may become used by malware writers. Gaps in, and extensions to, the public 
knowledge may be filled through inference, implication, interpolation and 
extrapolation and form the basis for this thesis.
The thesis presents a view of where APTs lie on windows-based systems. It 
uses this view to create and build generic views of where APTs lie on Hard Disc 
Drives on Windows based systems using the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain.
This is then used to treat APTs on Windows based IT systems using purpose-built 
software in such a way that the malware is negated by. The thesis does not claim to 
find all malware on but it demonstrates how to increase the cost of doing business 
for APTs, for example by overwriting unused disc space so APTs cannot place 
malware there.
The software developed was able to find Indicators of Compromise on all 
eight Hard Disc Drives provided for analysis. Separately, from a corpus of 228 files
known to be associated with malware it identified approximately two thirds as 
Indicators of Compromise.
xix
The king hath note of all that they intend,
By interception which they dream not of.
- Bedford, Henry V, Act II Scene II
(Shakespeare, 1599, p. 13)
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
This is a Cyber Security thesis within the Computer Science Discipline. It 
focuses on the deployment by Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) (Jeun, Lee and 
Won, 2012) of malicious software (malware) on the Windows family of operating 
systems on PCs and laptops which use Hard Disk Drives (HDDs). The technical 
analysis is framed within the business context of the user and is a file-based view.
This thesis is agnostic towards the origin and intent of APTs.
techniques. Cyber Security companies publish white papers (Lemay , 2018) on
the work they have performed researching the various APTs, their malware and their 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP).
This thesis presents a cyber defence philosophy and associated software 
aligned with the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain (LMKC) (Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 
2011) for the defence of Windows based operating systems against malware 
deployed by APTs. It presents the idea that it is not necessary to eradicate malware
from the operating system; the minimum that is needed is to disrupt the mechanism 
of action (Lynch, 1972), i.e. operation, of the malware. The thesis also presents the 
idea of increasing the business costs of the attackers. APTs impose negative 
externalities on APTs. 
The world is increasingly interconnected, one that is supported by computers. 
Many previous actions that involved face-to-face contact e.g. banking, can now be 
performed remotely, online, by the customer and with that has followed cyber-crime
exploiting the gaps in the new technology and associated business practices. This 
thesis will assert that, although the fundamental problem is one of poor Quality 
Control (QC) in the development and deployment of hardware and software by the 
IT industry, APTs are still able to construct and install malware onto computers 
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remotely even when defenders use industry standard techniques such as risk registers 
built on Personal, Policy, Physical and Technical (P3T) measures. 
Cyber Security affects the business bottom line: it is a cost but the cost of lost 
data or Intellectual Property could be higher. This thesis asserts that the cost of cyber 
security should not be greater that the value of the assets it is protecting. 
Additionally, one cannot prove that a given computer is malware free and no 
evidence of malware does not mean there is no malware.  In some ways a cyber 
security success can be a failure in that the success is finding malware but the failure 
is that malware has been found on the computer. The thesis starts with the 
assumption that malware is on the computer, so what can be done to treat it? The
approach is supported by software which may be used to help increase the future 
business cost of the APT beyond the point where it is cost-effective for them to 
continue attacking a given company or machine.
1.2 How the Thesis was Approached
Companies that provide cyber security advice and guidance openly publish 
on their internet web sites white papers discussing their work. The start for the thesis 
, selecting results from these companies. The 
search returned links to white papers, APT names, designators, with alternatives and 
further useful search terms which informed the next round of searches for an 
iterative approach until there were perceived diminishing returns. Similarly, 
academic papers are published on the subject and the search was repeated for several 
journals and academic websites. Later research was needed to support software 
development for proposed solutions.
In this thesis gaps in knowledge were identified through inference, 
implication, interpolation and extrapolation. The thesis was based on informed 
assumptions, leading to hypotheses that were tested by the software developed.
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1.3 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to identify novel approaches to counter APTs, and 
their malware, and construct implementable methods of protection against them 
while increasing the business costs of the attackers. This research will produce real-
time software to protect users, systems and information from APTs and other attacks 
by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of current APT approaches. It also 
identifies novel approaches to counter APTs as well to design and test a new, 
implementable approach which is APT independent.
This research objectives are to:
discover where APTs lie on windows-based systems;
create/build generic views of where APTs lie on Windows based 
systems using an appropriate Cyber Kill Chain (CKC);
treat APTs on Windows based IT systems in such a way that the 
malware is negated;
increase the cost of doing business for APTs, for example by 




The scope of this thesis is for malware on the Windows family of Operating 
System on the platters of a Hard Disc Drive (HDD) contextualised within the 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (LMKC). Microcode on the HDD controller is 
out of scope.
Furthermore, the scope of this thesis does not include the LMKC stage 
Reconnaissance as at this point there is no APT deployed malware on the HDD, but 
-
checking for example IP addresses and ports in conjunction with the port scanner 
written for this thesis.
1.5 Why Study a Windows PC based IT System?
Malware on computers costs users in lost time and money. Such malware 
may be deployed by what the IT industry calls Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), 
There are several operating systems for computers; one of the most popular is 
Windows which uses the proprietary file system NTFS (New Technology File 
System) (Microsoft, 2019a).
Windows is a family of computer operating systems produced by the 
Microsoft corporation in the US with a lineage back to 1985. Microsoft started in 
1975, shipping their first operating system, MS-DOS, in 1981 (Microsoft, 2015).
Market analysis (Appendix A) shows that, in January 2017, the various version of 
Windows had, in total, approximately 90.58% of the market share for desktop 
systems. In September 2019 the Windows share had declined to 86.38%.
It was observed in 2018 that eight of the top ten vulnerabilities which were 
exploited via phishing attacks, exploit kits or RATs (Remote Access Tools) targeted 
Microsoft products one more than in 2017 and that Adobe Flash had only one 
vulnerability on the top ten. This is a change from 2015 and 2016 when Adobe had 
the majority of the top ten places (Kuczma, 2019, p. 1). Again, in 2019, eight of the 
top ten vulnerabilities were for Microsoft products (Kuczma and Manalo, 2020, p. 
2).
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Although this thesis concentrates on secondary storage (HDD), the transition 
from larger devices (PCs, laptops etc.) to mobile devices for work and entertainment 
(Lion  Gu, 2014, p. 2) is acknowledged and supported elsewhere: In May 2016 the 
market share for different hardware was: Desktop/Laptop 70.3%; Mobile 24.42%; 
Tablet, 5.26%; Other - 0.02%. By September 2019 the market share for different 
hardware was: Desktop PCs/Laptop 41.84%; Mobile - 53.79%; Tablet, 4.37%; Other 
- 0.00% and this has been steady for at least a year (Netmarketshare, 2019b), now
spreadsheets, simply because it is easier to manipulate such data on these desktop 
PCs or laptops than on a mobile phone. It is for this reason that that laptops and 
desktop PCs is the primary hardware for such work. It is noted that the Windows 
share of the Top 500 registered fastest supercomputers in the world is now zero 
(Top500, 2019a). Finally, this author has more experience on Windows based 
systems. It is therefore a good fit.
1.6 What is New About This Piece of Research
This research has been developed from ideas that the author has had as an IT 
Security professional, using real-life observations of the subject as well as an 
M.Sc. dissertation (Bentley, 2008) and reading for 
Continuing Professional Development (CPD) purposes. The Aims and Objectives, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, were developed from these observations.
For the first two Aims and Objectives, there seemed to be no literature, 
academic or otherwise, looking at the subject of APT threats holistically using a file-
based approach while understanding the generic problem of mechanisms of action. 
Academic and white paper seemed to be concerned with particular issues of 
particular malware families and particular APTs. Interesting though they are, they 
seemed to be nothing linking them together, drawing wider conclusion and then 
extending that within the Windows and other operating systems. This apparent lack 
of linkage extended to advice provided by the IT Security industry. This is the third 
point of the Aims and Objectives.
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This seemingly lack of holistic view extended to CKCs and how malware was 
aligned to the CKC concept.
Finally, for the fourth Aim and Objective, there seemed to no consideration of 
how APTs were organised and resourced. They are, after all, a business just like any 
other (either a one-person unit or a fully resourced team) and viewing them in this 
way sheds light on how their knavish tricks may be thwarted.
1.7 Structure
The thesis is divided into nine chapters:
Chapter 1, this chapter, provides an overview for the thesis presenting the 
reasons for the thesis, aims and objective, scope and structure. It reviews the aims and 
objectives to reflect and identify what will be new about this piece of research.
Chapter 2 is the academic literature review and academic justification for the 
thesis. It discusses the investigative process for the thesis, the philosophical aspects of 
the research and contextualises the intellectual framework common for the research 
aims and the choice, design and implementation of the research method. For the 
academic justification it includes the literature choice and boundaries. It also includes 
the hypotheses that are in other chapters. All of this is then linked to the objectives
There is a discussion of the legal issues, including consent, and a view of the security 
actioned in support of the thesis.
Chapter 3 identies gaps in the knowledge. It concludes with that idea that 
cyber security issues are fundamentally ones of poor Quality Control (QC)
(25010:2011, 2011). It is a scene setting chapter which discusses how a HDD works 
and the aspects of the Windows operating relevant to the research for example: the 
Master Boot record (MBR), Master File Table (MFT) and Registry. 
Chapter 4 opens with the historical context followed by a discussion of the
international (United-Nations, 2018) and UK national (CPNI, 2018) provenance of 
the legitimacy of cyber defence. This is followed by a view of the size of the 
problem and cost to users. The motivation of APTs is discussed prior to a review of 
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Cyber Kill Chains (CKCs) and the reasons for selecting the Lockheed Martin Kill 
Chain (LMKC.)
Chapter 5 reviews academic literature on the subject and blends it with some
white papers published by cyber security companies, aligning the derived knowledge
with the LMKC.
Chapter 6 presents the main review of white papers aligned with the LMKC. 
The chapter briefly discusses stage 1 of the 7-stage LMKC before focusing on stage 
2-7. The stage 1 discussion is brief as no malware has yet been delivered and hence
is not on the HDD. It concludes with a review of APT errors.
Chapter 7 starts with a discussion of APT business organisation, their 
business costs and how these may be increased by the defender. The chapter 
continues with a distillation of the information uncovered into a manageable form 
and present a structure for the software suite developed to treat malware on the 
machine. It re-
how the malware is actioned and uses the concepts of the Windows operating 
system previously described to contextualise the malware and its actions. It is the 
analysis based on the literature reviews and discusses the research and the 
implementable methods of protection against APTs and APT disruption.
Chapter 8 presents the software developed in support of the analysis. It also 
introduces the concept of benware software which acts as malware but is benign.
Chapter 9 presents the results of analysis derived from the application of the 
software written. It presents a hitherto publicly unknown, mechanism of action in 
support of the Windows Registry which could be used to action malware. It then 
discusses another unknown attribute, this time on the length of Windows executable 
files. This is followed by a philosophical presentation of an approach to cyber 
security which frames the software developed in support of the thesis.
The chapter demonstrates that, on every one of a variety of Hard Disk Drives 
(HDDs) analysed an indicator of possible malware were found. It also applies the 
software developed to a known corpus of malware and presents the results.
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Chapter 10 is the conclusion containing a critical review of the thesis and a
discussion of the future including possible lines of research.
Throughout this thesis the term Hard Disk Drive will be abbreviated to HDD. 
Compact Disc and Digital Versatile Disc will be referred to as CD and DVD 
respectively. Also, although a misnomer, the term hacking (IETF, 1993) will be used 
for those who develop or place malware on a computer for which they are not 
A Glossary is provided before Chapter 1.
9
2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH FOR THE THESIS
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a discussion of the steps taken in the investigative process. 
It includes academic justification (literature choice and boundaries) and includes the 
hypotheses that are in other chapters. These are then linked to the objectives.
The chapter contextualises the choice, possible design and implementation of 
research method(s) in relation to the author's research. It draws on relevant reading 
and reflects critically the author's role as a researcher. It also discusses personal 
security for the thesis and security for the internet searches in support of the thesis. It 
is an chapter that lays the groundwork for the rest of the thesis.
The chapter discusses epistemologically: how we know what we know and 
how we know our knowledge is complete; dealing with the data; interpreting the 
data; modelling and presenting the Kill Chain world; legal issues including obtaining 
consent; the issue of hero culture within the IT industry; and the model for the thesis. 
This is followed by a discussion of the philosophy of the thesis, modelling, legal 
issues, concluding with a model for the thesis. This supports the first two Aims and 
Objectives of thesis
Overall the chapter contextualises the intellectual framework common for the 
research aims and contextualises them in relation to key paradigms and theoretical 
perspectives employed within the area of study as well as providing an orientation 
within that study. It also discusses the rationale for choosing Windows and the 
possibility of bias based on Anti-virus companies' research, business and cultural 
agendas, conscious or otherwise. There is a dearth of literature on a file-based view 
of an operating system. The support Aims and Objectives three and four.
2.2 Background
To help mitigate hacking there has been a growth in the IT Security as a 
subset of the IT industry. This subset includes IT Security or Anti-virus (AV) 
companies helping to counter APTs and their malware. These AV companies 
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produce white papers, which discuss the work of APTs. It is mainly from these 
papers, as well as academic research, that this literature review is based.
Analysing the strengths and weaknesses of current APT
approaches;
Identifying novel approaches to counter APTs;
Designing and testing a new, implementable approach which
is independent of APT;
The fundamental purpose of the thesis is as described by Prof Sir Peter 
Ratcliffe:
We make knowledge, that's what I do as a publicly funded scientist. That 
knowledge has only one quality that is definable really, it's good knowledge, it's true, 
it's correct. It is important that scientists have the courage and are allowed to derive 
knowledge for its own sake, independent of the perceived value at the point of 
(ABC, 2019a)
2.3 Securing and Protecting the Research Environment
This author is agnostic towards the origin and motives of APTs which is a 
point re-enforced by Forcepoint (Forcepoint-Security_Labs, 2016, p. 8) who strongly 
advise against getting distracted chasing attribution and that resources are better 
spent on prevention and remediation.
However, APTs may not reciprocate this view and so a reasonable amount of 
security should be built in to the research. Guererro-Saade (Guerrero-Saade, 2016)
11
anti-virus company viewpoint. There is no evidence in Guererro- paper to 
back up what can be inferred with respect to threats against researchers and a cited 
forthcoming paper does not appear to be available. 
Guererro-Saade does make a valid point about verification of the work of IT 
Security researchers however. This thesis verifies some elements of that work: by 
reviewing a large number of white paper and academic papers it is possible to build a 
view of APTs, across AV companies, noting agreements and contradictions.
A research topic of this type could draw unwanted attention to the university
and the student and an APT
network. In protecting my research the security environment needed to be protected. 
The intent was to try to draw as little attention to the University of Gloucestershire as 
possible. The Head of IT for the University met with the student to discuss the 
research proposal, and possible threats. There was agreement that for foreign 
language searches the university would issue a laptop to which would be used 
geographically distant from the university.
On the other hand, repeated searches to company websites using more 
advanced and focused search techniques may give the impression of a form of 
(Bort, 2015) using advanced search techniques to gather 
attention this research.
Some AV companies require registration details for some reports. In order to 
remain relatively anonymous, it was decided not to register for any reports. A lot of 
the reports that required registration were repeated on different sites.
Interestingly, more than one pdf report from more than one AV company had 
a modification date and time the same as the date and time, to the minute, that it was 
downloaded by this author. Another company had a modification date of the pdf 
before the creation date. When starting the literature write-up and comparing 
metadata,
modification date (Wyke, 2012b).
12
procedures, backups to personal offline storage was frequently performed during 
thesis and software development with backups being done on two separate USB 
memory sticks that were only ever used on university machines. The date and time 
of each backup, along with which memory was being used, was recorded. Complete 
loss of research data would no longer support any of the Aims and Objectives.
Technical security was achieved by using firewalls, AV software, Icognito or 
InPrivate browsing. Many tracking websites (Al-Fannah, Li and Mitchell, 2018)
were also blocked. 
attackers would be put to a great deal of work. i.e. increasing the cost of their 
business which is one of the research objectives.
Every website which potentially contained white papers was checked with 
websites that some websites blocked this researcher. A web search checked further 
details of the website. In some cases, the use of Google Maps facilitated the checking 
by the university facilitated checks of non-English language websites. However, in 
some cases the registrations of some websites were hidden behind privacy 
registration providers. 
having a link to a foreign white paper. Initial checks indicted no problems but as the 
address. A further check with Google 
maps returned a blurred out image what was possibly the house at the correct 
and fax contact numbers were all 9s. Google maps had a medium sized building with 
premises. One website registrant had a mailing address in a commercial mail centre. 




It is clear that a number of fake registrations were uncovered as well as 
possible illegal activity.
-Fi that was for public use. These searches 
and subsequent downloading of relevant information were from companies where it 
was judged that UK academic interest may raise warning flags.
Some mistakes were made by this researcher but it is thought that in general 
good IT Security practices were upheld.
2.4 The Thesis Structure
This thesis is built on the Opening Out Model selected from one of 
(Dunleavy, 2003, pp. 51-61). This provides a wide amount 
of room to discuss, develop and present original research. At thesis inception the 
literature review was expected to be large but this author had a good idea of the 
direction of travel. This has come from working in the IT industry and continuous 
professional development including reading academic and white papers. This is not 
to say that this knowledge is complete; there was no intention to put the cart before 
the horse and this thesis is evidence driven.
Dunleavy (Dunleavy, 2003, pp. 51-61) suggests splitting an 80,000-word 
thesis into 8, roughly equal, 10,000 word chapters: the first two being Lead-in
materials; the next five core subject; and the last being Lead-out materials. Dunleavy 
also suggests having a Research Methods Appendix. Dunleavy goes to say that a 
see this original work in the thesis as soon as reasonably possible. A discussion on 
Research Methods is a discussion on a supporting function. The examiners need to 
see evidence that there has been rigour to the research, and that the research has not 
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been random (q.v. Hume Section 2.8), but they do not need to wade through 20,000 
Although not a social scientific thesis it considers Harrington who concludes 
that:
Harington inherently states that there are limits to the extent of studying 
society scientifically. It is possible to study people (or society) in s statistical manner 
but not to apply results as self-evident truths.
Hammersley & Atkinson suggest that there are at least two textual approaches: 
thematic and chronological (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2009, p. 194). As is
demonstrated this thesis follows the LMKC which will follow both approaches. APT 
attacks must follow a path of cause and effect which this thesis will describe as 
followed by laying down of the malware. This must be done chronologically one 
cannot deliver the malware, manually or automatically, before scoping the system on 
which it is to work. Even automatically delivered malware (speculative or opportunist 
attacks) will not run if there is not software compatibility and with that compatibility is 
an inherent scoping. A CKC follows a logical chronological progression. However, 
within the chronological deployment of malware there may be themes to explore e.g. 









Figure 2-1: Textual Approach Representation
Layder (Layder, 1998, pp. 100-127) states that theorizing involves the ability 
to ask questions and come up with answers; think analytically and conceptually; and 
the ability to move from the concrete and particular to more general and abstract 
concerns and ideas. These concepts and background concepts allow this author to
documentation that conceptual and general themes for the thesis are developed. 
These themes also give rise other ideas developed for this thesis which are explored
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e.g. Attributes by Design; Attributes by Discovery and Mechanisms of Action. This
supports the first Aim and Objective of the thesis.
2.5 The Model for the Thesis
In support of the first Aim and Objective openly available literature is
reviewed and the thesis is guided using the Lockheed Martin APT Kill Chain. The 
research uses Mixed Method Approaches of Quantitative Methods, Qualitative 
Methods and Discipline Driven (cyber industry) Methods. Given that academic 
papers and white papers are both used as an evidential base there also are Concurrent 
Quantitative Methods (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p. 170)
It will be asserted in the next section, that malware exploits poor IT (QC) and 
the research will assume that malware has exploited this poor QC and is on the 
system.  AV vendors produce freely available non-proprietary information on APTs 
in the form of white papers, blogs etc. From this information it is possible to 
construct a view of APT families and pan-APT commonalities. The ethical hacking 
community produces similar information. In addition, academic papers provide proof 
of concept attacks and observations, some of which may become used by malware 
writers.
Gaps in, and extensions to, the public knowledge may be filled through 
inference, implication, interpolation and extrapolation. This supporst the second Aim 
and Objective.
The author's professional model is remarkably similar to the 36-Cell Sherwood 
Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) Matrix (Sherwood, Clark and 
Lynas, 2005) except the author has three conceptual layers (Strategic, Tactical, 
Implementation as well as six practical considerations for each layer: what, who, 
where, when, why, and how; with personal actions in the cells rather than business 
functions.
As stated, the initial reading is from academic papers and AV companies' 
white papers and. The former is, obviously, material from academia; the latter
describes what has been observed, perhaps leaving out some details for their own IP 
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reasons. The analysis leading to the latter may even miss salient points. What the 
writer meant and what the reader reads may, in some cases, lead to an incorrect view 
as to what really happened. The problem for inference, implication, interpolation and 
extrapolation is that this author will have to make intelligent assumptions, even 
guesses, leading to hypotheses, as to what may be in the gaps and then test these 
hypotheses. Iser in Lodge and Wood understands this phenomenological approach 
(Lodge, 2000). Although written for fiction, Iser points out that the two poles 
(artistic and aesthetic) are linked by what was meant by the author and what was 
realised by the reader and that there are gaps for the reader to fill in.
2.6 A Question of Poor Quality Control?
This thesis infers that there is an acknowledgement at the international level 
of a lack of good software QC as evidenced by the International Standards 
Organization (25010:2011, 2011). QC also suggests system design and code audit. 
This thesis suggests that if there were good IT QC then such a standard might not be 
needed. With simple systems QC may not be required but the complexity and 
interconnectedness of computer systems has produced poor outcomes. The advent of 
the internet as a business tool has seen the development of a world wide web of 
interconnected computers supported by associated software but with this there are 
inherent problems, most of which relate to design and implementation of software. 
This thesis asserts that the technical and business design of a computer system to 
support a business should be that which is necessary and sufficient to perform the 
business function it is required to do but, in many cases is not. As shall be 
demonstrated in this thesis, hacking exploits this poor hardware and software 
architectural design and subsequent implementation, as well as manipulating 
business practices. 
To help mitigate hacking there has been a growth in the IT or Cyber Security 
as a subset of the IT industry. This subset includes Anti-virus (AV) companies 
helping to counter APTs. These AV companies produce white papers, which discuss 
(J. N. Stewart, 2014). TTP is a 
modus operandi. It is mainly from these papers, as well as academic research, that 
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this literature review is based. White papers are explored in more detail later in 
Chapters Three to Six.
Such lack of QC is highlighted by Little who quotes Perrow:
In his book, , Charles Perrow described numerous failures 
of tightly coupled, complex systems.* In the search for speed, volume, efficiency, 
and the ability to operate in hostile environments, he maintains, 
(
). A particularly troubling characteristic of these tightly coupled, complex 
systems is that they predictably fail but in unpredictable ways. Similar chains of 
events do not always produce the same phenomena, but system-
*These occur where the systems involved are sufficiently complex to allow 
unexpected interactions of failures to occur such that safety systems are defeated, 
and sufficiently tightly coupled to allow a cascade of increasingly serious failures 
ending in disaster.
(Little, 2002)
This thesis asserts that it is this neglect of reliability and security that have allowed 
APTs to flourish and which will not be fully resolved (which is consistent with no 
development has been passed. (Perez, 2002, p. 74).
 
who p -driving cars will learn 
over time: 
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software for their entire careers: let the customer find out the problems and then 
charge them for the fixes. It is not a proper mentality of someone who is building 
(NPR, 2018)
This also supports the QC argument and SANS (SANS, 2011), with their list of the 
Top 25 programming errors. For there to be a Top 25 the same errors must be being 
repeated in different systems by different designers and implementers programmers).
2.7 Ontological Discussion
(Cornford, 
1945): Prisoners in a cave see shadows on the cave wall of events in the real world 
shadows (there is no artefact providing proof of a previous existence), APTs may 
. These artefacts are elements which
APTs need, or needed, to progress their attack and which are the outcomes of poor 
QC something from which APTs are not immune. In IT Security the 
shadows are manifestations or artefacts of actions of APTs, part of which are made 
by malware developers and deployers. Some artefacts may be pieces of software left 
over from a completed attack but not completely erased. Again, a QC issue.
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In looking for malware on a piece of IT equipment one is searching for 
causality. It is easy to see patterns in data when none exists. Indeed, malware may be 
designed to be hidden or obscured; to blend into the operating system and associated 
software.
Hume argues that there are three conditions for causal inference: contiguity, 
succession; and necessary connexion (sic) (Hume, MDCCXXXIX). This is 
elaborated on by Teddlie et al as:
Physical contiguity between the presumed cause and effect;
Temporal precedence (the cause has to preceded the effect in 
time);
Constant conjunction such that the cause has to be present when 
the effect if obtained;
"Ockham proposed a rule of logic which has come to be called "Ockham's 
Razor." He stated it variously: "Plurality is not to be posited without necessity" 
Or "What can be explained by the 
assumption of fewer things is vainly explained by the assumption of more things" 
"Where we have no reason to do otherwise and where two theories account for the 
same facts, we should prefer the one which is briefer, which makes assumptions with 




A model may thus be constructed. A generalisation from repetitive 
observations may be constructed but suggesting, as Popper does (Popper, 1968, pp. 
249-250), that just because something has always happened it does not mean it 
always will. With malware, certain actions or outcomes may be observed but there is 
a chance that the APT operators have chosen to not yet attack using a different 
combination of inputs which would give rise to other outputs. Therefore, existence of 
the same malware may not always mean the same outcome. Additionally, operating 
systems change over time and the vulnerabilities that were once present may not 
later be. New vulnerabilities may also come to light.
2.8 Research Orientation
The research orientation is not phenomenological. The author of this thesis 
has a mathematical background and considers himself a positivist. However, there is 
a danger of applying the science to people and Comte warns against an overly 
mathematical approach in Simpson:
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Crotty is just plain wrong: it is an almighty contribution to human knowledge 
full of factual content. These are fundamental statements in a branch of Mathematics 
called Logic. Logic is the basis for Boolean Algebra which itself is part of the subset 
of Number The
Without any of this computer would not work and more importantly would not be 
proven to work. As computers are ubiquitous in modern society, modern society 
would unravel very quickly. One does equal one and one plus one does equal two. 
Fact.
2.9 Problem Approach
As a natural scientist, this author has an epistemological position of a logical 
positivist that will support ontological claims. The thesis will not be solely based on 
academic and white papers - it is a consilience thesis. This supports the second Aim 
and Objective.
This approach aligns with the assertion of Popper who discusses the use of 
deductive reasoning to create hypothesis which may then be tested (Popper, 1968, 
pp. 27-34). This thesis will also be based on inductive and deductive reasoning to 
search for individual pieces of malware.
However, there may be a Problem of Demarcation as described by Popper:
n reason for rejecting inductive logic is that 
of the empirical, non-metaphysical, character of a 
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theoretical system; or in other words that 
(Popper, 1968, p. 34).
Popper goes on to discuss falsifiability criteria (Popper, 1968, pp. 86 - 91). A 
theory is falsifiable if it divides the class of basic statement into two: those 
statements which are potential falsifiers of the theory and those which do not 
contradict (or permit) the theory. Falsification of the theory occurs when basic 
statements that contradict the theory are accepted. This helps us scope the problem.
The Problem of Demarcation for this thesis is solved thus: The theoretical 
system is bounded by the physical system and the users of that system. The physical 
universe (Demarcation limit) of our work is platters of the HDD. Any malware must 
be located, and locatable, on the HDD and only on the HDD. Malware may manifest 
renaming with another suffix (Clearsky, 2015, p. 15) or it may be hidden from the 
user by use of the Windows Hidden files option (Microsoft, 2017aj). Inductive logic 
is used as, although malware may be present, not all types and variations of malware 
may be present. There may even be cases where no malware is located because no 
malware is present. Deductive logic is used to follow chains of event and 
mechanisms of action.
The physical system is initially demarcated by technology. The selection of 
HDDs as the physical medium is deliberate. Computers may have HDDs or a solid-
state disk drive (SSD) as secondary storage. As shall be shown later in the thesis, a 
SSD presents itself to the Windows OS as a HDD and Windows acts in the same 
manner for both HDDs and SSDs but SSDs automatically delete data whereas HDDs 
do not when a user deletes data the area it uses is simply marked as free by the 
operating system. However, the market for such secondary storage devices is 
changing. Based on shipments data, in 2021 the number of SSDs (360 million) will 
exceed the number of HDDs (330 million) (statista, 2019c).This differs from 2015 
where the number of SSDs shipped was less than a quarter of the number of HDDs 
shipped (470 million viz 105 million). This data tallies well, where it overlaps, with 
the HDD quarterly shipment data (statista, 2019a).
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Demarcation also extends to the use of the data on a computer. A computer 
system and the information it contains should only be available to the legitimate 
users, for agreed business reasons, in a timely manner. Not all parts of the systems 
and contained information should be available to all users of the business. An 
organi
organisation (ISO, 2013). This thesis asserts that malware writers and deployers are 
not legitimate users but they fall within the demarcation lines of this thesis. This
supports all four Aims and Objectives.
A Cyber Security professional legitimately installing software on a system to 
investigate a possible intrusion is a legitimate user. Therefore, any analysis software 
is within the demarcation limit.
The intent of the thesis is to stop all non-legitimate users, and software from 
running, from using the system under investigation. This thesis does not claim 100% 
eradication of malware but proposes that the ideas developed provide a framework to 
increase the business costs of the malware writers and deployers (collectively APTs), 
to a point where it is prohibitively expensive for the APTs to continue. Should these 
costs outweigh the APTs perceived gains then the APTs may cease the attack and 
move to a potential victim where their gains outweigh their costs. 
This thesis deliberately includes multiple references to support the evidence. 
Independent evidence for the same assertion provides greater support to that 
-key, multiple references 
are included to demonstrate how many APTs use that particular element of the 
Windows operating system to support their attack.
Many subsections start with direct quotes from Microsoft documentation. 
This is to allow the reader, who may not have complete knowledge of that subject, to 
gain an understanding.
Ellerton (ABC, 2019c) suggests that critical thinking is not analytic thinking; 
it is not just sophisticated or difficult thinking; it more than that. It is not just being 
intelligent to whatever extent that means. It is about metacognitive aware of some 
aspects of our own thinking and there some intentionality behind that and can 
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understand how one arrives at certain decision and are aware of the inferential chains 
or pathways that have been followed to come to the decisions. The second aspect is 
evaluative to make our thinking an object of study. Was that the best way to go? 
Am I thinking in a way to get the best answer regularly? Nature of argumentation. 
What make for a good argument? The needs to apply a set of values e.g. accuracy, 
precision, clarity, significance, relevance, simplicity, reproducibility, coherence 
Fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 321-322). The attribute of simplicity has already been 
considered earlier prior to thesis development in the form of Ockham
Ellerton also asserts that people think that one thing is more important than truth and 
that is coherence. If their world view is coherent - they have theories about how and 
why people act in the way they do and that is consistent with the way that they 
interpret the world - then that feels true. People mistake a sense of coherence for 
truth.
In a broadly similar way, Murdoch, who almost certainly predates Ellerton, 
asserts that 
rality by the idea of truth. 
we (visual metaphor) different things, not just in general but down to the last 
(Murdoch, 1992, p. 474).
Although Murdoch is more concerned with morals, the idea of people having 
different views of the world, it is the link with truth that is of concern to this thesis. 
view of the world which the shadows create and having a coherence even though this 
may not be a truth.
Derrida, as summarised by Newheiser (ABC, 2019b), says that there is an 
abyss of meaning; people complain that post-modernism leaves us in the abyss: 
uncertainly is destabilising on an emotional, effective, level and so people often want 
to assert a certainty that they do not possess in order to make life seem more liveable 
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that acknowledges that the abyss is there and that people do not possess certainty but 
it does overlap with Ellerton and the concept of coherence and truth: coherence for 
truth; assertation of a certainty as a truth.
Postmodernism may offer the concept that there is no reliable knowledge but 
this inherently rejects the concept of scientific, and therefore provable, knowledge. 
This falls into the same trap as Crotty whose ideas are discussed earlier in this 
chapter.
It is the intent of this thesis to reconcile the above set of values with the truth 
y with the truth.
Anti-malware techniques lean on the concept of Indicators of Compromise. 
These are unique indicators which are a form of inculpatory evidence i.e. they point 
to there being malware but may not, in themselves, uniquely identify malware. They 
point to a truth.
This thesis is agnostic towards the origin and intent of APTs. A research 
topic of this nature could draw unwanted attention to the student and the university 
The 
intent is to try to draw as little attention to the University of Gloucestershire for as 
long as possible. In order to mitigate any threat a meeting was held with the Head of 
IT for the University to discuss the research proposal, and possible threats. It was 
agreed that, for foreign language searches, a laptop would be issued which would be 
used away from the university.
This is a sensible approach as some internet users try to give the impression 
that they are based in another country, to either provide themselves with cachet or 
obfuscate their true origins. For example, the Financial Times states that a Turkish 
start-up based in Istanbul has offices registered in US and other offices outside of 
US. This is because there is a cachet by having a registered office in Silicon Valley 
or in this case San Francisco (Financial-Times, 2017b).
27
In order to support the thesis, multiple downloads from individual sites were 
to be needed and may attract attention. The hope was to be unobtrusive simply by 
being a reader of documents. Initially, there was a desire to perform non-English 
language searches but the scope had to be restricted (the clean university laptop was 
still needed). Such an action may also have drawn attention to the work and the 
university; and gatekeepers, IT passive or otherwise, would have to have been 
employed. In dealing with this the views of the university's IT Security department 
were sought. A lab development machine was sought, and obtained, on which 
downloaded software could run. In addition, a personal development machine was 
used. No software was downloaded nor run, on an openly used, university library 
based, machine
on all available English language thesis repositories (University-of-Gloucestershire, 
2018). Fortunately only one thesis of relevance was found and this was from the 
Athens University of Economics and Business, in English  -
2015). Although it followed a similar research path to this thesis the software 
outcomes were completely different those of this thesis.
The hope is that, after the end of the research process and following 
publication of the PhD, there may be a tertiary elaboration, co-opting the general 
theory and that this researcher or others will take it forward either in an academic or 
a business context.
The research started from the zero-base described above with an internet 
such information. The names of these websites were collected and then for each site 
searches were performed looking for .pdf files which contained the words or string 
thought to be .pdf). This information was stored in folders for the respective 
websites. These white papers yielded references to more white papers and websites 
which were collected and collated as well as names of APT campaigns and types of 
attacks which in turn were searched for. This provided an iterative method: as more 
websites were found, more APT campaigns names were found etc. Approximately 
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formal sources of information. Over 1100 white papers were downloaded from over 
rsity account in company 
specific folders. Using the Pareto principle to analyse the white papers from AV 
firms, the Concentration Ratio for the top 10 company white paper downloads 
account for just over 53% of the white papers while the top 20 account for just under 
70% of the same.
(McNamee, 2005)
The need to review literature is to gain a view of what is already, or not 
already, known is appreciated in this thesis (and needed for this thesis) but 
fragmentation of the research meant that was testing of parts of an emerging 
hypothesis in parallel with the literature review.
It is recognised that bias and confirmation bias may be a problem: the white 
paper analysis was started with the company with the highest number of white paper 
downloads. This may anchor the analysis in a company specific view. Other 
approaches which could have been used include: build up a view from companies 
with fewer downloaded articles; review articles in a random order; start with the 
most recently published white paper and work chronologically in reverse; or start 
with oldest first. No reason could be argued for one over the other so descending 
white paper count by company was used.
As previously discussed, different AV companies work on the same sets of 
conformation bias in the analysis: it reports the same attack more than once. It is 
unclear if different AV company white papers are reporting the same attacker and/or 
event or the reports are of different attackers and/or events.
29
is that:
Consistent with some other recent vendor reports, we found that 70 to 90% 
(depending on the source and organization) of malware samples are unique to a 
single organization.
(Verizon, 2015, p. 22).
-malware is 
not sufficient 
The question of bias is discussed in Yeadon who quotes Hay discussing long 
jump athletes:
(Yeadon, 2005)
This is a salutary warning against reading too much into a specific AV 
information provided in white papers, while true, may be selective information to 
unintentional company bias promulgated by the culture, direction of research, 
how to 
organise the analysis of white papers to produce evidence that is as unbiased as 
possible. This supports the second Aim and Objective.
For the various reasons given above the thesis may seem over referenced. 
Some references in support of observation noted in the thesis may refer to the same 
APT or even attack.
The author reviewed white papers in sets of five years, starting from the 
present and working backwards. This has the advantage of ensuring that the research 
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is current and it also allows a view on which pieces of malware are being recycled as 
highlighted by Dela Paz (Dela Paz, 2012, p. 1) who notes that the number of targeted 
campaigns continue to increase the techniques some of the attacks have existed for 
several years..
adapting to environments and using change control (Fireeye, 2015a, pp. 5-7) with
prioritisation (Fireeye, 2015a)
Initially there was intent to perform searches not just in English but other 
languages e.g. Russian, Chinese to gain a non-Anglo-Saxon view of APTs. 
However, with the abundance of reports to read written in English it became 
apparent that including non-English language papers, and the associated cost ion 
time of translation, would be too much. One wonders what the Lusophone view of 
APTs might be.
The literature search started from a zero base with an internet search of 
containing such information. A
record was kept of the names of these websites and the number of papers retrieved.
As all of the whitepapers were in .pdf format, the search was modified to look for
.pdf files APT ,
appropriate folder. These primary searches also highlighted additional websites as 
well as names of APT campaigns, which in turn provided starting points for more
searches. This provided an iterative method: the discovery of more websites led to 
more APT campaign names, which led to more websites etc.
In total almost 200 AV company websites were accessed, of which over 130 
had at least one whitepaper referenced in this thesis. Over 1150 whitepapers or 
similar were downloaded and reviewed as were approximately 300 academic papers. 
The number of webpages accessed was not recorded
The majority of results were analytic papers describing various APTs but 
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Another problem is that of knowing what has been done before. As has been 
stated, during the academic research part of the work the author came across another 
thesis which is similar to this one - . The approach is at 
a more macro level and the outcomes (software written) are different but it 
demonstrates how easy it is to do overlapping research.
Once the search was complete and the information reviewed it was decided to 
halt any further reading. However, later in the research it was decided to review 
documents that had been subsequently written. This was done about three-quarters of 
the way through the research and revealed papers which overlapped with the reading 
performed (Lemay , 2018).
A world-wide categorisation of PhD thesis would be helpful but a repository 
of commercial company white papers was found (CyberMonitor, 2019).
Should there be subtle disruption of an APT attack the malware operators 
may not work out what is really going on. As pointed out in Futility Closet (Futility-
Closet, 2017) with the psychology of deception: one cannot get to someone to 
believe something they are not already disposed to believe but can play on their 
hopes and fears to persuade them to believe something they want to believe. 
Deception is a course of action from the Lockheed LMKC. It is not the intent of this 
thesis to antagonise APTs (as previously stated, this thesis is agnostic towards the 
origin and intent of APTs) but simply to treat their operations so that they are not 
successful. They, and their malware, are unwanted visitors.
The University of Gloucestershire has an ethics policy (Univeristy-of-
Gloucestershire, 2019) which was followed. Grix, quoting Punch sums up the main 
areas in which ethical issues arise in research: Harm; Consent; Deception; Privacy;
Confidentiality.(Grix, 2010).
Within this thesis, all of the research reading is from open literature which by 
its nature is freely available and so there is neither harm done nor consent needed.  
Again, as the open literature is freely available, there are no deception, privacy or 
confidentiality issue. Software development to implement ideas produced was on a
University of Gloucestershire owned or a personally owned machine. No interviews 
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were undertaken and the thesis comes from standalone work. There is nothing 
unethical about the treatment of software that has been illegally placed on a 
computer owned by the organisation, or person, by those legitimately performing 
that treatment.
Any issues that could have arisen would have been worked through with 
School.
2.10 Discovery How will we know that we know?
Supporting the second Aim and Objective King and Horrocks (King and 
Horrocks, 2010) discuss epistemology as what we can know and what we might 
want to know. However, knowledge of knowledge, or lack of it, goes beyond this 
and into the concept of known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns, and 
unknown unknown, which is an extension of the Johari window (USC, 2003).
This Johari window view casts doubt on King and Horrocks' assertion that 
Ontology may be classed as Realist or Relativist. This thesis asserts that both exist in 
parallel and cannot be decoupled. The real world does exist (Realist) and in some 
cases may be measured (e.g. temperatures, pressure) but the real world is also 
unstructured and diverse as evidenced by people and other living organisms which 
populate it (Relativist). It is not an ontological binary choice. For example, the 
actions of any one organism may be statistically predictable but interactions within 
the whole make predictions impossible (forecasts less so). In a similar manner 
attributes of, and interactions between, software in an operating system may have 
unknown and undesired consequences. This theme is developed in the section which
The extension of the Johari window means that the epistemological definition 
of what we can know and what we what to know is blunted by not knowing what we 
do not know. In taking into consideration the Jorari window this thesis considers the 
full universe of knowledge. This is later condensed into what is known to the 
Windows operating system and what is not and is a key part to the thesis of malware 
on the HDD.
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There was almost no quantitative data from which to work, being mainly a 
review of published academic and commercial works on malware and APTs. The 
thesis uses these works to explore ideas (some of which have already been generated 
post-
Security that has not yet been explored. There were no interviews as the data will 
come from white papers, academic papers, other open sources, research and 
technical analysis. It could have been possible as the PhD evolved, and the thesis 
became known, that interviews may have been later performed. The research will not 
end with this thesis.
This thesis asserts that extensions to the public knowledge may be filled 
through inference, implication, interpolation and extrapolation. Inherently, 
interpolation and extrapolation make use of implication and inference. Logical 
extension allows a final point to be concluded or argued. Austin describes the 
leading to this point as expositional performatives (Austin, 1975, p. 85). This thesis 
interprets Austin's work to mean that a logical conclusion must be attained from 
supporting evidence. Assumption does not pass Austin's four tests (Does it make 
sense? Could the action be performed without uttering the normative? Could it be 
done deliberately? Could it be literally false?) (Austin, 1975, pp. 83-84) and so this 
thesis must be careful to support every assertion.
This author of this thesis has a scientific background and this is a STEM 
subject thesis so the stance is one of pragmatism within the 5Ps (Paradigms, 
Pragmatism, Praxis, Proficiency, Publishing), as described by Cameron (Cameron, 
2011, pp. 96-108). Discovery is by reading published work of others who may not be 
familiar with the 5Ps. This thesis asserts that researchers and authors do not need to 
be cognisant of epistemological positions and do things "naturally". Recent moves 
from monolithic programmes have led IT projects to the Agile philosophy; this 
means that people are encouraged to fail quickly and move on. This is an extension 
of the idea that one cannot be a successful entrepreneur until one has had commercial 
failures and learned from them. Such pragmatism is applied during the research 
thought not always successfully!
34
A research agenda for what is left to be known as mentioned by Financial 
Times (Financial-Times, 2016) could be drawn up. In personal investment, some 
(Frydman and Camerer, 2016, pp. 
661-675). This author has no problems in imagining a Future Self with possession of 
a PhD, perhaps leading a start-up company which has been incubated locally or a 
transition into academia.
McHoul in Balnaves and Caputi discusses first and second order 
interpretations of data. Natural scientists deal with first order data (atoms, planets, 
cyclones) whereas people (objects of knowledge have already interpreted the data 
before the social scientist arrives (Balnaves, 2001, p. 5). This is a valid point; with 
interviews, people are generally offering subjective data whereas scientific 
measurement of natural events is generally objective. The analysis of data in this 
thesis will, in the first instance, be people's interpretations of APT attack outcomes 
but, as has been discussed earlier, may have biases and information tautologies. The 
data which has been analysed is largely scientific but the researchers' analysis may 
also include personal bias and personal interpretation.
It is sad to see this first chapter of Balnaves and Caputi apologetically 
defending statistical analysis, even when published statistics was mature; it is even 
more so now with the arrival of the fashionable name "Big Data" (HMG, 2014).
This thesis deals with few, if any, quantitative data but the quantitative data 
that has been analysed will, as has been discussed, have already been interpreted in 
some manner. Research is not binary. This thesis will also be dealing with gaps in 
the data: some AV companies may see a part of the picture; they may also wish to 
withhold some information for business reasons. This thesis will interpolate and 
extrapolate from published information as well as try to fit together the pictures 
interpreted from different AV companies.
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2.11 The Personal Position
Supporting the first Aim and Objective Hart discusses literature searches and 
personal transferable skills (Hart, 2001, pp. 2-21). This author has successfully 
developed in these degrees plus a background in IT means that a transition to a PhD 
may not be as formidable as it might otherwise be. However, it is clear from Hart 
that the fountain of knowledge repositories is wide, deep and broad. The thesis will 
depend on a lot of research.
Once found, Hart suggests subdividing the literature into categories: 
Rationale; Research design; Findings; Discussion; Conclusions; Recommendations. 
This thesis is aligned to an Intrusion Kill Chain - the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill 
Chain which was been selected from a candidate group of Kill Chain. The list, 
below, are the seven stages of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain; information 
in parenthesis are practical applications of malware:
Reconnaissance (strategy; infrastructure);
Weaponization (development, testing, maintenance, DNS 
registration);
Delivery (delivery mechanisms);
Exploitation (passwords, encryption, PKC certificates);
Installation (storage on disc, in memory, graphics cards etc.);
Command & Control (communications, system configuration, 
inter and intra attack communications);
Actions on Objectives (thesis inspired software).
Within this the evidence and literature is aligned, as per Hart, to the relevant 
stage of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain.
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Interpreting the Data
McKee (2004) defines textual analysis as:
(McKee, 2003)
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Harford 2016 quotes Ross:
powerful illusion that whenever we meet someone whose views conflict with our 
o is deluded, rather than 
(Harford, 2016)
However, time became the limiter and few searches were performed in any language 
other than English.
2.12 Modelling the World
The author asserts that there are at least as many models of the world as there 
are people (some models may survive their originators). There are many similar 
models that are rooted in similar philosophies and there are conflicting philosophies 
which result in conflicting models. The epistemological position taken is that each 
world model is constructed by the individual based on experience.
Schulz asserts that to be fallible is to be human and that people get stuck in an 
internal state of being right which partly stems from early years where to be wrong 
meant being mocked by peers (and sometimes by pedagogues) (Schulz, 2011).
People are then conditioned to work within our comfort zone. Of course, making 
mistakes that lead to catastrophic outcomes is not acceptable and such outcomes are 
generally not the result of a single bad action but an aggregation of seemingly 
unrelated actions, many of which are sensible and based on the known information 
of the time (HMSO, 1967).
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However, feeling that one is right is a state when the observation fits one's 
internalised model of the world; but the model may be wrong. Being wrong, and 
learning from being wrong, should always lead to a modification the model.
For this author being wrong is not an issue: being wrong means that one has 
tried something outside one's bounds of knowledge or experience or made an 
incorrect assumption or interpretation. 
proportion as in 2013/14. "
(HESA, 2016)
to take a statistically valid sample for any poll regarding UK women academics 
(95% confidence level, 2% confidence interval) the author of any research paper 
must engage with 2,338 female academics as calculated by the Australian National 
Statistics Service (NSS, 2016) and Creative Research Systems (Creative-Research-
Systems, 2016). Reassuringly, both references agree.
In building a hypothesis, this author hypothesised that more time was spent 
being done on the holistic view. This view is supported by Jacoby and Jartelius:
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more time on new exciting vulnerabilities and threats than actually looking into the 
(Jacoby and Jartelius, 2013, p. 11):
The analogy provided by this thesis is that there are many pieces of the jigsaw, 
through reports published by AV companies and freely available, but the jigsaw box 
lid is not available. This is suggested by the second Aim and Objective.
2.13 Presenting to the World
Hammersley and Atkinson discuss Impression Management (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2009). The author has already been doing this at university by 
attending supervisor meetings and modules in a suit, white shirt and no tie. This is a 
brand which conveys position, informality with a hint of the formal and is then 
backed up in conversation with expert knowledge. The absence of a tie is a recent
western statement but the suit sets one apart from the informality of hands-on IT 
professionals. The absence of tie is a hint of rebellion yet the suit allows presentable 
appearance before senior managers. This is the brand that will continue into the field
for research should such action be necessary. Of course, this may backfire and the 
author ends up looking like some bloke trying to be trendy!
2.14 Legal Issues
All analysis is performed on machines and HDDs owned by the University of 
Gloucestershire or the author of this thesis. No testing was done over the internet. 
internet.
Any access to these pieces of hardware is authorised:
The UK Computer Misuse Act (1.b) states that 
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(HMG, 1990)
Any work which had the potential to adversely affect a computer and/or 
forensics machines. Substantial testing was done before any more delicate software 
was run.
As far as possible software was written for this project and the least number 
of executables were imported and run. There are two reasons for this: the first is that 
there is no guarantee that such software does not harvest personal information and 
intellectual property; the second is that such software does not come with levels of 
assurance that it has been written to an acceptable professional standard that has 
been independently verified. For example, in the testing of a pristine USB HDD 
assurance was needed that the new HDD would be viewed as sent from the 
manufacturer. Therefore, software to ensure that USB devices may be used in read 
only mode but it came with no assurance. The author simply used the Microsoft 
command in a batch to add the relevant registry key and associated value to block 
USB devices.
A potential problem with a thesis of the nature of this one is that it becomes a 
successful PhD submission, an electronic copy of the thesis will be placed with the 
British Library (British-Library, 2020) with open access which may inadvertently 
contravene export control regulations:
-use items 
from the UK to another country outside the EU. Most dual use items do not require a 
(HMG, 2019b)
The Windows Device Driver which was produced in support of the fourth Aim and 
Objective writes directly to given sectors of a HDD. This software overwrites data 
which is no longer being used.  However, this may be viewed as jamming software 
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under export control guidance as it could be modified to overwrite areas of the HDD 
(and SSD in other devices) which are being used:
Jamming equipment specially designed or modified to intentionally and selectively 
interfere with, deny, inhibit, degrade or seduce mobile telecommunications services 
and
(EU, 2009, p. L 134/161)
reason, all computer source code reproduced and techniques to run executables will 
not be placed within the thesis for publishing with the British Library and will be 
retained separately.
However, this author believes that aggregating information such as that in 
this thesis, and building on it, to provide mitigations does not contravene export 
control guidance and is, therefore, not a reason for not doing the PhD.
Use of independent software does raise the question with the author about 
how assurance of the software this is viewed in legal circles.
The provenance of informed consent may be traced from the Nuremberg Code 
(Unknown, 1947) into guidance on informed consent is provided by the UK 
(Civil-Service, 
Undated) and also the Social Research Association:
btaining informed consent 
Inquiries involving human subjects should be based as far as practicable on the 
freely given informed consent of subjects. Even if participation is required by law, it 
should still be as informed as possible. In voluntary inquiries, subjects should not be 
under the impression that they are required to participate. They should be aware of 
their entitlement to refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to withdraw data just 
supplied. Information that would be likely to affect a sub
participate should not be deliberately withheld, since this would remove from 
subjects an important means of protecting their own interests.
(Social-Research-Association, 2003)
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Homan discusses the ownership of data and states that:
(Homan, 1991)
This may be problematic if such data, or groups of data, are key to the thesis; 
years of work may be lost due to withdrawal of consent. It is therefore imperative to 
gain consent and custody of data from acquisition to publication.
into a group . There is even an unwritten, inherent, suggestion that 
the group need not know that they are part of a piece of research. This raises ethics 
questions. It also affects Intellectual Property. Should the interviewee not know that 
they are, in effect, being interviewed and they pass on a piece of useful, unique 
information and this is then used in the research there may be Intellectual Property 
ownership issues. It is worse (and unethical) if the interviewer does not attribute the 
information. Whichever path is chosen this author suggests that the interviewer 
There should be no instance where research is being performed and the 
subjects are not informed. thesis, most of the research is
performed after researching open literature. By its nature, open literature is freely 
available and there is an inherent consent behind it. Literature that is not open is, by 
definition, literature that has been withheld and not available to the world. Miller and 
Bell in Mauthner et al discuss what consent means but get a bit bogged down by it 
(Mauthner , 2002). There was a slim chance that this author would need to 
conduct interviews of people who have been affected by malware or who work in the 
AV industry. 
This author always presents himself as a PhD student before any interview or 
guided conversation takes place. The interviewee or group members are always 
aware that they are part of a PhD process. There is interpretivism, realism and 
relativism in these guided conversations.
The author did not need interviewing and listening skills. In previous 
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professional work the author was trained to interview internal and external 
candidates for positions, listen carefully and make judgements against a defined 
scoring system.
Interviewing people for the PhD did not come to pass but should it have 
happened a proforma would have been constructed and will be read out. This 
proforma would have been constructed with the help
In short: people are different; they have different experiences; they have 
different views; they have different interpretations. There are different forces at 
work. Be aware of it.
2.15 The Individual vs The Group in Computing
On the other hand, legislative bodies catch up through international bodies 
such as ASCII, ISO. Even the counter-culture has to communicate: it is no use 
having different computer architectures that cannot communicate.
2.16 Linking to  the Objectives
To recap, this research objectives are to:
discover where APTs lie on windows-based systems;
create/build generic views of where APTs lie on Windows based 
systems using an appropriate Cyber Kill Chain (CKC);
treat APTs on Windows based IT systems in such a way that the 
malware is negated;
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increase the cost of doing business for APTs, for example by 
overwriting unused disc space so APTs cannot place malware 
there.
The scope of the thesis has been defined academically, physically with 
respect to the hardware and conceptually with respect to the APTs software 
deployment. The academic literature with respect to HDDs and malware is explored 
using the academic techniques discussed. The white papers produced by AV 
companies will form the basis of discovery. Form this analysis a view of where 
APTs lie on a Windows based system is developed. These ideas are used to develop
software to increase the business cost of APTs
2.17 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a discussion of the thesis scope and the steps taken in 
the investigative process. It has included academic justification (literature choice and 
boundaries) and includes the hypotheses that are in other chapters. Finally, these were 
then linked to the objectives.
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3 APTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter sets the scene by reviewing existing literature and it supports the 
first Aim and Objective. It commences with a discussion about APT motivation and 
a review of malware surveys. It progresses through software development costs, and 
the difference between a virus and malware. This is followed by a description of how 
an HDD works, the issues relating to HDD storage and where malware may reside 
on an HDD. It then segues to Windows operating systems. This is followed by a 
short discussion of where APTs may get their information to attack victims. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the literature gaps and possible lines of 
research.
3.2 The Problem of Tautology
A problem identified early in the literature review is that which this thesis 
APTs are analysed and the APTs 
actions are written up by different academics and AV vendors over a number of 
years. Different AV companies work on the same APTs, gathering evidence from 
different customers and it is difficult to know if the different AV companies are 
reporting the same attack originators or not. Different APTs use the same or similar 
attack vectors which may appear to the analyst to be the same attack or originator
There are examples of within APT information tautology e.g. (Goncharov, 
2012), (Goncharov, 2014) where the former is the initial write-up and the latter a 
write-up of revisiting the subject. It is difficult to see in the latter if any of the 
emulating each other through the review of publications and data sources. This helps 
to protect their infrastructure, plant false flags and muddies the attribution waters 
(Insikt-Group, 2018a, p. 16). It is not surprising that the idea for this thesis of
reviewing freely available publications would be independently developed. A 
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the commandeering of their old infrastructure (Insikt-Group®, 2019a, pp. 2-3).
3.3 What is, and What Motivates, an APT?
It was not the intent of this thesis to define an APT but after careful 
consideration it became clear that one would be needed. 
being for a specific purpose and has since become the generic term, used 
interchangeably, for cyber attacker and deployment of malware. It will be 
demonstrated later in this thesis that not all threats are advanced or persistent they 
may be trivial, transitory, issues. Following a review of definitions, a broader 
definition will be proposed.
The term APT may be traced back to Cloppert who first heard it used by the 
USAF) 8th Air Force in a small meeting in 2006 
(Cloppert, 2009 p. 14). While Holland attributes APT toretired USAF General Greg 
Rattray 
(Holland, 2013)
(Rattray, 2001, pp. 79-118) on
definition of the growing cyber threat which he coined as weapons of mass 
disruption.
(Tenet cited in Rattray (Rattray, 2001, p. 80)).
As the term APT became to be used more widely one definition began to stand out:
6, the United States Air Force (USAF) analysts coined the term 
advanced persistent threat (APT) to facilitate discussion of intrusion activities with 
their uncleared civilian counterparts. Thus, the military teams could discuss the 
attack characteristics yet without revealing classified identities and explains the 
components of the terminology.
47
Advanced means the adversary is conversant with computer intrusion 
tools and techniques and is capable of developing custom exploits.
Persistent means the adversary intends to accomplish a mission. They 
receive directives and work towards specific goals.
Threat means the adversary is organized, funded and motivated.
(Jeun, Lee and Won, 2012).
This APT definition is widely quoted in papers, books and on the internet e.g. (Cert-
Polska, 2014, p. 17) but an extensive search has been unable to find the original 
2006 reference in the citation. This search includes the internet archive (Wayback-
Machine, 2017). A Google Trends search (Google-Trends, 2017) found the first five
r 2007 which aligns 
with the 2006 origin, allowing for the phrase to spread organically. NIST also 
defines an APT
(NIST, 2011)
This thesis view that APT is used interchangeably as an attacker and 
malware is supported elsewhere where it is suggested that the entire APT space 
suffers from definitional uncertainty (Edwards, Ford and Szappanos, 2014).
However, this thesis asserts that the problem is worse than this in that APT is a 
can
(IETF, 2007, pp. 304-306) where a threa
Indeed, a threat may only be a threat because it is perceived as such by an 
s organized, funded 
and motivated lar adversary will attack any 
network or machine. Threats may be made in the generic sense; they may be directed 
at specific organisations, entities or a wider industry. Drawing on the above NIST 
definition the threat may be persistent in time or not. The threat may change or not. 
The threat may be persistent in level or not. The threat may be advanced, primitive 
or thuggish. However, a threat only threatens. 
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In the organisational risk management world a threat may highlight a Risk (in 
a Risk register) to an organisation and when the threat is acted upon or materialises it 
becomes an issue (APM, 2018). The Risk Management process may, or may not, 
or
(Shostack, 2014)
one reason for inclusion of the word in the title 
LMKC Course of Action Matrix to be discussed later.
The recent development of Risk Management in wider UK business has its 
roots in the UK stock market where it is a condition of the UK stock market Listing 
Rules. These rules require companies to make a statement of how they have applied 
the Principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code. Principle C states that the 
board should have an effective mechanism to manage risk (FRC, 2018, pp. 2, 4, 10-
12). These risks are generally aggregated in the form of a Risk Register. Not all 
threats may be real they may have the perception of reality in the mind of the 
later, that coherence matters 
more than truth). There may be a genuine advanced, persistent, threat to business, or 
the IT industry in general, but for any one business or organisation this may not be 
the case. 
Different types of attack may be embraced by the APT term. A DDOS attack 
or well-hidden Trojan may be advanced. Cross-site scripting is not. A threat, 
advanced or otherwise, may become an Issue which is, or is not, persistent. A DDOS 
attack or well-hidden Trojan may be persistent. A one-off ransomware attack is not. 
Neither of these hypothetical examples are threats. They are issues. This may seem 
like pedantic semantics to some readers, but it is important to distinguish between 
the descriptions. This point is also taken up by Bejtlich who states that people use 





There seems to be no consensus about what is an APT and there is blurring in 
the use of the term APT between threat, threat actor (those who carry out 
development and deployment of malware) and malware. Sophos assert that some 
common traits are: they are targeted; goal orientated; Persistent; Patient; and Call 
Home (Hudson, 2014, pp. 2-3). While others (Friedberg , 2015) suggest that 
-Secure 
assert that while APTs do not impact the majority of consumers, they are of 
particular interest to governments and major corporations (F-Secure, 2016, p. 10). It 
may be true that APTs do not impact the majority of consumers but a non-directed 
attack against consumers which looks for success by simply infecting as many 
still persistent. It may also be an impact in the cost of electricity (as in the case of 
cryptomining), anti-virus (AV) defences etc. and these attacks may be deployed by 
an advanced, persistent, team.
Blue Coat (Blue-Coat, 2011, p. 3) state that it is better to think of an APT as 
well-planned and co-ordinated with every available tool. They are persistent because 
they are patient and are focused on avoiding detection. Blue Coat further state that 
the difference between an APT and mass-market malware is that APTs do not 
necessarily need unique malware or zero days. They assert that mass-market attacks 
use blended threat using multiple tools. Building on this, Technical Persistent 
Attacker (TPA) is a better description than APT. Furthermore, a TPA delivers 
However, not all attacks are persistent or technical (non-technical, business
process manipulation, attacks have been highlighted earlier in this thesis). They may 
strictly, being persistent, the machine is rendered inoperable. Technical Cyber Attack 
(TCA) is a better fit. Are there any non-Technical Cyber Attacks? There will be a 
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return to a better definition after a review of current APT definitions, a summary of 
which is:
Chen et al: Specific targets; Highly organized; long-term 
campaign; stealthy and evasive (Chen, Desmet and Huygens, 
2014);
RSA: Highly targeted; Well-funded: Well-researched; Designed 
to evade detection; Multi-modal and multi-step: (Robinson and 
Keswani, 2016, p. 2);
Stewart: APT as Cyber-espionage activity targeting government, 
industry or activists (Stewart, 2011, p. 3);
Websense: Targeted; Evasive; Persistent; Complex (websense, 
2013, p. 3);
Alien Vault: Exploit publicly known vulnerabilities but the 
attackers also are highly skilled etc.; accomplish a mission that 
can take place over months; Dedicated organized groups are 
behind the attack motivated by political, economical [sic] or 
military reasons. (Blasco, 2010, p. 3);
WatchGuard: An unknown, zero-day attack that has malware 
payloads and uses kernel rootkits and evasion-detection 
technologies; It does -to-detect 
threats are launched daily at targets ranging from large 
corporations to small and midsize businesses. (WatchGuard® 
Technologies, 2016, p. 2);
Imperva: APTs leverage malware and hacking techniques; APT
hackers continue the assault until the attack is successful; APTs 
are growing and require organisations to adapt their security 
strategies and practices. (Imperva, 2011, p. 2);
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CA: The attacker has the significant technical capabilities required 
to take advantage of weaknesses in the target; APTs often unfold 
over the course of years; have the motivation, ability and 
resources needed to be successful. (ca-Technologies, 2014, p. 3);
Bejtlich: adversary can operate in the full spectrum of computer 
intrusion; the adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a 
mission; the adversary is not a piece of mindless code (Bejtlich, 
2010);
Trivett: A target of value; Multiple types of stealthy attack 
vectors; sophisticated adversary (Trivitt, 2013, p. 3).
Clearly, there are differences of opinion. Funding, technical ability, persistence, and 
patience are themes. Imperva suggests that attackers continue until the attack is 
successful. This thesis is about increasing the costs of attackers, perhaps to the point 
where they give up and go elsewhere.
Working with the HMG legal definition above (HMG, 1990) this thesis only 
deals with illegal acts and therefore the description should be Illegal Cyber Attacks 
(ICA) which are perpetrated by threat actors using unauthorised techniques for gain 
by deploying malicious software (malware).
As previously discussed, this thesis is agnostic towards the origin and 
motives of APTs but this thesis will touch on motivation, first drawing on a 
power which provides a basis for motivation
. and use of weapons and power as an extension in support of this
(Nietzsche, 1968, pp. 383-386)
While Maslow has a similar view of drive or needs
wanting animal
(Maslow, 2016, p. 4)
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It is clear, therefore, that at least Nietzsche and Maslow see Man as a being 
who has a drive or thirst for power and is prepared to weaponise that drive to bring 
about a desired outcome.
No literature was found on the motivation of APTs and only three items were 
discovered relating to the insider threat. It is from these definitions, and related work, 
that this thesis will develop a general definition which includes all threats.
Wall, in a wider discussion, breaks down IT breaches into two categories: 
internal and external (Wall, 2013). It is hard to gain a view as he provides 
percentages from a sample size of 3001 but a non-scientific review for this thesis 
looks as if the ratio is about two to one in favour of breaches from an external 
source. This thesis will consider the holistic view of cyber security breaches and, 
where the malware lies on the system, align it with the LMKC.
The insider threat has been defined as
(Bishop, 2005).
This thesis will now modify and develop the definition to become (This thesis 
:
the power to violate one or more rules in a 
An insider has not been given the power; it is given the opportunity to exert the 
power through poor QC. This power may have been taken but not given.
background and he refers to insider motivation as: money, ideology, coercion and 
ego. This neatly fits in an acronym: MICE (Burkett, 2013).
Kaspersky suggests that motivation for malicious insiders is hard to predict 
and anticipate but suggests financial gain, disaffection, coercion and simple 
carelessness (Kaspersky, 2016b). However, this thesis suggests that carelessness is 
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not an attacker motivation but a victim attribute 
model.
Nation Infrastructure (CPNI) describes 
an Advanced Persistent Treat as an entity (an individual, collection of individuals 
into an entity or collection of entities) that has a quiddity to wish to have a 
comparative advantage over its victims or target and categorises the motivation of 
insider threat: Financial gain (47% of cases); Ideology (20% of cases) ; Desire for 
recognition (14% of cases); Loyalty to friends/family/country (14% of cases); 
Revenge (6% of cases) (CPNI, 2013). However, by 2015 this had changed to: 
Financial gain; Revenge or notoriety; Fear or coercion; Ideological. (CPNI, 2015).
combined under the latter heading which is generic (one may not have the same 
one of a number of Ego related reasons and that Revenge should be kept separate as 
it overlaps Ideology and Ego. Furthermore, although Revenge may be considered a 
form of ideology for the purposes of this thesis there is less overlap than loyalty and 
ideology.
For this thesis the MICE acronym for motivation can now be extended to a 
new acronym, CRIME: Coercion, Revenge, Ideology, Money, Ego.
These findings may now be aggregated for this thesis and applied to 
ICAs/APTs by s
ICA:
In summary: The ICA is the modus operandi, Illegal Cyber Attack Team (ICAT) 
is the group of one or more people performing the ICA. Malware is the malicious 
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software laid down by the ICAT. However, for consistency with the rest of the world 
this thesis, as presented earlier will used the terms APT for the team of attackers and 
malware for the malicious software laid down 
3.4 Malware Surveys
Several malware surveys and categorisations have been produced. Most 
-level technical 
aspects of the malware (Uppal, Mehra and Verma, 2014), (Saeed, Selamat and 
Abuagoub, 2013), (Damshenas, Dehghantanha and Mahmoud, 2013), (Landage and 
Wankhade, 2013). Others are a blend of this techniques: keyword identification (e.g. 
SetWindowsHookEx - to which this thesis will return)  and functionality of the 
malware to statistical attributes of the malware presented visually (Egele ,
2012). Elsewhere keywords and some statistical properties (Rudd , 2019) are 
discussed, touching on encryption and commenting about the high number of false 
positives when searching for hooks. It also includes N-grams, instructions counting, 
as well as a short categorisation of obfuscation techniques:
like dead code insertion, register reassignment, subroutine reordering, 
instruction substitution,
(Gandotra, Bansal and Sofat, 2014)
A breakdown of malware detection techniques is provided in (Gaikwad, 
Motwani and Shinde, 2015) their Figure 1 and in more detail elsewhere 
(Ponnambalam, 2015). Although Ponnambalam mentions malware encryption one 
has to look elsewhere for a classification of encryption methods (Singh and Supriya, 
2013).
3.5 The Difference between Virus and Malware and Identification
Zamora (Zamora, 2015) states that a virus self-replicates in order to achieve 
its goals, while malware is an umbrella term that includes rootkit, virus, trojan, 
spyware, worms, adware and ransomware. This thesis asserts that this is the correct 
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way to view the terms but, like the term APT, both virus and malware are used inter-
changeably.
No academic evidence could be found about how commercial anti-malware 
works. This could be because terms and conditions prohibit reverse engineering of 
products (McAfee, 2018b), (MalwareBytes, 2018b). The researcher, therefore, is left 
with comparing and contrasting outputs from AV companies in the form of 
whitepapers: AV software appears to users, in a way, as a Hidden Markov Model.
Symantec provide a illustrative view of heuristics (Schmall, 2018) which 
looks for previously unexamined functionality of malware using a weighting system 
which, when the weight passes a threshold, triggers an alarm. This is tantalising as 
Schmall does not appear to have written any academic papers on the subject. 
A combination of any of Heuristic-based detection, behavioural-based 
detection, sandbox detection, data mining techniques (Eliz, 2018). Suspicious 
behaviours may include modification of registry entries or start-up list changes 
(MalwareFox, 2018). One can envisage this being work testing observation against a 
known sample e.g. modified operating system against a pristine version of that 
system. Both the scoring mechanism and observations against a known base were 
part of the thinking behind the development of the submission of the proposal for 
this thesis.
Given the titles and order, some of these definitions may be copies of other 
websites e.g. Comodo website (Comodo Security Solutions, 2018)).
3.6 HDD Geometry
3.6.1 How a HDD Works 
This section describes how a HDD works with particular emphasis on the 
allocation and de-allocation of storage. This is crucial to the understanding of where 
malware may reside. Some of this section paraphrases and updates earlier work by 
the thesis author (Bentley, 2008) for a master s degree. 
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The mechanism and geometry of a HDD is described by Sobey (Sobey, 2004, 
pp. 4-12) as well as Arpaci-Dusseau and Arpaci-Dusseau (Arpaci-Dusseau and 
Arpaci-Dusseau, 2018, pp. 1-17). A HDD is comprised of a number of platters. Each 
platter contains concentric tracks which are divided into 512 user byte sectors. 
Encoding and error detection needed for the user data means that the sector size 
increases to 600 bytes. Every HDD disc contains areas that are faulty, and therefore 
unusable (and inaccessible), either at the time of manufacturing or during the life of 
the disc. The former is known as the P-list (Primary list) and the latter is known as 
the G-list (Growth list). The number of areas in the P-list does not affect the 
performance of the disk but the number of areas in the G-list, as it grows, does. More 
recently with the Advanced Format supported by IDEMA, the International Disk 
Drive Equipment and Materials Association (IDEMA, 2019), HDDs have been able 
to support sector sizes larger than 512 bytes in multiples of 512-byte logical sectors 
of user data, notably 1KB, 2KB, 4KB (Chicoine , 2007, p. 10). It is noted 
elsewhere that the sector size can be greater than 512 bytes (Microsoft, 2018j). The 
hardware and software in this thesis use 512-byte sectors.
Each sector of disc is delimited at the start and end by the use of delimiters. 
-length limited 
(RLL) encoded. RLL algorithms restrict the consecutive number of binary zeros and 
ones. Not having RLL encoding would mean that the hardware would not be able to 
correctly interpret the user's data. RLL encoding increases by 1% - 12.5% the 
amount of data in the sector. User data may be encoded up to five times and may 
also include insertion of timing information before the application of run-length 
limiting.
3.6.2 Different types of HDD and Storage 
This thesis notes that there are different types of HDDs such as ATA and
SCSI, and that HDDs may be internal to a laptop or PC as well as external USB 
enabled HDDs.
Information is stored on computers in many ways for example on HDDs, on-
chip RAM, on flash memory and on graphics cards. This thesis is based on HDDs.
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3.6.3 Master Boot Record (MBR) 
The master boot record (MBR), the most important data structure on the 
disk, is created when the disk is partitioned. The MBR contains a small amount of 
executable code called the master boot code, the disk signature, and the partition 
table for the disk. At the end of the MBR is a 2-byte structure called a signature word 
or end of sector marker, which is always set to 0x55AA. A signature word also 
marks the end of an extended boot record (EBR) and the boot sector.
(Microsoft, 2009a)
3.6.4 The Master File Table (MFT) 
, or MFT.
There is at least one entry in the MFT for every file on an NTFS file system volume, 
including the MFT itself. All information about a file, including its size, time and 
date stamps, permissions, and data content, is stored either in MFT entries, or in 
s
(Microsoft, 2018q).
Descriptions of the MFT are openly available from Microsoft (Microsoft, 2018q) or
discussed by researchers (Hsu , 2016).
Deletion of a file by the operating system does not mean it is deleted or 
erased. Every file has an entry in the Master File Table (MFT). This is a file index. 
On deletion the file's MFT entry is changed to tell the operating system that the area 
of storage occupied by the file is now available for use. This concept is later 
addressed (LaBarge, Mazzuchi and Sarkani, 2014). Schneier states that eventually 
the area will be used again (and hence over-written).and also states that erasing data 
is much harder that one might think (Schneier, 2000, p. 253). The HDD may be 
tidied up by defragmentation. A defragmenter brings together data blocks that belong 
together logically and releases unused smaller blocks into larger contiguous sets of 
disc space. 
Files can be read by the user using available software within the Windows
operating system. In this scenario the file is available and has not been deleted. After 
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deletion the file is moved to the Recycle bin from where it may be recovered by the 
user using Windows software. Once deleted from the Recycle bin a file is not 
recoverable using Windows software. As previously discussed, the data appears to 
have been deleted, but what has occurred is that the MFT link has been destroyed 
and the data is still available, depending on how long ago it was deleted. 
Commercially available software can recover the data if the operating system has not 
overwritten it.
3.6.5 The Windows Registry 
The is a system-defined database in which applications and system 
(Microsoft, 2017aa).
Microsoft provide an overview of the registry (Microsoft, 2012). Both 
Thomassen (Thomassen, 2008) and Morgan (Morgan, 2008) independently discuss 
registry forensics and places where data could hide.
However, it has been demonstrated that programs which uninstall registry 
may inadvertently corrupt those 
.
It has also been shown that, on uninstallation, not all registry keys for the software 
are deleted  (Kim, Lee and Hong, 2008). Although this demonstrates how deleted 
registry keys and key fragments may be recovered forensically, using hidden parts of 
the registry to hide malware, and expect it to persist, does appear to be a risky 
strategy for attackers.
3.6.6 Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal and Cluster Usage. 
change journal. When any change is made to a file or directory in a volume, the USN 
change journal for that volume is updated with a description of the change and the 
(Microsoft, 2018d).
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There appears to be little on forensic examination of the USN change journal.  
Lees provides evidence (Lees, 2013) of changes when InPrivate Browsing and 
CCleaner, a disc wiper, are used but nothing about where malware might be able to 
reside. This thesis postulates that malware may be able to manipulate the USN 
change journal and/or cluster usage. However it is asserted that it does not appear to 
be possible to directly change the USN change journal (Eterovic-Soric , 2018)
but surely software running in kernel mode could directly amend the contents on the 
HDD? 
It is suggested (Singh and Singh, 2018) that using a correlated model for 
program execution artefacts, which would include the USN journal, could be 
designed. This would be a form of Process driven defence and this author believes 
that this analysis should go further and look at the USN change journal as a file, and 
hence Landscape Driven Defence, to determine inclusion of malware in the USN 
change journal and holistic issues relating to the USN change journal. 
At least one piece of malware deletes the USN journal (Wüest and Anand, 
2017, p. 16) which may be an indicator of the presence of malware although 
Microsoft recommend housekeeping by administrators by deleting the journal when 
the USN approaches the maximum USN (Microsoft, 2018h). However, the ability to 
delete the USN journal suggests a conflict with the observations of Eterovic-Soric, 
above.
3.7 How Data is Stored on a HDD
Data is stored on the HDD in several logical ways leaving unused space on 
the HDD. The existence of this unused space is a point to which this thesis will 
return.
Data is also stored by programs in different ways depending on the function. 
Wilson et al describe how memory is allocated in Ramps, Peaks, and Plateaus:
Ramps: these programs accumulate data monotonically over time;
Peaks: these programs use memory in burst, allocating and 
releasing it when needed;
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Plateaus: these programs allocate memory at the start and use it 
for long periods.
(Wilson , Undated, p. 15)
Knuth describes how data in the storage device is assigned in blocks by 
software, (known as an allocator) using complex mathematical algorithms (Knuth, 
1997, pp. 435 456).
Jones and Lins discuss the three ways that storage can be allocated by a 
compiler for high-level languages:
Static Allocation is where the names in the program are bound to 
storage locations at compile time;
Stack allocation is where an activation record or frame is pushed 
onto the system stack as each procedure is called, and popped 
when it returns;
Heap allocation is where data structures may be allocated in any 
order.
(Jones and Lins, 1996, pp. 2-3)
Randell describes how data may be inefficiently allocated by one of two 
means: (1) the size of the data is greater than the block size which means that small 
areas of free storage space are skipped over and the data is allocated elsewhere 
causing external fragmentation; (2) the size of the data is less than the size of the 
block size which causes internal fragmentation; (Randell, 1969).
s (Tanenbaum, 2001, p. 237) and from which it can inferred that choosing 
operating system page sizes as multiples of HDD sector size would be more efficient 
than otherwise. However, Tanenbaum (Tanenbaum, 2001, p. 237) later goes on to 
t
external fragmentation is also called checkboarding (Tanenbaum, 2001, p. 253).
Analysis of such space, also known as slack space, is known to the forensics 
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community (Prem, Selwin and Mohan, 2017), (Srinivasan and Kolli, 2013), (Slot, 
2015, p. 16). The latter asserts the difficulty of detection of rootkits in slack spaces 
but the MFT should have the file size and hence disc usage. Any slack space can 
Knuth also provides examples of different allocator algorithms but the results 
are the same: the storage allocated is not contiguous. Garbage collectors may be 
needed to collect up free space (Knuth, 1997, pp. 408 423).
Zelkowitz has produced a graphic demonstrating data hiding tactics for 
Windows and Unix file systems (Zelkowitz, 2008, p. 5) e.g. end of partitions.
The size of slack space can be non-trivial: A review of 18 different versions
of Windows for slack space found slack (unused) space of the order of tens of 
megabytes (Mulazzani , 2013).
It can therefore be seen that memory is being continuously allocated and 
unallocated leaving empty space on the HDD. This, along with the allocation 
methods described above, means that the data is not uniformly distributed on the 
HDD.
3.8 Persistence in the HDD Firmware
Seagate defines firmware as 
-coded into the hard drive and 
contains its basic operational storage programming. Another way to think of it is that 
firmware is a software middleman that allows your hardware to talk to software (i.e., 
Windows operating systems, etc). For a hard drive, firmware is a program that 
governs the behaviour and factory settings, even the identity, of that drive. Any drive 
that comes out of the factory and is in use in a computer or server has firmware 
(Seagate, Unknown)
Kaspersky have observed one APT reprogram the firmware of the HDD and 
provide an API into a set of hidden HDD sectors. (Kaspersky, 2015c, pp. 16-18).
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clear from the reference it appears that these are manufacturers and models); while 
the later version 4 can reprogram 12 
Microsoft offer guidance on how to modify firmware (Microsoft, 2016) while 
others have provided proof of concept (Read , 2013). The reason that firmware 
is modifiable may be that, as suggested by Gruhn, that HDD firmware is not digitally 
signed (Gruhn, 2017) and that the contents of given HDD sectors may be hidden by
the modified firmware to: only return zeros from specific sectors being read; only 
return zeros for all reads; or return returns for reds and overwrite the requested data 
with zeros.
However McAfee lead the reader to believe that HDD firmware has signatures which 
can be checked (McAfee, 2016, pp. 1-2).
The move from BIOS to UEFI is noted. Each HDD partition has a Volume 
Boot Record (VBR) and at least one attack has been seen overwriting VBR areas  
(Dell-SecureWorks-Counter-Threat-Unit-Threat-Intelligence, 2013).
MBRs may be manipulated (Grill, Platzer and Eckel, 2014) and forensically 
analysed (Gruhn, 2017) and Symantec (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, pp. 5, 
19) have observed one APT overwriting the MBR:
McAfee have also seen an APT with the facility to wipe a MBR 
(Sherstobitoff, Liba and Walter, 2013, p. 5) using a small, 24KB, executable and F-
Secure have seen modification of the MBR to achieve persistence: 
(F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, pp. 5, 8)
F-Secure-Labs note that this method of persistence has stability issues and crash 
dumps are controlled.
Mandiant observed an APT using Volume Boot record modification as their 
persistence mechanism 
(Mandiant, 2017, pp. 14-15).
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3.9 Windows is a File-Based Operating System
It is asserted that there is a lack of up-to-date anti-forensic research literature 
between 2010 and 2016 (Eterovic-Soric , 2018). While this does not give this 
thesis carte blanche it does indicate that, supported by the academic evidence 
reviewed above, there is a wide scope for this thesis. Also, it appears that all the 
research points to artefacts and fragments of malware from APT attacks rather than 
viewing them holistically. It is for this reason and, as will be shown that Windows is 
a file-based system, that the thesis will be based on looking at malware at the file 
level. This will now be further explored.
(Carrier, 2005, p. 274), (Casey, 2007, p. 134) (Richard  Russon, 2018).
(Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007, p. 217)
Before finding these assertions, this author recognised that for the purposes 
-
enforced this belief and finding the evidence, above, was a vindication. There are 
very few references to this concept and non are directly from Microsoft and it is 
sparsely repeated (Russon and Fledel, Undated, p. 5). It is recognised that the 
assertion is a small sample size but, on the one hand this sparseness demonstrates 
gaps in the academic knowledge of NFTS (and hence Windows) and on the other 
hand it provides direction and support for this thesis.
Eterovic-Soric et al also assert, and later demonstrate, that that it is possible 
to run malware without modifying the change journal. Should this be the case then it 
might be possible to cross-reference file creation, existence and deletion directly 
from the HDD with a missing USN change journal entry. This, together with a test of 
kernel level software making change to the USN change journal, would be an
interesting avenue of exploration for this thesis.
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One research group (Garba , Unknown) describe the Lockheed Martin 
Intrusion Kill Chain and claim that the research will effectively detect APTs based 
on the kill chain. The work seems to only detect at the perimeter for incoming 
attacks, not those which have got past the perimeter. One could argue 100% 
detection at the perimeter means there is no resident malware on the system but it is 
a bold claim. In addition, they only seem to address the Detect part of the LMKC 
There are a variety of papers looking at statistical technique for malware 
identification. One looks at Major Block Comparisons (Kang , 2012 ), while 
another suggests a visualisation (Han, Lim and Im, 2013).  However, these rely on 
malware being unencrypted. Something which this thesis will address.
virtual storage) (Willet, 2008, p. 159). The first two definitions are generally used 
(Microsoft, 2019b)
virtual, or is being processed i.e. is in transit. The academic literature points to 
researchers observing a process and then building a generic process to counter-act 
views the HDD and builds a HDD view which this thesis calls
3.10 File Sizes
Analysis of executable file sizes appears to be a little researched area.  An 
early paper (Lee , 1998) briefly discusses Windows NT executable file sizes in 
the context of performance of desktop applications for Windows NT. Methodologies 
for identifying file types (Li , 2005), (Karresand and Shahmehri, 2006) look at 
content and not file size - s deliberately truncated files before 
statistical analysis. Elsewhere (Shahzad, Haider and Lavesson, 2010) there is a 
discussion about using binary features of files but nothing on the file size. This work 
is broadly similar to n-gram analysis (Kim , 2014). Another paper discusses 
identification of executable signatures on the basis of statistical criteria (Krivtsova, 
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Lebedev and Salakhutdinova, 2017) but, again, there is no analysis of file sizes. The 
importance of the detection of executable files may lead to discovery of malware, 
either individually or as part of a botnet (Satrya, Cahyani and Andreta, 2015).
Further evidence supporting the lack of study of executable files lengths it is 
noted that a study of data mining techniques for malware detection using file features 
(Siddiqui, Wang and Lee, 2008) makes no mention of file length.
A file size study (Tanenbaum, Herder and Bos, 2005) comparing a 
in this research. Although it is based on UNIX systems and all file sizes are a 
grouped in bands of a multiple of 2, the authors state that the median file size if 2475 
bytes i.e. an odd number. One other study (Downey, 2001) suggested a statistical 
distribution. Although not an exhaustive search it appears that little to no work has 
been performed on Windows file lengths. 
This research takes two different lines of analysis by separately looking at the 
distribution of the most and least significant digits (first and last digits) of executable 
file sizes. It is asserted that the introduction of malware is a form of fraud and that
any insertion of malware may affect either or both distributions. Within the 
(Nigrini, 2012, p. 5) is a well-known method 
for highlighting potentially fraudulent activity. This is performed by analysis of the 
distribution of the most significant digit of each number in a set of numbers. Given 
that analysis of the most significant digit is to be performed a hypothesis was 
constructed that there was no difference in the distribution of the least significant 
digit (last digit) of the same set of numbers. A search of academic literature found no 
such work had previously been performed. Analysis of the last digit of the same set 
of number is it odd or even might provide other insights.
(provided in Figure 2-
1, below) of numbers in many naturally occurring datasets follow a negative 
exponential distribution. The expected frequencies for these single digits are given 
by:
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Table 3-1: Benford Probabilities 
3.11 From Where the APTs May Get Their Information
number of websites such as that hosted by Offensive Security (Offensive-Security, 
2018).
Some APTs use the same malware for their attacks and, of course, different 
AV companies are sometimes analysing the same APT without knowing it until 
publication of their results. Attempts have been made to deduplicate both instances 




APT can also make use of well-known TTP (pwc-BAe, 2017, pp. 16, 18-19).
3.12 Where are the Gaps in the Knowledge?
This chapter has shown that one tenet of the Windows OS is that everything
is a file. Malware surveys and other papers showed no evidence of making use of 
this. Hardly any academic papers which discuss the malware problem addressed 
shared attributes of files that define file types. For example, these attributes may 
come from aggregation of ostensibly similar files based on filename extension or on 
shared properties. There is little discussion in about
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how AV products work. The only hints are vague definitions like heuristics and 
keyword search. Finally, these white papers displayed no direct references to 
academic papers.
This apparent lack of research at the file level is the gap in the knowledge 
that this thesis will explore.
3.13 Conclusion
This chapter supports the first Aim and Objective, through a review of 
academic literature and some supporting white papers. It has laid out APT 
motivation, a discussion on the difference between a virus and malware. It followed 
with a description of how a HDD works, issues relating to HDD storage and where 
malware may reside on a HDD and ended with a review of where are the gaps in the 
knowledge. It then looked at evidence of analysis of Windows as a file-based 
operating system, No such evidence could be found for a file-based review centred 
on file attributes and unused disk space.
The thesis will now progress to discuss the wider, global, business issues and 
taxonomy issues of APT attacks.
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4 THE TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter commences with a review of technological revolutions and 
continues with the reasons for caring about IT Security. This is followed by a review 
of a history of attacks on IT systems, parallels to attacks in the non-IT physical world 
and also popular culture, which affect the public perception of an APT and IT 
Security. It then follows with a discussion on the costs of malware infection to the 
defender and the business positions for both attackers and defenders. It also 
discusses how bad the problem of malware and APTs might be, followed by a 
definition of an APT.
The chapter highlights the governance chain through international co-
operation to company governance with respect to Risk management. It continues 
with a review and comparison of various Cyber Kill Chains, with discussion and 
argument for selecting the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain. This supports the 
second Aim and Objective
4.2 Technological Revolutions and The Long-term Business View
The emergence and use of computers by all and the rise and ubiquitousness 
of the internet have has been nothing short of a technological, business or industrial 
revolution and, no doubt, still has far to run. However, the existence of such a 
revolution is not new. Perez asserts that technological revolutions recur every half 
century and are based on the causal mechanism of capitalism (Perez, 2002, pp. 5, 
78). She lists the five technological Revolutions as:
The Industrial Revolution;
Age of Steam;
Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering;
Age of Oil, Automobiles and Mass Production;
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Age of Information and Telecommunications.
Perez describes the four stages of a technological revolution: IRRUPTION 
(Love affair of FK (Financial Capital) with revolution); FRENZY (Decoupling FK-
PK (Production Capital)); SYNERGY (Recoupling FK-PK); and MATURITY 
(Signs of separation). (Perez, 2002, p. 74). Perez also defines FK and PK
respectively as the criteria and behaviour of the agents who possess wealth and the 
motives and behaviour of those who generate new wealth. Okasha re-enforces this 
view with:
This author suggests that social stability does not directly follow but may do 
after a period of time. Disruptive technologies may destroy old industries, put people 
out of work and create a breakdown in social structure c.f. coal mining in the UK as 
a source of energy. This point is taken up by Schumpeter when he states that 
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lack of good QC which in turn has led to opportunities for 
APTs to develop and thrive.
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The IT Security industry has grown to meet the threat and issues through 
specialised IT Security or Cyber Security companies. Larger companies have 
developed their own IT Security sub-divisions. Many anti-virus (AV) companies 
have grown from entrepreneurial beginnings and produce white papers and blogs 
discussing APTs, as evidenced by F-Secure (F-Secure, 2017), Symantec (Symantec, 
2017) and Trend Micro (Trend-Micro, 2017a). There is also a world-wide academic 
requirement for research in this area (Marchetti , 2016), (Friedberg , 2015)
and (Banna , Singh and Samsudin, 2015).
4.3 IT Security - A Global Concern 
4.3.1 History 
The problem of illegal manipulation of IT assets is not new, with a history
dating back to at least 1973. Although no examples could be found earlier than 1973,
an abstract of a report issued by the US Government on the guidance on controls 
over data processing equipment in disbursing operations indicates that thought was 
being given to the problem of computer security in the 1960s (US-Dept-of-Defense, 
1965).
In 1973 the Chief Teller at the Park Avenue, New York, branch of the Union 
Dime Savings Bank (Fosburgh, 1973, p. 1) was able to embezzle $1.5 million by 
ter. The 
publicised details are vague but it seems that the teller removed money from 
accounts and ensured that it was redeposited when quarterly interest payments were 
due. In addition, the computer was manipulated so that records always contained the 
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correct figures. One can infer that a process surrounding the quarterly interest 
payment was the method of governance to monitor issues at the account level and the 
Chief Teller was able to abuse his governance position.
In the late 1980s a true-life popular science story on hacking emerged: in
earlier days of computing some organisations charged computer users for use. These 
charges were at the departmental or individual level and the IT department was paid 
At Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in the US,
Clifford Stoll, a PhD student and systems administrator, discovered and tracked a 
hacker after he, Stoll, discovered a 75-cent financial discrepancy on a computer log 
(Stoll, 1988).
These two examples, 15 years apart, demonstrate the two methods of 
computer, or cyber, crime: the first is a manipulation of the business process,
,
perhaps, the idea of cybercrime more common in the public consciousness.
APTs attacking computer systems are regularly in the news (Barrett, 2017).
The idea of computer hacking, or what is now referred to in the cyber security (IT 
Security) profession, as Advanced Persistent Threat, may have first come to the 
(Collinson, 1969) a (Badham, 1983). In the former the character 
played by Benny Hill, Professor Simon Peach, is able to gain physical access to the 
computer controlling the Turin traffic system and replace a reel-to-reel magnetic tape 
containing legitimate software with a magnetic tape containing illegitimate software. 
In the later, the character played by Matthew Broderick, David, is able to gain 
access, and complete control, through a software back door and password guessing,
of a computer which controls the US milita
However, philosophically, computer hacking techniques are not new and 
have their origins in the non-IT world. In 16th century England, Sir Francis 
Phelippes
to overthrow Elizabeth I by followers of Mary Queen of Scots. All messages 
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between Mary and her supporters, which were encrypted, were copied and decrypted 
by Phelippes who, unknown to Mary and her supporters, added a forged post script 
Elizabeth (Kahn, 1973, pp. 86-90). This is an example of a man-in-the-middle attack, 
later to evolve as a man-in the-browser attack, as well as signature forging which can 
be done with fake public key computer certificates. All of these will be discussed 
later in this thesis.
In 1834 two brothers, François and Joseph Blanc, who were bankers in 
of the French stock market could take several days to reach Bordeaux. The Blanc 
brothers bribed an operator to insert a backspace, which deleted the previous 
character, into a message. The spurious character, which was not written down on 
ovement in the French stock exchange. An 
accomplice, who was a former telegraph operator, viewed the spurious character 
outside Bordeaux through a telescope (Standage, 2017) and passed the information 
to the brothers Blanc. Manipulation of data streams will be discussed later in this 
thesis.
These two examples demonstrate that it does not take long for something 
new to be abused and in this regard the internet is nothing new: On June 23th 1989 
3.26.53pm Australia was connected to the internet via Hawaii. Within eight months 
two young Australians had been arrested by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for 
hacking (ABC, 2017).
It is clear, therefore, that technology and processes can be exploited for uses 
other than what they were intended and that some form of governance is needed to 
re-enforce technological security.
4.3.2 International and National Governance 
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e the peoples of the United Nations determined to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained
(United-Nations, 1945)
Also, under Article 10 of the UN Charter The General Assembly may discuss 
questions or matters with the scope of the Charter and may make recommendations 
to the Security Council or members of the UN (United-Nations, 1945).
There are five UN General Assembly resolutions related to cybersecurity 
(United-Nations, 2018) the most recent of which, in 2010, was to take stock of 
national efforts to protect Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) which the UK 
government officially defines as: 
frastructure (namely assets, facilities, systems, 
networks or processes and the essential workers that operate and facilitate them), the 
loss or compromise of which could result in: 
a)    Major detrimental impact on the availability, integrity or delivery of essential 
services including those services whose integrity, if compromised, could result in 
significant loss of life or casualties taking into account significant economic or 
social impacts; and/or 
b)    Significant impact on national security, national defence, or the functioning of 
(CPNI, 2018) 
The 2010 UN Resolution builds on the January 2003 UN Resolution to create 
a global culture of cybersecurity which itself builds on the call to Member States:  
to promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and 
potential threats in the 
(United-Nations, 1998) 
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This thesis suggests that what is good for critical infrastructure is also good 
for wider the wider 
business as:
Those critical elements of business (namely assets, facilities, systems, networks or 
processes and the essential employees that operate and facilitate them), the loss or 
compromise of which could result in major detrimental impact on the confidentiality, 
availability, integrity , information, intellectual property or 
delivery of the business including those aspects whose confidentiality, availability 
and integrity, if compromised, could result in significant business loss, both financial 
and physical, including reputational and emotional 
4.3.3 The Size of the Computer Hacking Problem 
An Act to make provision for securing computer material against unauthorised 
access or modification; and for connected purposes
76
The UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) states that the cost to the UK economy of 
cyber-crime is billions of pounds a year and growing (NCA, 2016, p. 3) and is such a 
well-recognised problem that the UK government has seen fit to invest £1.9bn to 
fight cyber attacks (Reuters, 2016). In 2016, research by Ponemon sponsored by 
IBM derived from of 383 companies, found that the average total cost of a data 
breach had increased from $3.79 million in 2015 to $4 million in 2016. There was 
also an increase for the average cost paid for each lost or stolen record containing 
sensitive and confidential information from $154 in 2015 to $158 in 2016 (Ponemon, 
2016, p. 1) and the $141 and $146 in 2017 and 2018 respectively The total cost of a 
data breach was $3.62M in 2017 and $3.86M in 2018 (Ponemon, 2018, p. 10)
Ponemon define a compromised record as
one that identifies the individual whose information has been lost or 
(Ponemon, 2016, p. 1)
Clearly this is the cost of the loss of personal records to a company, not a cost 
to those whose records have been lost. i.e. the cost to wider society in rectifying the 
problems caused by the data loss. definition does not explicitly consider
intellectual property which is discussed by Deloitte:
Valuation of both the impact of the stolen IP and the lost contract employs 
the following generally accepted principles:
The with-and-without method. This approach estimates the 
value of an asset after an attack, compared with its value in the 
absence of the theft. The difference is the value of the impact 
attributed to the incident. 
Present value of future benefits (and costs). To calculate an 
while accounting for the time value of 
money, the cost is associated with the specific point in time at 
which the attack is discovered. 
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Industry benchmark assumptions. Typical industry benchmarks 
are used to arrive at the value or financial impact associated with 
various assets. Examples include royalty rates for the licensing of 
technology or trade name.
(Mossburg, Fancher and John, 2016, pp. 106 - 121)
This thesis asserts that it is difficult to assess the cost of lost information, 
opportunity cost, disciplinary action against internal culprits, rebuilding databases or 
files, adding new security software, and adding extra security procedures. 
Reputational cost is, for practical purposes, immeasurable. 
Accenture group the range of costs into two sets: the first by internal cost 
activity centre for the attack (Discovery, Investigation, Containment and Recovery); 
the second by business function (Cost of information loss or theft; cost of business 
disruption and Cost of equipment damage) (Accenture, 2019, pp. 34-35). This thesis 
will later discuss Cyber Kill Chains but post-thesis development could overlay the 
internal cost centre on the Cyber Kill Chain to have a structured approach to the Kill 
Chain, including the Courses of Action matrix i.e. a Recovery Chain .
This view of a range of costs is also held elsewhere (Center-for-Strategic-
and-International-Studies, 2013, p. 16) where it is suggested a financial range (rather 
than a specific monetary figure) should be used. A theme also followed by the UK 
Government (HMG, 2019a, pp. 51-54). However, not all such reports consider all 
aspects of the cost of doing business. In a work commissioned by the UK 
Government the authors do not include, with no reason given, reputational costs in 
their report  (Anderson , 2014, p. 269).
The problem is not just about monetary and reputational value - it may 
directly affect lives. In the US medical field, it was reported to the Information 
Security and Privacy Advisory Board that medical devices could become infected 
with malware to the point where they cannot provide the information needed to 
deliver care. They also stated that device vendors say they are 510 certified and so
they cannot patch the devices or put firewalls on them. Furthermore, after being 
cleaned and re-attached to the network, devices become re-infected in about 10-12
78
days with some devices using older operating systems being re-infected in less than a 
day (Information-Security-and-Privacy-Advisory-Board, 2012, p. 8 of 18). The 510
certification relates to US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (US-Government, 
2014) summarised by the US Food and drug Administration:
the extent that its sa
(FDA, 2020)
intentionally
more than 20 years imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000,000 (US-Government, 
2014, p. 23). This would be sufficient deterrent even to those who, with good faith, 
updated the software of medical devices but who would probably know that much 
software is faulty.
Fireeye state that in a world-wide proof-of-value (PoV) trials made up of
1,216 organisations from October 2013 to March 2014, 97% of the organisations 
were breached with three quarters of all systems running active Command & Control
sessions (Fireeye and Mandiant, 2014, pp. 7,9-10). The top six AV vendors, the 
majority, missed 62% of the malware at the time of FireEye detection. In addition a
quarter of the malware was not detected by any of those vendors. (Fireeye and 
Mandiant, 2014, p. 11). Cisco claim that 93% of websites accessed by customers 
contain malware (CISCO, 2016). This figure is consistent with a trial bot infection 
where the attacker retained 108 out of 110 cryptocurrency miners overnight 
(Barysevich, Moriuchi and Hatheway, 2017, p. 9) and is comparable to research by 
Check Point which showed that in 75% of organisations scanned a host accessed a 
malicious website (Check-Point, 2013, pp. 11-12).
Villeneuve (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 13) asserts that many of the attacks are 
simple and have simple remediation. In many cases, the persistence mechanism 
consists of using OS program execution techniques e.g. the Windows Startup folder, 
Windows Registry Run keys or Windows Service installation. Villeneuve goes on to 
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say that Mandiant found that 97% of the targeted malware they analysed used these 
mechanisms.
This re-enforces the view that the same issues come up time after time, year 
after year, as highlighted by SANS (SANS, 2011) and this is compounded with 
assertions that anti-virus techniques are still not working:
-
as a remediation product. Meaning we would clean up the mess caused by the other 
anti- -virus when I first got infected. One of the big ones that 
(Financial-Times, 2018).
In nearly all of investigations, the user anti-virus software 
failed to hinder [the APT], despite . The APT
would typically modify and recompile source code to evade detection. (Mandiant, 
2015a, p. 18). The lack of efficacy is acknowledged in the business world - an 
organisational survey quoted by Mandiant states that approximately 88% of 
organisations say their threat-hunting programs need to be improved (CrowdStrike, 
2016, p. 8). This improvement should not be difficult and Villeneuve describes how 
97% of malware is actioned, above, and evidence from Verizon states that most of 
the malware may be easy to identify:
(Verizon, 2012, p. 3). It is reassuring that that both Verizon and Fireeye and 
Mandiant both use figures in the 90% range. However, Connor offers a view of 
why attacks may be successful:
Briefly consider the implications: this particular malware existed for several years 
on a public website and antivirus vendors did not write a signature for it. 
Understanding this, we begin to realize the lack of usefulness in most antivirus 
vendor products. Instead of examining the indicators of malicious activity (for 
example, logging keystrokes, turning on the webcam, installing a persistence 
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module), most antivirus programs use a sequence of bytes or an MD5 hash to 
identify a malicious program.
A signature, as an Indicator of Compromise, may be useless when malware is 
iving Off the Land i.e. using legitimate software which is combined in such a 
way to produce malicious intent, as will be discussed later in the thesis.
view is consistent with the ideas behind this thesis which will be discussed later.
Given the lack of AV software efficacy it is perhaps not surprising that APTs
can successfully mount and maintain an attack. Clearly malware can reside on 
machines for a long period of time. The research  of Jacoby and Jartelius (Jacoby and 
Jartelius, 2013, p. 4), based on an undisclosed sample size, states that it takes 
companies about 60-70 days to fix a vulnerability and in another attack attackers 
were able to maintain persistent control and that the average length of compromise 
was 145 days, with the longest infection being 660 days (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 5).
This thesis will return to the subject of length of compromise.
The problem is not just related to single machine infection and intent for 
direct financial gain. For just one piece of botnet malware with an estimated 
1,000,000 nodes on the bot, Sophos estimated that there was 895 Terabytes of 
network traffic per month, before file downloads, and lost computing cycles i.e. a
larger electricity bill through use of more computing cycles for running the bot and 
cooling the machines (Wyke, 2012b, p. 46).
This use of resources for purposes other than an attack against the host 
organisation may seem trivial however but some APTs use vict
their computing power for cryptomining and, as highlighted above, the cost of
electricity for powering and cooling of the hardware is not trivial. An estimate of the 
cost of electricity of using malware to mine cryptocurrencies can be ascertained (F-
Secure-Labs, 2015c), (Marosi, 2016). Although the malware may not steal
information, IP personal or otherwise, cryptomining does steal electricity and the 
cost in commodity hardware of bitcoin mining now exceeds the value of the rewards
81
and that in 2014 the electricity consumption for mining bitcoin is similar to that of 
the electricity consumption of Ireland (O'Dwyer and Malone, 2014).
Clearly this is non-trivial and it can be inferred from this that illegal bitcoin 
mining on a network can exceed the capital investment and take a large proportion of
the running costs of that network. Comparative costs which demonstrate the most 
profitable cryptocurrency, from a basket of eight, are given in a mining calculator 
which also highlights that profitability is directly related to the time the malware is 
und (Barysevich, Moriuchi and Hatheway, 2017, p. 
8). Cryptocurrency mining may be embedded in a website and hence 
CPU a method which may lock battery of the 
device. It is not that the mining algorithm is not as efficient as custom made 
ASIC mining chips (Insikt-Group, 2018b, pp. 18-20) a subject to which this thesis 
will return when discussing mitigations to APTs and malware.
All of the above discuss the size and cost of the problem but, this thesis 
suggests, the problem may get worse. Although good IT Security will close off some 
avenues of attack, the barriers to entry for computer crime are becoming lower. 
Exploit kits, first seen in 2006 -as-a- , have 
allowed people with less coding experience and skill levels to gain access to systems 
(Kuczma and Manalo, 2020, p. 10).
4.4 Space and The Internet of Things (IoT)
A set of international standards is being developed at
Communications and Navigation (SCaN) program office. These standards are 
collectively known as Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) standards and will 
support internetworking in space. The standards are designed for a secure, reliable 
network service similar to TCP/IP, but implemented differently. The difference is 
that distances in space are so vast and end-to-end paths may not be available. An 
example of this is when a space vehicle in orbit receives data from Earth and then 
needs to wait before it can forward it to a lander on a planet. (NASA, 2017). One can 
see how there might be 
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for a gateway between them or the DTN might find a use on earth when data cannot 
be forwarded in real time. This too may have vulnerabilities.
4.5 The Cyber Security and Anti-Virus Market Size
In 2018 the UK Government estimated the 2015/16 UK total for cyber 
security revenue at £5.7bn (to the nearest £100 million) (RSM and CSIT, 2018, p. 
22). The size of the global cyber security market is expected to grow from 
$137.63Bn in 2017 to $248.26Bn in 2023 (statista, 2019d) i.e. an annualised growth 
rate of over 10%.  At £1.3 to the US dollar this translates to a UK share of the global 
market of over 5.3%.
The market share for the 10 leading anti-malware application vendors sums 
to 77.14% (statista, 2019b). Another report provides similar data from the same top
ten AV companies (but in a different order and market share) with a total of 77.57% 
(OPSWAT, 2019). These concentration ratios indicate that almost 25% of the market 
is held by companies which each hold around 1% of the market. This market is 
expected to shrink in terms of revenue from US$ 3770 million in 2019 to US$3500 
million in 2024. Clearly there is a data conflict: The evidence in the previous
paragraph provides a view on the global cyber security market yet the AV market 
share (which surely must be a constituent part of the global security market) is 
$3.77Bn. Appendix A analysis is based on desktops while the other references just 
(Feynman, 1959).
How might AV companies provide a service in this market? 
Technology Officer states (NPR, 2019b) that McAfee has a billion sensors deployed 
around the world which allows McAfee to see new threats and track them.
MalwareBytes similarly claim (Malwarebytes, 2018a, p. 3) that they have intel and 
statistics from their Intelligence, Research, and Data Science teams along with 
telemetry from their consumer and business products. Their software is deployed on 
millions of machines.
We may infer from this that McAfee takes the business view that each 
machine which hosts McAfee AV software is not only performing AV work for the 
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customer but is part of a wider network which will pass back to McAfee new threats. 
It can be further inferred that this could include date and time of possible infection 
allowing McAfee to see the evolution and deployment of the threat, rate of infections 
etc. On the one hand this helps all customers but on the other it gives access to 
machines by an AV company which has security consequences for the customers 
possible unrestricted access to every file on the machine. There has been an example
of one commercial AV company being breached (Kaspersky, 2015b) and it is known 
that files are uploaded to the cloud and analysed using big data. Another APT loaded 
information to a file hosting service (Insikt-Group and Rapid7, 2019, pp. 2,8,21-
23,26).
malware and spam, we may scan, collect, and store data from your files, including 
(McAfee, 2019)
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4.6 The Cost of Software Development and IT Security
IT projects have been notoriously difficult to cost and manage with some 
ending as failures after much time and money has been spent (Charette, 2005). The 
first methodologies were based on physical production process: simply take the 
number of widgets needed and divide by cost for, or time to make, each widget. 
(Putnam, 1978). Brooks helped to expose this mythology and claims for several 
⅓ planning; ⅙ coding; 
(Brooks, 1995)
While this may be an acceptable technique for a relative view of software production 
there is no absoluteness to this how does one cost or price the work? ⅓,⅙, ¼ must 
be ⅓,⅙, ¼ of something. Anyone who approaches their management board with 
this as a cost is surely going to be asked what is the currency value of their work? In 
addition, Brooks does not address documentation and nowhere in his book does he 
address the full life-cycle costs. It is not for want of trying that the IT industry has 
had problems with costs, as highlighted by one survey (Boehm, Abts and Chulani, 
2000).
This is compounded by the cost of business in different areas of the world. 
For example, the World Bank states:
The most popular reform is making it easier to start a business. More than a 
quarter of economies did just that in 2017/18. It now takes an average of 20 days and 




4.7 Costing the Technical Business Model
It has been shown that malware writers use AV sites to test and hone their 
malware (Zetter, 2014). Such sites may be used to help with defence.  At the front 
end use may be made of AV (Fisher 2019), (Raymond.cc, 2019), (Comodo Security 
Solutions, 2019).
The Top500 supercomputer list (Top500, 2019b) provides evidence of the 
growth of compute power. One may view the list in various ways but the 
Performance Development graph gives an idea of progression over the years in terms 
of Flops (floating point operations per second). For example, the number one 
machine in 1994 would not make the Top 500 in 2001 and this is a broad trend 
through subsequent years: in any given year the number one does not make the Top 
500 about 7-9 years later.
One could calculate the cost (CPU time, electricity etc.) for a given attack 
and then make predictions about when that attack would be feasible based on the 
Top 500 list. It is not just about one particular machine but also a network of Top 
500 machines.
Historically, calculating the number of flops was the number of floating-point 
operations per second multiplied by cycles per second but working out comparative 
speeds has become more difficult. Modern machines may have levels of parallelism, 
multiple silicon devices per nodes (socket) multiple cores, multiple threads per core 
as well as more sophisticated instructions (Dolbeau, 2018). Perhaps, for the purpose 
of this thesis, there should not be an attempt to calculate the maximum number of 
flops but the calculation should be the minimum number. This calculation should 
also include test data. For a 2Ghz CPU with an estimation of one Flop per cycle then 
there are 2GFlops. Such a machine would be number 500 in June 1995 but is now an 
affordable desktop or laptop. A business with 100 such machines would have the 
ber one supercomputer in mid-to-late 1993.
However, the best measure may just be to run programs on a sample of data 
and cost the whole work by multiplying up. Apart from normal operating system 
functions, the programs had sole use of the 1.7GHz machine on which it was 
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running. This device has two cores each of which can run two threads (Intel, 2019a).
In addition, each program in the thesis outputs the start and end time of the program. 
Form the individual timings a reasonable estimation could be made of longer runs. 
For example, the work for the search programs divided the disc size by 10 and the 
first decile run and costed (both machines had 460GB discs). One of the search 
programs ran on a faster machine (Intel i5-4690 3.5GHz). This device has four cores 
each of which can run four threads (Intel, 2019b) and the elapsed run time was four 
times faster (roughly one hour down from four hours). A doubling of each of: the 
processor speed; number of cores; and number of threads; would suggest an elapsed 
time difference of a factor of eight but the difference of a factor of four gives weight 
ing out comparative 
differences. 
On a much smaller scale a "supercomputer" can be constructed from a 
network of machines by dividing up the work into manageable packages  in the 
manner of the seti@home (University-of-Berkeley, 2019) project  so an attack could 
be produced by linking various universities' networks, for example. Microsoft 
provide guidance for a proof of concept cluster (Microsoft, 2013). Assuming that a 
business has hardware that satisfies the recommend specifications (2GHz or faster 
CPU, 2GB or more RAM and 80GB or more of disc space) then the capital costs are 
zero as the hardware costs are sunk costs. The costs become setup costs and running 
cost. Other software options are available e.g. Hadoop (Apache, 2019), Beowulf 
(Beowulf.org, 2019). One hardware option is a Raspberry Pi cluster (Los-Alamos-
National-Laboratory, 2017).
Dividing the work into deciles gives the added benefit of a form of check 
pointing: should any job fail for any reason then the results up to that decile of data 
are preserved. Simple arithmetic demonstrates that a search run on the faster 
machine reduces the elapsed time from 40 hours to 10 hours. Further dividing the 
work space across 100 of the faster speed machines will reduce the elapsed search 
time to .1 hours or six minutes allowing many up to 240 such searches to be 
perfomed.in a calendar day. Another option for the search process is a series of 
FPGAs and at least one product uses USB 3.0 (Xilinx, 2019) which can transfer data 
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at up to 625 MB per second but, again, the speed calculations are difficult (Strenski
, 2008). A 460GB disc would take a minimum of 1.3 hours when the data 
transfer rate is 100MB or just under 15 minutes at the theoretical maximum.
4.8 A Cyber Kill Chain Model
4.8.1 Overview 
This section examines Cyber ; it will 
define a Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), review a selection of CKCs and select one, the 
Lockheed Martin APT Kill Chain, for the thesis. A tabular comparison of some
CKCs will be produced.
Many Kill Chains follow similar designs. The thesis asserts that the 
Lockheed Martin Kill Chain is the seminal design for cyber or IT Security and its 
intellectual paternity can be seen in other Kill Chains, as will be demonstrated.
A Google Trends s (Google-Trends, 2020) from 
2004 to 2020 shows some interest November 2009 and September 2010 and then 
almost constant, rising, interest from November 2011. However, as shall be 
demonstrated, the groundwork had been laid by the USAF in the late 20th century.
symposium by Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, the then Air Force Chief of Staff, in which 
he said:
ognizing the reality that in the first 
quarter of the 21st century, it will become possible to find, fix or track, and target 
(Fogleman, 1996)
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4.8.2 The Business View 
Kaspersky in Smeets state: 
known threats (70%), unknown threats (29%) and advanced threats (1%). (Smeets, 
Undated). However, this is too simplistic: this thesis asserts that this description is 
confusing the technical abilities of attackers with their business sense. As has 
discussed earlier in this thesis it is sensible to deploy the minimum technical attack 
against a potential victim. This thesis further asserts that a true APT will deploy low 
level attacks to appear to be something else. Another problem with the Kaspersky
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view is that there are known and unknown threats i.e. it is a binary choice and so 
there cannot be the third outcome of advanced threats. Additionally, threats may be 
advanced or not.
low-level attack may be devised, built and actioned by an APT but a high-level
technical attack by a non-APT may not. Why would, or should, an attacker deploy
their most technical attack, on which they may have spent much time and money,
against an easy target?
Smeets takes up this issue of the business aspects of malware development: 
; the knowledge required to design 
and acquire the weapon. Second, there are the and costs. Third, 
weapon development often requires an as various actors 
have to work together to
Indeed, for well-funded and resourced APTs one can imagine it being a 
business with associated business controls and economies of scale and economies of 
scope. This would need to be well-managed, perhaps with the victims being viewed 
as customers with associated attributes. This is also an idea touched on, but not 
further developed, with respect to Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
(Wrolstad and Vengerik, 2015, p. 11) who speculate that web analytics tools may be 
used. This thesis suggests that a good, well-organised, well-led and disciplined team 
of attackers should have a list (database) of every attack under development, every 
attack deployed, a unique serial number for each piece of malware and for every 
attack as well as every victim.
What has just been described is a business flow for the APT. This may be 
formalised into a CKC. This thesis will now discuss what a CKC should look like.
4.8.3 What Should a Kill Chain Look Like? 
This thesis asserts that a Kill Chain model should cover every part of the 
attack lifecycle.
Velazquez asserts that 
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Detecting and preventing attacks earlier in the kill chain is critical in 
defending against cyber threats. By implementing defence layers to detect and block 
attacks earlier in the kill chain organizations decreases the amount of remediation 
that needs to be
(Velazquez, 2017, p. 17)
Velazquez provides no evidence for this and this thesis argues that all stages should 
cover detection. Remediation is only needed if an attacker is on the system. No 
remediation is needed is the attacker has been blocked. Velazquez provides no 
evidence for the assertion. Arguably, placing mitigations at the gateway stops 
malware but there are the associated costs of software blocking, monitoring logs, and 
looking for changes in probes to the defences.
Pols builds a Unified Kill Chain (UKC) from the action of one APT by 
UKC has three main stages (Initial Foothold, Network Propagation, Actions on 
Objectives) and subsequent sub-stages (Pols, 2017, p. 78)
work is included in the Kill Chain comparison table.
Pols (Pols, 2017, p. 7) highlights criticisms of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion 
Kill Chain by Engel
ally be detrimental to 
network security because it reinforces old-school, perimeter-focused, malware-
(Engel, 2014)
Engel goes on to confuse method of delivery with malware. This is similar to the 
mixed use of APT as a delivery team and APT as software which has been discussed 
(Hutchins, Clopperty and Amin, 2011, p. 5) but Pols does (Pols, 
2017, p. 20). This thesis has found no evidence for a scenario where the Lockheed 
Martin Intrusion Kill Chain does not describe the attack and asserts that the 
Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain is the best available model from those 
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reviewed into which all cyber-attacks may be fitted and mitigated. Not all attacks 
need to be fitted into the model at once and not every cyber-attack needs to be 
deployed against it all mitigations in the mitigation universe. The Lockheed Martin 
Intrusion Kill Chain is a model into which the defender inserts selected mitigations 
based on the Risk Analysis that has been performed. These mitigations may be 
Pols raises another criticism in that insiders are not hackers and that:
(Reidy, 2013)
This is simply not true. An insider will perform reconnaissance (How do I 
not get caught given the security I have seen in place?), Weaponization (build 
malware), Delivery (Insert USB or type on keyboard, run programs, get data to 
which I should not have access, access website with known malicious code) etc. The 
Insider Threat is a Threat. They are Persistent (they attend their place of work and 
have access to the IT either at work or remotely). They may or not be Advanced but 
as has been asserted and as will be demonstrated, not all APTs need to be advanced.
4.8.4 A Review of Kill Chains 
There appears to be little academic literature on comparisons of CKC. The 
closest to such a comparison (Cho , 2018) diagrammatically depicts five CKCs 
Chains and references four. The authors chose the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill as 
the most representative without reason and without pointing out its seminal place in 
the evolution of CKCs, as has been discussed, above. Elsewhere (Grant, Burke and 
van Heerden, 2012) there is a comparison of seven different attacks which produces 
three different CKC models. This will be discussed later in this section. It appears 
that this thesis is one of the first times that a comprehensive comparison has been 
made.
Given that there appears to be little academic literature on the subject, 
primary data for the author will be mainly white papers produced by AV companies.  
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The white papers are the results and analysis (both qualitative and quantitative) of 
APT attacks which leads this author to suggest that they fall into the class of 
Retrospective Primary data i.e. compiled by the writer after the event, as described 
by Brewer (Brewer, 2000, p. Figure 3.2), although this is categorised as a subset 
across APT attacks through interpolative and extrapolative thoughts and actions. 
Arguably academic research papers do not fall into any of the Brewer categories.
It is noted that the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain which, this thesis 
will select, precedes Kadivar.
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For completeness of the selection review this thesis notes that Grant et al 
(Grant, Burke and van Heerden, 2012) review seven different attacks and distil them 
into a model using SADT (Structured Analysis and Design Technique a meaning 
not elaborated on in the paper but inferred for this thesis), Rational Reconstruction 
and a Canonical Model to produce a five-stage model with multiple sub-stages and 
sub-sub-stages
Fujitsu acknowledge the existence of malware on machines and inherently 
accept the existence of a CKC but are not explicit about it (Torri , 2014). One 
could argue that they have proposed a 3-stage CKC: Spying, System Research, 
Breakout. It is a pity that they did not develop this model to make their counter-
measure process clearer.
One CKC (Trend-Labs, 2014, p. 2) (Trend-Micro, 2013b, pp. 5-7) has six
stages of a Targeted Attack but another Trend Micro CKC has eight stages 
(Kellermann, 2012, p. 7) while a semi-
2 (TrendLabs, 2012a, p. 2). Trend Micro change their model frequently (Trend-
Micro, 2017b) (TrendLabs, 2015b, p. 6), (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 12) (TrendLabs, 
2013b, p. 2) which may have evolved from an earlier model (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 7).
It is possible that Trend Micro are, at least partly, fitting CKC models to observed 
attacks but if they are this in not clear. A consistent CKC, with change management, 
could be used in their analysis. Deviations from this norm could then be 
documented. While it is good practice to develop a specific rule from observations it 
is difficult to see how, if at all, Trend Micro are building a theory from the 
observations. It is possible that different teams within Trend Micro have their own 
views and hence CKC models.
Pernet and Sela seem to be trying to fit the TrendLabs model, above. to the 
specific APT under discussion, which some other AV companies seem to be trying 
to do. To be fair, all of the above is consistent with what we shall see of the 
philosophy of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain of an informed analysis of 
adversary campaigns and therefore an evolving model but at some point, a model 
should be fixed.
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Symantec observed one APT with a 6-stage architecture: 
Stage 0 - Dropper. Installs onto the target computer;
Stage 1 Loads driver, decrypts and executes next stage;
Stage 2 Loads driver, decrypts and executes next stage;
Stage 3 Kernel Framework;
Stage 4 - User Framework and Kernel Modules;
Stage 5 Payload Models.
The initial Stage 1 driver is the only plainly visible code on the computer. 
All other stages are stored as encrypted data blobs, as a file, or within a non-
traditional file storage area such as the registry, extended attributes, or raw sectors at 
the end of disk. (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, pp. 8-11) (n.b. This method 
help support its attack.. Symantec go on to suggest that 
, while Stage 
attribute or a registry key blob
The CKC definitions, above, are now summarised and a selection of Kill 
Chains are cross-referenced in the following table (N.b. An asterisk (*) next to a 





















































































































































































































































































































Incursion 1 3* 2 1*
Initial 
Compromise
2 3 2* 2*
Droppers 1






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data of Interest 5










Table 4-1 Kill Chain Comparison Table (Selected Comparison)
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.:
From the literature and Table 4-1 it can be seen that: 
Lockheed Martin have a 7-stage model (Hutchins, Clopperty and 
M., 2011);
IPA have a 7-stage attack Scenario for targeted email attacks: 
(IPA, 2013, pp. 11-14);
Trend Micro/Trend Labs have a number of models (Trend-Labs, 
2014, p. 2), (Trend-Micro, 2013b, pp. 5-7), (Kellermann, 2012, p. 
7), (TrendLabs, 2012a, p. 2), (Trend-Micro, 2017b) (TrendLabs, 
2015b, p. 6), (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 12), (TrendLabs, 2013b, p. 
2), (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 7);
Grant et al (Grant, Burke and van Heerden, 2012) have a 5-stage 
model with sub-stages and sub-substages;
(Mandiant, 2010, pp. 3, 6) has a 7-stage model. 
However Mandiant later changes this model (Mandiant, 2017, p. 
10) (Mandiant, 2013, p. 27), (Madiant-Consulting, 2016, p. 27),
(Mandiant, 2015a, p. 14);
Symantec uses a four-stage model (Symantec, 2011, pp. 2-6);
Blue Coat uses a four-stage model (Blue-Coat, 2011, p. 6);
Forcepoint uses a seven-stage model  (Forcepoint-Security_Labs, 
2017);
Damballa have different models for different types of malware: 
How the Malware Lifecycle Worked in the Past (1-stage); How 
the Idealized Dropper Lifecycle Works (6 stages); How the 
Idealized Downloader Lifecycle Works (7 stages); How the 
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Crimeware Installation Lifecycle Works (12 stages) (Damballa, 
2016, pp. 2-7);
F-Secure offer four stages in their user centric Chain of
Compromise: (F-Secure, 2016, pp. 2, 22-25, 28-34)
RSA suggest a 4-stage model (Maczuba, 2016, p. 2), (RSA, 2016,
p. 2) which is a subset of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill
Chain;
Assante and Lee have a 2-stage model based on the Lockheed
Martin Intrusion Kill Chain. (Assante and Lee, 2015, pp. 4-12);
McKew has a five phases model (NPR, 2017);
Websense have evolved their 3-stage model (websense, 2011, pp.
3-5) through a five-stage model (websense, 2013) to 7-stage
model (Clark and Robinson, 2013);
Imperva has five stages (Imperva, 2014, p. 2);
EY propose six stages (Miller and Zaveri, 2016, p. 3) as do M86
Security (M86-Security, 2010, p. 3);
InfoSec Institute propose seven stages (InfoSec-Institute, 2017);
CA Technologies have a 12-stage model (ca-Technologies, 2014,
p. 4);
LogRhythm have a 3-stage (LogRhythm, 2013, p. 3) and a later 5-
stage model (LogRhythm, 2014, pp. 2-4);
has a 7-stage model (Mitre, 2018) as well as
a later 11-stage model (Mitre, 2019a);
McAfee illustrate a 5- (McAfee®-Foundstone®-
Professional-Services and McAfee- .And that while all CKCs 
broadly align, there are some that appear disjoint against the majority
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4.8.1 Critical Analysis of The Presented Cyber Kill Chains 
The review of CKCs highlighted that many Kill Chain models can trace their 
lineage directly or indirectly to the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain. For 
example Chen et al (Chen, Desmet and Huygens, 2014) directly reference Hutchins 
(Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 2011), the Kill Chain phases of which can be seen to 
be very similar to the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill chain.
malware or at least control and minimise the d
One taxonomy (Kiwiaa , 2018) follows the LMKC without an
explanation of why this particular Kill Chain was chosen. The taxonomy is very 
Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy against the seven phases of the 
Kill Chain. This seems to be a common restriction. This taxonomy also claims that 
Trojans generally consist of two parts: one for the server; and the other for the client. 
This may be true but both a server and a client are computers and both parts of the 
Trojan will have mechanisms of persistence, as well as mechanisms of action, and 
will need to possess similar methods of concealment from defenders as both parts 
will face the same sort of searches by defenders.
Although there is no reference to the USAF Kill Chain in the Lockheed 
Martin APT Kill Chain (Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 2011), the lineage is obvious 
- :
Reconnaissance - find, fix;
Weaponization - fix, target;
Delivery - target, engage;
Exploitation - engage;
Installation - engage;
Command & Control - track;
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Actions on Objectives - engage, assess.
Many CKCs have the LMKC in their ancestry and some appear to have been 
developed from observation of a single attack without regard for the wider needs and 
issues. This thesis will now reduce the field of competitors to a final selection.
4.8.2 Moving towards Selection of the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain 
In selecting a CKC as a model for this thesis, all models that listed 
machine or network as part of a 
DDOS attack; it may be for ransomware etc. 
Therefore, the models of Trend Micro, Mandiant, Symantec, Blue Coat, 
Force Point, McKew, Imperva, EY, Miller and Zaveri, CA Technologies,
LogRhythm Mitre and McAfee were all rejected. In addition, Trend Micro, 
Damballa and M86 were rejected as they did not have one consistent model, even if 
they had good ideas within those inconsistencies. Assante and Lee were too heavily 
based on the Lockheed Martin Model as were RSA and Maczuba and were therefore 
rejected.
F-Secure have a very clean and memorable Kill Chain, however it
concentrates on entry to wider infection without a clear description of what are the
outcomes of the attack and so their model was rejected.
The last three candidates are Lockheed Martin, IPA and Grant et al. All were 
strong, well-documented and thoughtful but the first two concentrated on malware 
delivery by email
ignored) and the third was designed from an point of view with a final 
Damage, Evaluate operation, Disseminate LL (Lessons Learned). The Grant et al 
model was rejected as it was from an APT viewpoint,
Both Lockheed Martin and IPA separate the initial compromise and 
persistence into two steps but this author feels that any destructive intent could be 
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achieved in one step and would prefer to see initial compromise and persistence in 








The fourth Attacking Infrastructure Building too specific. The 
Attack Plan is directed to towards targeted email attacks but even so, one does not 
ucture for a successful attack. However, defenders 
need to protect that infrastructure as this may be a way into the wider IT system.
IPA have their seventh and final stage as re-infiltration but Lockheed Martin 
This may map to 
Advanced Persistent Threats are a combination of multiple 
factors but IPA are not explicit. - e a 
language or translation issue (it is a Japanese model). There is no need for re-
infiltration if the malware has not been mitigated and is persistent but the IPA 
authors may have meant it to be part of a Command & Control stage.
Like Lockheed Martin, IPA generalise the executing phase. As discussed, 
other models only state exfiltration but the outcome may be to put information onto a 
machine or network e.g. illegal material that would get the victim removed from 
their position or worse.
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only weakness would be there is no continuous 
monitoring but one could argue this is inherent in the Command & Control Stage
The LMKC - - what this thesis will call, a 
quasi-insider attack. Attackers were able resolve the pseudorandom number 
generator of slot machines to predict outcomes and bet accordingly (NPR, 2019a). It 
seems likely that the attackers were able to acquire a least one type of slot machine, 
reverse engineer it and build C&C to support an attack to make money by adjusting 
betting based on the slot machine outcomes by sending electronic messages to the 
players. The LMKC is flexible enough to support description of this attack:
Reconnaissance Obtain and reverse engineer a slot machine.
Search for casinos which use the slot machine;
Weaponization reverse engineer a slot machine, build an app to
aid exploitation;
Delivery send people to casinos with the slot machines;
Exploitation play the slot machines;
Installation continue to play the slot machines;
Command & Control record slot machine outcomes, deliver
outcomes results in real-time, send betting directions back to
player;
Actions on Objectives player bets according to directions
received. Cash out as appropriate.
persistence after installation. However, nstallation is flexible enough to assume 
direct access of the APT team to, and not software on, the machine. The LMKC (or 
mechanism of action) for this attack was broken when members of the team were 
arrested in the US.
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L
- a strong piece of support 
thesis fits. This thesis suggests that the course of action table could be improved by 
as discussed by Smith and Rothwell (Smith and Rothwell, 
2015, p. 4) bringing the full table to Deter, Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, 
Destroy. This thesis combines all such elements.
It is this view that leads this thesis to discuss APT attacks through the vehicle 
of the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has provided the wider business context of APTs and malware.
It supports the first Aim and Objective and has:
discussed the reasons why IT Security is important;
given a history of malware and some of their parallels in the non-
IT, physical world; 
addressed the costs of malware infection to the defender and the 
business positions for both attackers and defenders;
reviewed and compared various Kill Chains and selected the 
Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain for the thesis. 
As stated in the Financial Times (Financial-Times, 2017a) that if one is doing 
something new one should have a good explanation presented in an effective way. 
The subject said that she was going to solve the biggest problem for people who ride 
bikes. It is the biggest problem for a big bunch of people. This gets attention and 
people ask:
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This thesis will address the biggest problem in IT Security: APTs - and 




This chapter introduces open source white papers on APTs and malware and 
supports the first and second Aims and Objectives. It explains aspects of the HDD 
and Windows operating systems where APTs may lie. It links to the first two points 
of the Aims and Objectives:
discover where APTs lie on windows-based systems;
create/build generic views of where APTs lie on Windows based 
systems using an appropriate Cyber Kill Chain (CKC);
In order to understand where malware lies and what it looks like the chapter 
start with a review of a pristine HDD and Windows OS.
Each sub-section starts, where appropriate, with a definition and/or 
description of the subject under review, taken from Microsoft webpages. This is to 
allow the reader to gain an understanding of the subject and how the mitigations 
against APTs fit in.
The malware deployed by an APT may hide in plain sight (i.e. the files may 
be known to the operating system or may be largely invisible to the operation 
intercepting communications between application and the operating system) or not.
APTs use a variety of techniques to make 
this chapter, building on the previous one, to highlight commonalities across APTs 
and malware to produce a set of observations that can be used as a basis for anti-
malware computer programs and associated software.
5.2 HDD and Windows OS Analysis
5.2.1 What does Pristine and Re-formatted HDD Look Like? 
Having discussed how, philosophically, malware may be analysed this thesis 
asserts that first one should know what a pristine system looks like. Without 
knowing what is legitimate and, therefore, expected, one cannot identify the 
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unexpected or abnormal i.e. Categorisation and analysis should not be done on a 
HDD without first having a baseline of what a pristine HDD should look like.
The author bought a new SP USB 3.0 1TB portable HHD and analysed 
random sectors of the HDD by writing and using the program . No 
information on what a pristine HDD should look like could be found and this author 
speculated that it could be all zeros, repeating 0s and 1s or a check pattern. Given 
that it was 1TB it was hypothesised that not all of the HDD would be written to 
(such a business proposition for HDD manufacturers would just take too long for all 
of the product line) and that it would be all 0s. This indeed was the case as far as
could be ascertained. A number of consecutive 5000 sector areas of storage were 
viewed. Apart from the start which contained an MFT (there were indications that it 
was a FATS HDD and some documentation), the observed sectors were all zeros.
Elsewhere, on one of this author's personal machines, there were many 
sectors with all zeros but some had repeating binary pattern) The pristine HDD both 
confirmed (sectors all zeros) contradicted (no repeating binary patterns) what had 
al machine.
A previously used Windows HDD was analysed before and after 
reformatting. The program was used to output the MBR and the full list of 
files. The program sec_check output five different random sectors before and after 
reformatting. These sectors were equal across reformatting. After reformatting all 
files on the disc could not be accessed by Windows 10 but they could be read by 
software developed for this thesis. Simply using Windows OS software to reformat 
the disc does not delete files or cause them to be unreadable by all software. 
The before and after reformatting MBRs were different with different MFT 
Record Size (1024 viz a negative, presumably unallocated number), Sectors Per 
Cluster (8 viz 1), Clusters Per File Record Segment (246 viz 2) MFT logical cluster 
number start (786432 viz 6291456) and two different VSNs. Additionally, two 
separate files for each format containing random sectors were analysed using the MS 
ly affects the 
MBRs. It can, therefore, be stated that although the original files on the reformatted 
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software. The MBR difference table may be viewed in Appendix C.
This leads to an observation on one Windows tool: the GUI for reformatting 
with Disk Management in the Control Panel is not strictly true which. It states that 
on reformatting "All data on the partition will be lost." A simple internet search 
reveals tools that can recover data. One demonstration of a product has the GUI 
(Hetman-Recovery, 2019).
Loss of data after reformatting is not true.
Given the amount of time it would take to overwrite the HDD one assumes 
that Microsoft decided to make it appear to the operating system that the files had 
been deleted. Similarly, this thesis infers that, a pristine HDD may not contain all 
zeros but any position that has not been magnetised will return zero by the HDD 
microcode.
Analysis of the pre and post reformatting of the HDD highlights a 
contradiction in the VSN fields structure description. The VSN is a function of the 
date and time HDD creation or copying as described by Lunt in Section 28.2 (Lunt, 
2004) and is eight hex digits (The conversion is not a 1-1 mapping. Using the 
example given in the reference of 1995 and 21:55, the same result (VSN part), 
0x1D02, can be obtained with 1996 as the year and 21:54 as the hour and minutes). 
Elsewhere the VSN is claimed to be 16 hex digits (Wilkinson, 2017), (LSoft-
Technologies-Inc., 2020a)
digits the first four bytes of the 16 hex digits read as little Endian. The leaves four 
bytes, eight hex digits the middle two overlap with the first two of the VSN.
5.2.2 What Does a Windows Operating System Look Like? 
Having discussed what a pristine HDD looks like attention is now turned to
the OS of choice for this thesis. For a commercially available desktop or laptop a 
Windows OS permits 16 physical drives (0-15) and 26 logical drives (A-Z). Logical 
drives may reside on more than one physical disk. The program , written 
for this thesis, lists all physical and logical drives permitting the analyst the 
opportunity to check the drive structure on the computer. It also list the attributes of 
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the drives e.g. drive size, sector size etc from the MBR. At the high-level Windows 
is laid out one a disc thus (LSoft-Technologies-Inc., 2020b):
Figure 5-1: Windows Schematic on a HDD
5.2.3 Overview of Windows Components 
The major components of the Windows operating system are well known 
(Microsoft, 2017y).
Kernel Mode vs. User Mode:
architecture of the x86 and x64 processor defines four privilege
levels, or rings, to protect system code and data from being overwritten either 
inadvertently or maliciously by code of lesser privilege. Windows uses privilege
level 0 (or ring 0) for kernel mode and privilege level 3 (or ring 3) for user mode. ... 
two levels is that some hardware architectures that were supported in the past (such 
as Compaq Alpha and Silicon Graphics MIPS) implemented only two privilege
levels.
(Russinovich and Solomon, 2009, p. 16)
This is graphically illustrated by Atwood (Atwood, 2008) with the x86 CPU 
hardware protection rings: 
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Figure 5-2: x86 CPU hardware protection rings
Ring 0, or Kernel mode, makes use of kernel specific routines which begin 
Zw. Outside of the kernel, machine information may be acquired by routines such as 
DeviceIOControl and programs may be suspended by the use of  the sleep routine. It 
has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis that APTs build malware out of such 
routines and this observation will be built on.
5.2.4 What happens at Startup? 
It has previously been shown that the Registry RunOnce and Run keys at 
HKLM and HKCU run at start up and both are separated by a call to the start-up
folder. This is discussed by Skoudis and Zeltser (Skoudis and Zeltser, 2004, pp. 191-
201) who quite rightly suggest that their list of registry keys that start programs on 
login or reboot is not exhaustive. It is noted that the registry key name has a limit of 
255 characters while the value name has a limit of 16,383 characters (Microsoft, 
2018u).
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Many APTs (Symantec, 2016a, pp. 13-14) use what is called fileless malware 
to store and run their malware. Fileless is when the malware is stored not as a file 
listed in the MFT but as a file in a key in the Registry. File based protection (stored 
in, and from, the registry) is not a new concept (Symantec-Security-Response, 
2012c, p. 6) and the software developed for this thesis could be modified to work in  
this way. However, as will be discussed the file related date information is not
reliable. Software developed for this thesis addresses this form of attack.
5.3 Executables and DLLs
The Microsoft Portable Executable (PE) format is well documented (Pietrek, 
1994), (Pietrek, 2002),  but is provided here pictorially for convenience:
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Figure 5-3: Structure of a 64-bit Portable Executable (Patel, 2016)
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An executable may be considered a standalone program while a DLL is a 
Dynamic-linked library which may be considered subroutine. The difference 
between an executable and .dll is a one-bit flag (Microsoft, 2018r).
It is generally
order to commence the attack. This malware may be in the form of a set of 
commands, e.g. .bat files, or executables. The malware may be enciphered, or not, 
and may contain hardcoded information, for example URLs to connect (Yaneza, 
2015a, p. 8). Executables may be identified by the filename extension of .exe and the 
use of a specific format, including the MZ two-byte header (Pietrek, 1994).
However, one APT replaces the MZ bytes 
possibly to confuse AV software (Fidelis-Cybersecurity, 2015a, p. 5). These bytes 
are later changed back to MZ when the file is needed.
Malware has  also been seen as a Visual Basic Script, .VBS 
p. 20), (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012b, p. 3), Assembly, Basic, C, Delphi and 
Visual Basic (Suenaga, 2012, pp. 2-3)
Symantec have observed one APT using fileless persistence in the registry. 
The meaning of fileless in this context is that the file, malware, does not have an 
entry in the OS file system. As will be later discussed in this thesis, malware creates 
a Run subkey entry which points to a malicious executable. This is then executed at 
logon. In some cases, the APT uses rundll32.exe, a legitimate Windows executable 
used to load DLLs, and passes several parameters. These parameters include 
JavaScript results in malware
and Gutierrez, 2015, p. 18).
Symantec (Neville and Gibb, 2013, p. 26) have observed a piece of malware 
machine (a dropper) flipping the DLL 
flag in the PE header to change itself from an executable to a DLL.
While Sophos have seen files dropped into folders and registered in Registry 
keys (Szappanos, 2014a, pp. 3, 6, etc.).
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It has been noted that zero length files may be malware (Bontchev, 2006, p. 
9) although no explanation of the mechanism of action is given. However, Hamre 
(Hamre, 2005) The 
use of ADS is not restricted to zero-length files; one or more ADS may be used with 
any length file. The use of ADS is noted elsewhere 
p. 6) and will be addressed later in this thesis.
F-Secure have seen malware constructing concatenating names from a 
common list of two to four
, for example, the malware may be named urllsa.exe or rasdns.exe 
(F-secure-Labs, 2014b, p. 7).
It has earlier been referenced that AV tools easily identify the malware as the 
malware entry point lies outside the legitimate code section (Symantec, 2005). Such 
an action would be easily identifiable but will not be considered in this thesis as it 
has already been done. Elsewhere executable path extensions (.COM; .EXE; .BAT; 













The Services automatic update program is wuauclt.exe and Process 
Hollowing (removing legitimate code and inserting malware) has been observed 
(Malwarebytes, 2018a, p. 7).







5.4 Filename Extensions including Compressed Files
As previously discussed in this thesis (Villeneuve and Bennett, 2012, p. 5), a 
common me is the use of spear phishing with 
.doc files containing malware (Alintanahin, 2015, pp. 2-3), ,
infected (Pernet and Lu, 2015, p. 2) and .exe files being made 
doc) (Microsoft, 2017q). It is also possible
to (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 10), (Suenaga, 
2012, pp. 41-43) (with the latter hiding - If the worm finds a folder, it hides the 
original folder, copies itself using the folder name, and gives it the file extension of 
) or folders by using the associated icon and using right-to-left override 
(RTLO) in UNICODE (TrendLabs, 2014, p. 10), (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 19),
(Kaspersky, 2015a, p. 12) or other software (Nart  Villeneuve , 2014, p. 9), (F-
secure-Labs, 2014b, p. 4). One APT (Pernet and Lu, 2015, p. 8) used free online 
cloud storage and the malicious file had a Microsoft Power Point (.ppt) icon but 
whose extension was .ppt.exe i.e. an .e.g. disguised as a .ppt file. Re-labelling one 
type of file as another is not restricted to .exe, .dll, or .pdf etc.: one piece of malware 
propagates through removable drives (TrendLabs, 2012b, p. 2) or one which uses a 
font file as a .dll extension name (Dela Paz, 2011) or Encrypted Virtual File System 
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(EVFS) containers which contain for example ..evt and .imd file extensions 
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, pp. 11, 14).
Panda Security have seen a self-extracting file disguised with a .pdf icon to 
extract six files into a folder which it creates (Panda-Security, 2015, p. 4). This
attack makes no use of malware, just legitimate tools and scripts (i.e. Living Off the 
Land). Kaspersky (Kaspersky, 2015a, p. 24) have also seen an APT use attacks 
which demonstrate that zero-day techniques are not necessarily needed for efficient
targeted attacks. Using phishing emails, social engineering and homemade tools and
backdoors, the APT infected hundreds of victim computer systems or mobile 
devices. A Living
of this thesis and will be discussed later.
Spear-phishing emails can have various file type attachments. During one 
example of TrendLabs organisational monitoring (TrendLabs, 2012c, p. 2)
TrendLabs found that the most common and shared file types in organisations (e.g., 
.xls, .pdf, .doc, .docx, and .hwp) accounted for 70% of the of spear-phishing email 
attachments.
TrendLabs asserted (TrendLabs, 2012c, pp. 2-3) that executable files were 
not commonly used as spear-phishing email attachments. This is probably because
emails with .exe file attachments are detected and blocked by AV software.
TrendLabs later assert that this is why .exe files are usually compressed and archived 
before being sent as .lzh, .rar, and .zip files. This is consistent with observations 
about .exe files, above.
This is somewhat reflected by one APT attack as documented by Symantec 
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2013, pp. 15-16). Of 35 attachment files the 
extensions were .exe (3 times), .xls (8 times), .doc (7 times), .scr (5 times), .pdf (12 
times). .scr and .7z have been seen by others (Arborsert, 2014, p. 1), .CSS files to 
obfuscate .7z, .RAR files as well as using .PST files (Chang , 2015, pp. 6, 7)
Fireeye support the TrendLabs view (Fireeye, 2014g, p. 6) stating that there 
is a move away from .exe as a filename extension with .zip representing the vast 
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majority at 76.91% of extension names, followed by pdf (11.70%), .exe (3.98%), 
.doc (2.67%) and .pif (1.09%)
Symantec also report (Candid  Wüest, 2014, p. 23) their analysis where, of
the attachments analysed, 38% were .exe and 12% were .src files. Only 6% used 
double extensions like .pdf.exe to fool the user. Also 23% were Microsoft Word 
documents using an exploit to execute custom code on the .
One APT uses non-standard filename extensions e.g. .-MP, .wA-, .Bz7 
(Katsuki, 2012, p. 5) and another uses .Enc (Nart  Villeneuve , 2014, p. 8).
At least one APT specialising in an given economic sector has used Control 
Panel Applet (.cpl) files (Kaspersky-Lab, 2015, p. 3). Each tool in Control Panel is 
represented by a .cpl file in the Windows\ System folder. The .cpl files in the 
Windows\System folder are loaded automatically when you start Control Panel. Note 
that Control Panel files are sometimes loaded using entries in the [MMCPL] section 
of the Control.ini file. (Microsoft, 2017g)
Forcepoint have seen the use of encrypted binary blobs (proprietary device 
drivers) typically packaged into a malicious document via an encrypted binary 
blob within that document. This binary blob often contains a legitimate decoy 
which is not associated, by default, as being a VBScript file. The extensions 
and have been observed. The shellcode is responsible for adding a new file 
association for the file extension which specifies that they should be interpreted as an 
(Settle, Griffin and Toro, 2016, p. 17). Other filenames include 
.tmp (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015a, p. 10) and Cabinet Files .cab (Kaspersky, 
2014f, pp. 8-11, 13).
A cabinet is a single file, usually with a .cab extension, that stores 
compressed files in a file library. The cabinet format is an efficient way to package 
multiple files because compression is performed across file boundaries, which 
(Microsoft, 2018c)
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There is no single compression algorithm or methodology used in Information 
Technology and each has its own extension name. Christiansen provides a review of 
a variety of compression formats (Christiansen, 2010, p. 25).
5.5 Alternate Data Streams (ADS)
Russinovich (Russinovich, 2016) observes that NTFS allows applications to 
create alternate data streams. All data is stored, by default in a file's main unnamed 
data stream, alternates may be written to and read . A Microsoft graphic supports 
this definition (Microsoft, 2009b). An ADS carrying malware may also be known as 
(Symantec, 2007).
The problem with ADS is that Windows and many applications make use of 
it (Broomfield, 2017). For example the USN change journal uses two alternate data 
streams (Russon and Fledel, Undated, pp. 60-62). However, ADS cannot be sent 
over TCP/IP to a remote network. Attempting to do so results only the main stream
being sent. ADS cannot be copied, transferred or exist in a non-NTFS environment.  
Any attempt results in transferring the main stream and not the ADS (Martini, 
Zaharis and Ilioudis, 2008).
It is claimed (Mahajan, Singh and Miglani, 2014) that ADS can be hidden 
behind any existing system file and that multiple files can be added behind a single 
file. ADS are not affected by moving or copying; and that the existing file is 
unaffected by the ADS but the original reference cannot be found. The same authors 
also state that file system backup only backup the default streams of the file and 
therefore backups of ADS cannot be created. 
Mahajan et al further claim  that Microsoft Word uses ADS attached to the 
document to store annotations but the reference (Berghel and Brajkovska, 2004 )
does not mention this. A wider list of ADS features is available (Mahajan, 2016)
5.6 Use of Hidden Files
Microsoft® files may be Hidden or not. The Windows OS Hidden attribute 
ensures that the files are not viewable by the user with the normal Windows 
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operating system software (Sancho , 2012, p. 2). They are viewable, however, 
using the comman cmd.exe window. The use of the Hidden 
(Chang , 2015, p. 26). While Fireeye (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 37) note the use of a 
hidden file.
Rootkits can hide processes, registry keys, and other evidence of the 
existence of malicious software in a computer. (Goncharov, 2012, p. 15). Symantec 
have noted (Falliere, Murchu and Chien, 2011, p. 24). The file sizes are between 
4Kb and 8Mb. They also note the uses of 
Shortcut to .lnk Copy of Copy of Copy of Shortcut to. .lnk etc.
F-Secure have also seen the use of a LNK file in the start-up folder with the 
LNK file being a shortcut to the main dll using rundll32.exe (F-Secure-Labs, 2014a, 
p. 10).
Although not a hidden file in the true sense of the word at least one APT has 
been using software that is legitimately used to hide contents from those who would 
pirate those contents (Chen and Li, 2015, pp. 6-8).
Kaspersky have seen malware set its attributes to Hidden and System if they 
are not already set as such before connecting to the C&C server (Kaspersky, 2013d, 
p. 29) as well as seeing a LNK file in the Startup folder which is later removed 
(Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 38).
Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2013e, p. 16) a driver whose purpose is to 
hide malware network connections which the driver has established. For example, if 
the user decides to check a list of connections while the bot (malware) is
communicating to its control, the driver will protect and hide the malware 
connections. Many Windows rootkits use this technique.
F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2015c, p. 3) have seen an APT which requires the 
victim to click on a zipped file. This is launched and looks for a specific Dynamic 
Link Library (DLL) file, fbgen.dat, from a defined Dropbox file sharing link. If the 
file is found and successfully downloaded, the Java executable (JAR) file executes it 
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silent registration of DLL. This ensures that
dialogue boxes are not displayed and so hides execution from the user.
There are few references in AV company literature to the use of Alternate 
Data Streams (eset, 2017, p. 14), (Wyke, 2012a, p. 17), (Giuliani, 2011, p. 2) which 
cover just two APTs. Either AV companies are withholding this information as 
intellectual property, AV companies are not looking for the use of ADS or AV 
companies have been looking for, and have not found, the use of ADS. 
The use of a hidden console window has been seen in support of a keylogger 
(Kaspersky, 2014c, p. 2).
5.7 Use of the Windows Recycle Bin
Both RSA (RSA, 2014, p. 33), Sophos (Wyke, 2012b, p. 7) and Kaspersky 
(Kaspersky, 2013e, pp. 31, 47) have seen malware hidden in the Windows recycle 
bin. While Fidel Cybersecurity have seen use of %APPDATA%, 
%USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, AND %TEMP% as well as a USB 
drive $RECYCLE.BIN (Fidel-Cybersecurity, 2016, p. 4). Novetta have seen 
%TEMP% (Novetta, Unknown, p. 7), %PROGRAMFILES%, %WINDIR% 
(Novetta, Unknown, p. 10), %SYSDIR% (Novetta, Unknown, p. 17) and Kaspersky
%SYSTEM%, %APPDATA% (Kaspersky, 2014f, p. 10)
5.8 Process Camouflage
Process Camouflage is the description given to well-named processes that do 
not attract attention. They may be slight variations on legitimate operating system 
process names whose binaries reside in non-standard locations. They may also be 
variations of common processes (Harbour, 2007). Fireeye (Fireeye and Mandiant, 
2014, p. 14) re-enforce this by stating that malware is given a benign looking name.
Alternatively the malware may inject itself into a legitimate process such as 
svchost.exe (Dela Paz, 2012, p. 4), taskmgr.exe (Kharouni, 2015, p. 4) or
services.exe (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, p. 11). Symantec report that one 
APT injects into svchost.exe using ZwQueueApcThread (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2015b, p. 13). McAfee also report the injection of svchost.exe by an 
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unspecified mechanism with one of two DLLs depending on operating system 
(Sherstobitoff, Liba and Walter, 2013, p. 14) . Others may simply install itself as a 
Windows service as described Section 5.14.4.
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2010, p. 8)
Bac
60% was made up of Windows Service (76%); HKLM Run Registry Key, other 
(3%) -Persistent 
Backdoors 30% used process injection
backdoors presumably includes the Startup folder.
These statistics are somewhat confusing:  presumably this means that 40% 
malware used Non-Persistent Backdoors and of these 30% used process injection to
avoid de Such 
injection may be done by a binder (Pernet, 2016, pp. 22-23), (Cylance, 2016, p. 33)
or a joiner (Goncharov, 2012, p. 2) and although not identified as being modified by 
a binder Katsuki (Katsuki, 2012, pp. 6-7) noted that a legitimate application had an 
entry point modified to launch appended code. Katsuki goes on to note that a 
legitimate SSH client had been modified to become an installer.
Injection may also be by reflective injection (Fewer, 2008) which the ability 
of a program to modify its own code (Malenfant, Jacques and Demers, 1996)
In Section 5.8, Process Camouflage, one malware builder makes the malware 
self-
such as Word and PDF documents, Excel workbooks, CHM-compiled help files, and 
The process may also set the font code to match the background 
colour making it look like there is no content (Gábor Szappanos, 2016, pp. 4, 15).
Ször and Ferrie discuss different types of obfuscation (e.g.  encryption, 
oligomorphism, polymorphism and metamorphism) and state that:
format applications), is not infected already (the 
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header. Windows applications do 
not generally use this field), and is a Portable Executable file.
(Ször and Ferrie, 2003, p. 16).
Svchost.exe has been seen in conjunction with DeviceIOControl (Florio and 
Kasslin, 2009, p. 5) which will be discussed later in this thesis.
5.9 Miscellaneous Windows Functionality
5.9.1 Shadow Copy 
implements a framework to allow volume backups to be performed while 
(Microsoft, 2018w)
Sophos have seen ransomware deleting shadow storage using vssadmin.exe 
(Wyke and Ajjan, 2015, pp. 4, 14, 53), as well using other software to perform the 
same task (Wyke and Ajjan, 2015, p. 51). Panda Security have also seen malware 
delete shadow copy (Panda-Security, 2017, pp. 2, 5). While in a review of 10 
ransomware families Sophos (Loman, 2019, pp. 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27-28)
have seen ransomware deleting shadow storage in eight of the families.
5.9.2 Use of Directories 
Following payload execution the decoy document is decrypted and then 
saved into the Windows temporary directory (Trend-Micro-Threat-Research-Team, 
2012, p. 4), %ALLUSERPROFILE%\Application Data\default (Kruse, Hacquebord 
and McArdle, 2012, p. 9).
5.9.3 Use of Computer Specific Information 
The Volume Serial Number (VSN) may be used in the attack (Kruse, 
Hacquebord and McArdle, 2012, p. 11) as a bot id. Fireeye (Fireeye, 2015a, p. 16)
have seen malware with 45 encoded hard disk serial numbers hardcoded within the 
controller binary and this will only run if there is a match. Kaspersky have seen  
(Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 26) the VSN used as a basis for an encryption key: a unique
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system ID is constructed from a hash of the system drive VSN which comprises two
hash algorithms: a custom algorithm and then MD5.
5.9.4 Bypassing Security Controls 
Some APTs check the infected machine for AV protections and disable them. 
One such APT disables the Firewall, default Windows protection and UAC. Using 
WMI it checks for other security products  (Yaneza and Mendoza, 2016, p. 2).
Another APT (Alintanahin, 2015, pp. 4-5) performs a similar check while yet 
another (Falliere, Murchu and Chien, 2011, p. 14) looks for known AV products to 
inject malware.
Kaspersky (Kaspersky, 2017a, p. 8) have also seen UAC bypassing where a
changing 
the relevant registry key.
5.9.5 Residing in Unused HDD Space 
An APT may hide in any unused space on the HDD (Symantec-
Security-Response, 2012c, p. 3). Palumbo has seen one APT overwriting its stage #1 
component on the HDD before freeing the memory space (Palumbo, 2014b, pp. 6-7).
An attack which also sees the use of an APT using a enciphered VM before payload 
deployment of a PE32+.
5.10 Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is the infrastructure for 
management data and operations on Windows-based operating systems. You can 
write WMI scripts or applications to automate administrative tasks on remote 
computers but WMI also supplies management data to other parts of the operating 
(Microsoft, 2017al).
WMI runs as a service and starts automatically at system start-up under the
LocalHost account. If it is not running it will start automatically when the first script 
or management application request connection to a WMI namespace. Stopping WMI 
is not an option as other services including Windows firewall will also stop 
(Microsoft, 2018v).
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Microsoft (Microsoft, 2009c) present WMIC which is a way of taking 
command line control of WMI, something observed by Mandiant (Mandiant, 2017, 
p. 14) for persistence and Mandiant express the opinion that PowerShell is the most 
powerful way to interact with WMI (Mandiant, 2015b)
Persistence may be established by using WMI (Trend-Micro.Forward-
Looking-Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 3) and also being a repository from which 
attacks may be run (Dizon, Galang and Cruz, 2010). In addition WMI may be used 
to check the files opened by victims and APTs can easily determine and collate these 
files for exfiltration (Trend-Micro, 2013c, p. 4). 
Trend Micro (TrendMicro, 2013, p. 5) observe that remote control tools 
allow APTs to access other desktops in the network and execute programs, schedule
tasks, and manage data collections on other systems. Cylance note (Cylance, 2016, p. 
39) that PsExec can be used to run commands on any other machine which accepts 
those domain credentials and that if this is combined with cached credential 
dumping, it can be used on a compromised network to jump from machine to 
machine.
FireEye have produced a discussion of WMI attacks and defence (Ballenthin, 
Graeber and Teodorescu, 2015).
Kaspersky have seen WMI used to collect information from profile directory 
lnk files and user information that available from remote registries (Kaspersky, 
2015b, p. 20) as have Mandiant to collect run data (Mandiant, 2015a, p. 16),  
5.11 Multiple APTs on One System
Kaspersky have seen an APT which stored malware at the end of the last 
partition on disk (Kaspersky, 2014e, p. 6), while Palumbo has seen an APT store the 
payload in the gap between the past partition on the disc and the end of the disk 
(Palumbo, 2014b). This has the potential for APT collisions on a system which may 
cause problems for one, both or all APTs on the system and may look like good 
defence by the victim.
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Although having two different APTs on the same machine sounds 
unbelievable, Kaspersky have identified one computer which is infected by at least 
six different, probably unrelated, APTs (Kaspersky, 2015c, p. 31), (Kaspersky, 
2014e, p. 3). As an aside this is interesting for at least two reasons: either that some
of the APTs know that others are on the machine and seem to have an unspoken tacit 
agreement to leave each other alone; or they do not check for other APTs on the 
system and therefore may not get all the data they require as another APT may be 
restricting access to files.
However, aggressive responses are unusual but not unknown: one APT found 
itself the victim of a spear phishing attack and responded with malware (Emm ,
2015, p. 6). Elsewhere Kaspersky have seen false flag operations where malware 
used by one APT was deployed by another (Kaspersky, 2014d, pp. 71-72).
5.12 Windows Kernel, ZwXxx and NtXxx Routines and Other 
Interventions
Zw routines provide a set of system entry points that parallel some 
of the executive's system services. Calling a Zw routine from kernel-mode code 
results in a call to the corresponding system service. Calling a Zw routine from 
user mode is not supported; instead, native applications (applications that bypass the 
Microsoft Win32 subsystem) should call the Nt equivalent of the Zw
(Microsoft, 2018x).
Zw routines are called from kernel mode and use of these routines, while not 
evidence of malware, may be an Indicator of Compromise (IOC). For example, one 
piece of malware uses a .dll which uses at least seven Zw routines (Falliere, Murchu 
and Chien, 2011, pp. 13, 30) and another uses at least two (Neville and Gibb, 2013, 
p. 19).
Symantec has seen the use of at least eight Zw routines (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2015d, pp. 12, 14) while McAfee highlight the use of 
ZwAllocateVirtualMemory to allocate user space from the kernel (McAfee-Labs-
Threat-Advisory, 2014). F-Secure have also seen the use of Zw routines where the
124
bootkit created a system thread via PsCreateSystemThread which loads the kernel 
payload by reading it from
(F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 9).
5.13 Hooks
-handling mechanism where an 
application can install a subroutine to monitor the message traffic in the system and 
process certain types of messages before they 
(Microsoft, 2018m)
An APT Hooks onto the kernel filesystem device stack and obfuscates the 
IRP file buffer for protected files (Bingham, 2012, p. 4). File buffering allows 
drivers which service slow devices (i.e. those which transfer small amounts of data) 
to improve memory usage. It is generally used by such as mouse, keyboard and 
video (Microsoft, 2017ah).
A hook may be used to evade file-based Sandboxes. This is done by using the 
SetWindowsHookEx function (Microsoft, 2017ae) (Singh and Bu, 2014, pp. 4-5).
The function monitors the system for a specific type of event e.g. a mouse click or 
other human actioned events. When this occurs, malware is called. Similarly a 
keyboard logger has been seen using GetAsyncKeyState (Fireeye, 2015b, pp. 21-22).
This code may have been based on a publicly available keylogger (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 
22)
File-based sandboxes can identify malware by monitoring OS processes. This 
is done by PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine. One piece of malware uses 
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine to remove all registered call backs which would 
include those from security software (Singh and Bu, 2014, pp. 14-15).
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is a technique where an APT can bring 
about arbitrary behaviour in a program from control flow diverted by the APT. This 
is done without code injection. ROP chains are short instruction sequences in the 
ends in a return instruction. A ROP Chain 
attack has been noted by Sophos (Gabor Szappanos, 2016), (Szappanos, 2015a).
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(Kaspersky, 2015b, p. 4) APT using a Word 
Document which contained an exploit for a zero-day vulnerability. This malware 
relied on a malicious embedded True Type Font File (TTF) which allowed the APT
to jump directly into Kernel mode from the Word Document, which Kaspersky 
Other computers in the 
domain were infected by a few different strategies and in most of the attacks, the
APT prepared Microsoft Windows Installer Packages (MSI), which were then 
deployed remotely to other machines. These were then launched as a service using 
msiexec. The Task Scheduler was also used to start msiexec remotely.
5.14 Persistence through Startup Mechanisms
5.14.1 General 
Villeneuve observes that:
such as adding the malware executable to the windows Startup folder, modifying the 
Run keys in the Windows Registry or installing an application as a Windows 
Service. The security form (sic) Mandiant found that 97% of the targeted malware 
they analyzed
(Villeneuve, 2011, p. 13).
Mandiant list (Madiant-Consulting, 2016, pp. 28-35) a number of persistence 
mechanisms: Windows Services; Windows Registry; DLL search-order hijacking; 
Modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO); Use of Common Object Model 
(COM) objects; Modification of existing binaries; Windows scheduled tasks; 
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI); Malicious Windows Security 
Packages; and MBR and VBR bootkits. Glyer (Glyer, 2010, p. 6) provides a variety 
of examples as well as Mandiant (Mandiant, 2017, p. 14)
Chien states (Chien, 2005, pp. 13-14) that Windows has load points at 
different times during start-up e.g. when Windows starts, user log in, when the shell 
(Explorer) starts, and when applications start and that almost all malware uses at 
least one load point to ensure persistence across reboots. Having more than one 
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mechanism of action, load point or persistence mode is not unusual: one APT has the 
ability to gain persistence through six different persistence modes: ShellAutorun; 
HiddenTaskAutorun; ScreenSaverAutorun; StartupAutorun; Task 
SchedulerAutorun; LinkAutorun (eset, 2017, pp. 9-11).
One APT has been seen changing the path of the startup folder (eset, 2013, p. 
12).
5.14.2 Registry Keys 
The is a system-defined database in which applications and system 
components store and retrieve configuration data. The data stored in the registry 
varies according to the version of Microsoft® Windows. Applications use the 
registry API to retrieve, modify, o
(Microsoft, 2017aa)
Malware persistence may be achieved at reboot by installing Registry entries 
(Microsoft, 2017ab) which facilitate automatic start-up of software, (Microsoft, 
2017ag) as directed by userint (Microsoft, 2010). Persistence can also be achieved by 
adding entries to one or more of the following registry keys and the following list of 
malware using these keys are documented:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Curre
ntVersion\Run (Symantec-Security-Response, 2013, p. 14),
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2014, p. 11), (Virus-Bulletin, 
2012, p. 10), (F-Secure-Labs, 2015a, p. 4), (Chang , 2015, 
pp. 24-25), (Anthe , 2015, p. 11);
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current
Version\Run (Trend-Micro-Cyber-Safety-Solutions-Team, 2016, 
p. 2), (Trend-Micro-Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 3), (Kruse, 
Hacquebord and McArdle, 2012, p. 7), (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 
24), (Trend-Micro-Incorporated, 2015, p. 3), (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2013, p. 14), (Katsuki, 2012, p. 6), (Symantec-
Security-Response, 2014, p. 11),
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p. 8), (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 27), (Szappanos, 2014b, p. 4), (Rivera 
and Inocencio, 2016, pp. 73, 77-78 etc.), (Kaspersky-Lab, 2015, 
p. 13), (Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 27), (Kaspersky, 2013e, p. 38),
(Settle, Griffin and Toro, 2016, p. 22), (Damballa, 2014b, p. 3),
(Manos  Antonakakis , 2012, p. 5), (F-Secure-Labs, 2015a, p. 
4), (F-Secure-Labs, 2015c, p. 3), (Gross and Cylance-Spear-
Team, 2016, p. 13), (Langill, 2014, pp. 13-15), (Fidelis-
Cybersecurity-Solutions, 2015, p. 12), (Fidelis-Cybersecurity, 
2015a, p. 11), (eset, 2016b, p. 14), (eset, 2015, p. 17), (Check-
Point, 2015, p. 33), (Arborsert, 2014, p. 3), (Arborsert, 2015, p. 
6), (Guarnieri and Anderson, 2016, p. 48), (CrowdStrike, 2014b, 
p. 35), (Clearsky, 2015, p. 16), (Haq , 2014, p. 10), (Panda, 
2017, pp. 14, 33);
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Curre
ntVersion\RunOnce (Kharouni, 2015, p. 5), (Settle, Griffin and 
Toro, 2016, pp. 19, 42), (Check-Point, 2015, p. 33), (Fireeye, 
2015a, p. 47), (Panda, 2017, p. 33);
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current
Version\RunOnce (Chang , 2015, p. 36).
There is an order for actioning registry keys and running programs in the 
startup folder (Microsoft, 2018p).
Modification of other registry keys to facilitate attacks is known to occur 
(Kruse, Hacquebord and McArdle, 2012, p. 9) (Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011, p. 7),
Fireeye have observed a common piece of malware being custom load and 
only extracted into memory to bypass AV controls. The custom malware uses 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for 
persistence (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 25).
Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2015c, p. 10) persistence through shellcode 
from the registry: The malware starts Windows and launches a multi-stage (four to 
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five stages) mechanism of decryption before execution within the Windows. The 
malware then runs the modules that are stored inside the Windows registry. Each 
stage decodes and executes the next, and the entire suite will start after successful 
execution of all levels. Should an error occur the entire malware suite self-destructs.
The implementation may have been designed this way to make it invisible to AV
products. When used with the bootkit, all the modules as well as the stolen data are 
stored encrypted in the registry and dynamically decrypted and executed. No
executable malware modules are on the infected filesystem (Kaspersky, 2015c, p. 
12).
5.14.3 Startup Folder 
Another way to ensure persistence is to create a shortcut in the Startup folder 
(Villeneuve, 2011, p. 13) or to change the common Startup folder to a specially 
created one. The existence of the new folder is constantly checked and redone if it is 
changed back to normal (Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011, p. 7).
5.14.4 Windows Service. Kernel Service, Raised Privileges 
Microsoft® Windows services, formerly known as NT services, enable you 
to create long-running executable applications that run in their own Windows 
sessions. These services can be automatically started when the computer boots, can 
be paused and restarted, and do not show any user interface. These features make 
services ideal for use on a server or whenever you need long-running functionality 
(Microsoft, 2017s).  A database of installed services is maintained by SCM in the 
registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
(Microsoft, 2017f).
Malware may be installed as a Windows service, (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2015d, p. 5) or may be installed by looking for inactive services and, on 
success, killing one at random and then starting up malware with that service s name 
(Trend-Micro-Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 5). MacAfee have also seen 
(McAfee®-Foundstone®-Professional-Services, 2017, pp. 11-12) persistence being 
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achieved through the use of Windows Service or Kernel Service. Damballa have 
seen an APT installing a kernel driver (Damballa, 2014b, p. 6).
Fireeye have seen at least one APT use schtasks, the Microsoft tasks 
schedular, to a create a service (Carr, 2017). F-Secure have seen (F-secure-Labs, 
2014b, p. 7) use of a Windows Service to open a handle to explorer.exe process and
duplicate its process token, It then reads the path of the malware binary from a
registry and starts the malware using the duplicated process token.
Mandiant have seen use of phishing for OAuth tokens (Mandiant, 2017, p. 
16). OAuth is an open standard to share information without a password. With these 
tokens an attacker can bypass multi-
data.
Kaspersky have also seen (Kaspersky, 2013c, pp. 26-27) the use of system 
services - a Win32 PE executable file compiled in Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0. It
drops a .dll file and registers it as a system service. The 
malware takes a suitable service name from one of the values in the registry.
5.15 Intra and inter-process Communication
5.15.1 Threads 
Many APTs are automated and intra and inter-process communication allows 
APTs to check to see the malware is running on the target machine.
is the entity within a process that can be scheduled for execution. 
All threads of a process share its virtual address space and system resources. In 
addition, each thread maintains exception handlers, a scheduling priority, thread 
local storage, a unique thread identifier, and a set of structures the system will use to 
(Microsoft, 2018b)
Kaspersky have seen the use of threads for intra-process C&C (Kaspersky, 
2013d, p. 29).
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5.15.2 Export Tables 
difference a DLL file contains an exports table. The exports table contains the 
name of every function that the DLL exports to other executables. These functions 
are the entry points into the DLL; only the functions in the exports table can be 
(Microsoft, 2017m)
r DLL is to export them by 
name. This is what happens when you use __declspec(dllexport), for example. But 
you can instead export functions by ordinal. With this technique, you must use a .def 
file instead of __declspec(dllexport). To specify a function's ordinal value, append 
(Microsoft, 2017n)
As APTs run, the malware may pass execution to other routines. For 
example, Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2015b, p. 10) one piece of malware pass 
the execution to the second exported function in export table. This ignores the 
export name and relies on the order of functions in the table of PE export ordinals.
At time export function is called a next stage structure pointer is passed to it so that it 
can use some of the values set on the upper layer.
Export by Ordinal has been seen  by Palumbo (Palumbo, 2014b, pp. 6, 14)
5.15.3 Server Message Block (SMB) 
protocol, and as implemented in Microsoft Windows is known as Microsoft SMB 
Protocol. The set of message packets that defines a particular version of the protocol 
is called a dialect. The Common Internet File System (CIFS) Protocol is a dialect of 
SMB. Both SMB and CIFS are also available on VMS, several versions of Unix, and 
(Microsoft, 2017w).
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Cyrus (Cyrus, 2016, p. 4) gives examples of APTs using SMB. At least one 
of the references (Nart Villeneuve , 2014) does not explicitly mention SMB but 
elsewhere (Cylance, 2016, pp. 10, 28, 39) it does.
5.15.4 Mutexes and Pipes 
A mutex is:
A synchronization primitive that can also be used for interprocess 
synchronization (Microsoft, 2017x). APTs may use more than one mutex in their 
malware (Kharouni, 2015, pp. 2,4-5,8-9).
One malware tool offers creation of random mutex names (Villeneuve and 
Bennett, 2014).
is a section of shared memory that processes use for communication. 
The process that creates a pipe is the . A process that connects to a pipe is 
a . One process writes information to the pipe, then the other process reads 
(Microsoft, 2018s)
Malware has been seen communicating through named pipes (Symantec-
Security-Response, 2015b, p. 14), (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, p. 15):
A list of mutexes and pipes recovered from the white paper reading is 
retained separately to this thesis.
5.15.5 Mailslot 
functions to access it. The data in a mailslot message can be in any form, but cannot 
be larger than 424 bytes when sent between computers. Unlike disk files, mailslots 
are temporary. When all handles to a mailslot are closed, the mailslot and all the data 
(Microsoft, 2018a)
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As part of a C&C mechanism Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2015b, pp. 
33-34) the use network pipes and mailslots as well as raw filtering of network traffic 
and masking C&C traffic inside image files. Kaspersky also mention that the use of 
mailslots has been inspired by another APT they have seen (Kaspersky, 2014e, p. 
14). Interestingly, Symantec note the same use of mailslots by the other APT 
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, p. 12). F-Secure, who have seen the same 
APT do not mention the use of mailslots in either of their reports 0n the other APT 
(Palumbo, 2014a) (Palumbo, 2014b).
5.16 Anti-Anti-Malware Techniques
In order to evade detection, some APTs use anti-anti-malware techniques
which Symantec summarise (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b, pp. 12, 20-21) as: 
Anti-debug; Anti-emulation; Anti-VM; Packing/compression; Obfuscation; Host-
based encryption; Network-based encryption; Server-side tricks; Anti-AV Company. 
as well as password encrypting malware in a zip archive then compressing the
file again hoping to bypass email gateway filters (Candid Wüest, 2014b, p. 15).
Fireeye discuss a number of ways to evade sandboxes (Singh and Bu, 2014).
For example, -virtual machine 
heuristic. Specifically, the GetTickCount function is called and a loop is executed 
999,999,990 times that simply increments a variable. After this loop completes, 
GetTickCount is called again and the values are compared. If they are the same, the 
(Nart Villeneuve , 2014, p. 7). FireEye also discuss the use 
of anti-virus and sand box detection, one of example of the latter being with WMI 
and PowerShell (Ballenthin, Graeber and Teodorescu, 2015, pp. 21-24)
SecureWorks reports five ways that advanced malware avoids sandboxes:
Stalling - Malware performs useless CPU cycles disguised to look 
like non-malicious activity;
Interaction - Malware determines whether it is on a real-live PC 
by lying dormant until predetermined human interaction is 
initiated;
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Environment Check - Malware checks the environment for a 
virtual machine or well-known registry keys/files that would 
signify a sandbox;
Fingerprint - Malware computes a unique host fingerprint upon 
arrival in environment. When malware starts execution, a new 
host fingerprint is computed and compared against original to 
determine if in a different environment;
Sleep - Using sleep calls, malware refrains from suspicious 
behavior during monitoring.
(Dell-SecureWorks, 2015)
Fireeye also highlights one APT attempting to disable an AV security 
(McAfee-
Labs-Threat-Advisory, 2014, p. 3)
range of AV products as well as disabling features (Settle, Griffin and Toro, 2016, 
pp. 39-40) for example disabling the registry (Microsoft, 2017i)
Although not-strictly an AV mechanism, McAfee have seen a piece of 
malware check for a debug file, exiting if found. It is believed that this is included to 
(McAfee-Labs, 2016, p. 29).
Another IOC may be the use of DeviceIoControl function. Also the use of 
IRP_MJ_READ request which can be used when a kernel-mode component has 
called ZwReadFile (Kaspersky, 2014f, pp. 51, 54). Other IRP requests may be an 
IOC.
Sophos have seen one piece of malware attempting to disable some AV 
(Microsoft, 2017ai), (Wyke, 2014, p. 10). Sophos have also seen one piece of 
malware change the dropper so that checksum detection will not work (Wyke, 2011, 
p. 6).
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Virus Bulletin report malware choking the anti-virus engine by entering a 
loop of 271 API calls using a combination of GetWindowThreadProcessId, 
GetWindowRect and GetDlgItemTextA APIs. This loop has (0x9C40) 40,000
iterations, generating a total of 10,840,000 API calls. Following this the malware 
sleeps for 200 milliseconds then continues with the rest of the code. (Virus-Bulletin, 
2013, p. 6).
Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2014e, p. 10) an APT analysing 24 VFSes
(Virtual File Systems) from victims around the world. These have generally been 
random names and are located in several places in the infected system. Kaspersky 
have also seen a VFS stored as a .exe file (Kaspersky, 2016a, p. 7). Elsewhere 
Kapsersky have observed the modus operandi of one APT which suggested the APT
had analysed the patches and implemented a better way to patch new changes 
(Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 5). In the same attack the malicious payload was spilt into two 
pieces in two different zones of responsibility, to attempt to hide from anyone who
would investigate. Kaspersky go on to state that they have seen this technique at 
least twice and believe that it is not a coincidence. (Kaspersky, 2017b, pp. 11-12).
For this same APT Kaspersky go on to say that the APT:
knows the value of quality code, which is why we normally see rudimentary 
backdoors being pushed during the first stage of infection. Burning those doesn't 
cause too much impact on the group. However, if the first stage backdoor reports an 
interesting infection it starts deploying more advanced code, carefully protecting it 
from accidental detection on disk. The code is wrapped into a DLL loader or stored 
in an encrypted container, or maybe hidden in a binary encrypted registry value. It 
usually comes with an installer that only the attackers can use, because they 
(Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 24)
F-Secure have seen (F-Secure-Labs, 2015a, p. 3) an APT which first checks 
to see if an anti-virus product installed . Should one be 
found, it will be checked against a list of product names. Should there be a match,
the dropper exits. Newer versions of the dropper will perform checks see if it is in a 
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VM or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Again, should either occur,
the dropper will exit.
Elsewhere an APT has been observed (Fidelis-Cybersecurity-Solutions, 
2015, pp. 5-7) disabling AV software by changing the values of various registry 
keys. 
exploited: Microsoft Malware Protection Engine does not properly scan a specially 
Microsoft is not aware of active 
(Microsoft, 2017d, 2017e).
Placing malware in AV products would be a good way to gain persistence as 
AV products, by definition, need to run to look for malware.
Elsewhere (Barysevich, Moriuchi and Hatheway, 2017, p. 8) have seen 
persistent malware which is hidden from the Task Manager and can be restored if 
deleted. Also seen are counterfeit certificates registered under legitimate 
corporations (Barysevich, 2018, pp. 1-2)
5.17 Coding
Attacks are coded in a range of languages: NET (Yaneza, 2015a, p. 7) Python
(.pyc) (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012a, p. 6). C++ and Python libraries  
(Fireeye, 2015b, p. 28).
5.18 Auto-Obfuscation
Symantec state that obfuscation might deceive automated analysis but not an 
observant security analyst. They further assert that if code [a PowerShell script] is 
obfuscated then it is likely to be malicious and suggest looking for a high number of 
quotation marks or curly brackets (Symantec, 2016a, p. 17). They also briefly 
discuss entropy. They assert that most PowerShell scripts use ExecutionPolicy and 
NoProfile parameters which are good indicators of compromise. Other keywords e.g. 
MSBuildShell may be invoked. 
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IRP_. It will also be necessary to identify IPv4 and IPv6 addresses as well as website 
names.
5.19 Malware File Lengths
Fireeye (Fireeye and BT, 2015, p. 13) point out that with rare exceptions,
malware typically has a small size which is usually no larger than a few hundred 
kilobytes. For example, Fireeye (Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, p. 12) have seen one 
piece of malware (a Web shell) with a size of 73 bytes, for the ASPX version, or four 
kilobytes on disk. This malware written in a variety of languages such as ASP, 
ASPX, PHP, JSP, and CFM. (Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, pp. 7, 15), Delphi (Nart  
Villeneuve , 2014, p. 7). Other Web shells seen are 619 bytes and 8,527 bytes 
(Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, p. 12)
Kaspersky have seen a file of 27Kb (Kaspersky, 2014a, p. 15) and also a file 
of 4-5Kb (Kaspersky, 2016a, p. 7) and a file of 20KB (Kaspersky, 2013b, p. 6).
However Fireeye also observed APTs using a 10MB file (it was padded with 
nulls) presumably this is because most AV do not have the ability to scan larger files 
(Haq , 2014, p. 8)
Loman describes how one piece of ransomware sets files for deletion and 
then sets their file lengths (Loman, 2019, p. 10) to zero, something which is 
describe
make no mention of this technique (Panda-Security, 2017).
Elsewhere a binary of 9511 bytes has been seen (Chohan, DeSombre and 
Grosfelt, 2018). Although a Unix based attack, this is an odd number of bytes. 
Analysis of executable file length is discussed  in Section 5.19.
5.20 Prefetch
Prefetching allows Windows to fetch files at bootup time (Russinovich and 
Solomon, 2009, pp. 823-827). One APT has been seen deleting prefetch entries 
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2017, p. 14) and they can also be manipulated by changing the 
value of a registry key (Russinovich and Solomon, 2009, p. 824). The Prefetch folder 
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may be viewed at C:\windows\prefetch (Rivera and Inocencio, 2016, p. 88).
Kaspersky found a Windows prefetch file in this directory which was created when 
the malicious attachment was opened. (Kaspersky, 2013e, p. 35) and also use of 
Prefetch by an APT (Kaspersky, 2017b, pp. 19-20).
5.21 Suspect Domains, Names
Some work has been done looking at suspect domain and file names with 
perties (Szabo and Huq, 2013) but simply looking at URL and file 
names which can be changed is not enough.
It might be possible to build a language model of DSN for each language 
type against the country code tope level domain e.g. .uk and then score the main part 
model. Alternatively, sites may be blocked by pattern matching as in the proof of 
concept Firefox browser add-on software written for this thesis in Appendix H
At the simplest level, the use of no-ip could be blocked by searching for the 
- (Kharouni, 2015, p. 4), No-ip and six other similar sites (Fireeye, 
2014e, p. 13).
Domain names have been registered which appear to belong to legitimate 
companies. For example, the domain name may be something like 
legitmatecompany.com or have a small typo. Additionally, some registrations clearly
contain false contact details (e.g. telephone and/fax numbers). It would not be too 
much effort for Domain Name System (DNS) registrars to offer a service to 
legitimate companies to highlight such registrations or check against online 
telephone books the legitimacy of the registrant.
5.22 Miscellaneous
Evidence of APTs may be found on corporate log files but (i.e.
machines). The log files on C&C servers for one APT were securely deleted on a 
computers  (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012a, pp. 2-3, 7).This may be indicative 
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of a wider security awareness by this APT and help defenders to categorise this 
.
System Monitor (SYSMON) is the application programming interface (API) 
that you use to configure the Microsoft System Monitor ActiveX control. The 
System Monitor control lets you view real-time and previously logged performance 
(Microsoft, 2017af).
After one APT used sysmon they forgot to remove evidence of their attack from the 
sysmon log files (Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 9).
Novetta have seen evidence of clearing MRU lists (Novetta, Unknown, p. 24)
Fireeye have observed the use of Skype and avatars. An APT may pose as an 
attractive woman and engage in a Skype conversation with the potential victim. A 
to the victim after ascertaining what device the 
victim would be using. The photograph would contain malware. (Fireeye, 2015b, pp. 
4, 11)
The Process Environment Block (PEB) contains information about every
running process. The Thread Information Block (TIB) is a Windows data structure 
which holds information and every running thread and there is a TOB for every 
running thread. The PEB and TIB have been used by fake AV and other malware for
anti-emulation/anti-debugging. Kuser Shared Data (KSD) is a shared Windows data 
structure area. Should the KSD not be populated with the appropriate values 
malware uses that to detect the presence of an emulator (Chandraiah, 2012, pp. 8-9)
5.23 Conclusion
This chapter has supported the first and second Aims and Objectives. It has 
demonstrated that APTs may place their malware anywhere on a computer
either within the Windows OS or in free: Malware has been seen placed on a HDD 
and the HDD controller. From here it can extrapolated that malware will be placed 
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anywhere there is storage: on-chip memory, HDD, wireless card, graphics card etc. 
This thesis will concentrate on the HDD platters.
It has been shown that APTs can modify the system to hide the existence of 
files with a given name or less than a given size. One mitigation is to create an 
executable of l
used to list files has been modified.
This chapter has demonstrated that APTs use malware that:
Have the true file extension disguised by icon;
Have file filename disguised (and hence use more than one full
stop in the filename);
Replaces a legitimate program with a malware that uses the same 
name;
Uses Zw, Nt and other routines e.g. SetWindowsHookEx,
GetAsyncKeyState;
is able to gain persistence on machines by various mechanisms of 
action e.g. Windows Services; Windows Registry; DLL search-
order hijacking; Modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO); 
Use of Common Object Model (COM) objects; Modification of 
existing binaries; Windows scheduled tasks; Windows 
Management Instrumentation (WMI); Malicious Windows 
Security Packages; the Startup folder; and MBR and VBR 
bootkits;
uses C&C communications;
Intra-communicates by mutexes, pipes and mailslots;
uses encryption;
use files of a small size;
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may not be detected by the Process Identification (PID) number 
sequence;
Malware may be identified by the use of little used routines and given keywords.
All of these observations link to the first two Aims and Objectives of this 
thesis.
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6 USING THE LOCKHEED MARTIN INTRUSION KILL
CHAIN TO SUPPORT THE SOLUTION
6.1 Chapter Overview
The thesis has, so far, presented the academic background to the research 
methodology, selection of the LMKC, description of a HDD, a discussion of the 
difference between a virus and malware . It will 
now review, in depth,
supporting sources, aligned with the LMKC, to present real-world examples of
malware on machines and how the malware gets there. Sub-section 5.3 to 5.9 
(inclusive) are the seven LMKC stages. At least one other recently produced 
taxonomy of APT malware is available (Mitre, 2019a).
The purpose of this chapter is to distil salient information from the 
whitepapers and use this information to build a solution to treat the malware 
deployed by APTs.
Objectives.
6.2 Where the Thesis Solution fits into the Kill Chain
Damballa assert that
(Damballa, 2014a, p. 3). This thesis will demonstrate 
that effective identification, containment and disruption can occur at the individual 
computer level.
The thrust of this thesis is to increase the business costs of APTs and this 
may be partially achieved by minimising APT breach longevity or dwell time. 
Douglas states that Cyber dwell time is measured by tracing the threat back to its 
origin and that it begins when an attacker enters the network and continues until they 
are removed or leave (Douglas, 2015, pp. 4-5). However, this thesis argues that 
measurement should only be to the point of entry on the network or machine, not the 
origin. In some cases, it may not be possible to discover the origin and, given the 
philosophy of this thesis it is agnostic to the origin and intent of the APT it is not 
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necessary to discover the origin, the malware is on the system; just treat it. However, 
should there be a need, it may be possible to identify the Reconnaissance stage of the 
LMKC by examining logs which contain evidence of contact (e.g. use of ping from 
outside). National Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are the vehicle 
for pan-industry collaboration should it be necessary to identify the APT origin.
As has been previously discussed in the selection of the LMKC for this 
thesis, two of the courses of action in the LMKC are Degrade and Deceive. 
Therefore, part of the counter-APT strategy may be to leave the malware on the 
time and hence increase their business costs. An example of a manifestation of this 
strategy is the use of Honey Pots machines or files that look attractive to the APT 
but are designed to waste their time and allow victims to learn more about the APT 
modus operandi. A further treatment is to infect files on the Honey Pot area with a 
virus which the attacker may download (LMKC Destroy course of action). Leaving 
the malware on the machine also provides the opportunity to gather evidence.
Counter-measures should not be done in isolation but as part of a holistic 
defence and it is worth now taking a short historical detour. AV defences could be 
mapped against good practice. Schneier provides a view on the security of systems 
using Attack Trees (Schneier, 1999) which is claimed (Giura and Wang, 2012, p. 3)
to be based on earlier Threat Tree work by Edward Amoroso (Amoroso, 1994).
However, this type of modelling attacks appears to be based on, and is very similar, 
to Structured Design Methodology (SDM) (Jackson, 1975) which was used by some 
organisations in the 1970s. Although SDM is a design methodology and not a 
security tool, this was a departure from the then norm of using flowcharts to design 
programs. SDM is, arguably, the forerunner of Object Orientated (OO)
programming.
structure diagrams rather that the sequential operations that were to be performed on 
opera
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concatenation (sequential flow), iteration (DO WHILE or REPEAT UNTIL) and 
selection (IF THEN ELSE or CASE). 
The GO TO statement should be avoided completely or so far as possibl (Jackson, 
1975, p. 1).
In his ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS statement (Jackson, 1975, p. ix), Jackson 
states tha
more into the subject, Dijkstra summarises these ideas as "concatenation", 
"selection" and "repetition" (Dijkstra, Hoare and Dahl, 1972, pp. 16-23).
However, the idea of categorising and compartmentalising data is common to 
both attack trees and data structures. This is an idea that forms the basis of the 
software written for this thesis.
Having discussed how this solution fits into the LMKC, the thesis will 
continue with the white paper review, with the next seven subheadings aligned with 
the seven stages of the LMKC. 
6.3 Reconnaissance
6.3.1 Definition 
The LMKC presents the components of this stage as crawling internet 
websites for information on specific topics e.g. conference proceedings, email 
address, social relationships
these are all passive actions in that they can be performed without touching 
infrastructure or websites owned by the victim. Other techniques may include 
searches of official and commercial databases, social media, email address 
harvesting. It is possible to use vulnerability scanners and proof of concept code to 
targeting specific vulnerabilities (Dela Vega and Ingal, 2010, p. 5) but this particular 
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6.3.2 Victim Selection 
Installation may be indiscriminate or specific. For example, Dela Vega and 
Ingal provide four different types of vicitm selection:
Geo-targeting or IP delivery: 
determine their geographic locations in order to deliver location-
specific content to their systems. 
Blog scraping: This refers to regularly scanning blogs to search 
for and to copy content using an automated software.
Referrer page checking: This ensures that only users arriving via 
search engines will be included in the infection chain and prevents 
security analysts or system administrators from seeing anything 
malicious when they directly access a doorway page.
User-agent filtering: This refers to distinguishing between 
browsers to enable OS-
(Dela Vega and Ingal, 2010, p. 11).
Sophos have seen the use of poisoning search engine results by filling 
webpages with topical keywords and phrases which will be harvested by search 
engine crawlers. Victims arriving via search engines are processed differently than 
those who arrive by those just happening on the page or are search engine crawlers 
(Wyke, 2012a, pp. 2-4). Kaspersky have seen the opposite occurring, where users 
from specific countries, based on IP address, are not infected (Kaspersky, 2015c, pp. 
24-25). F-
location (F-Secure-Labs, 2014c).
This thesis asserts that minimising the electronic footprint is a good start to 
any defence if one does not have to provide information, do not offer (advertise) it 
on the internet.
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6.3.3 DNS Hi-jacking, ARP Cache poisoning and Spoof Websites 
-readable domain names 
into IP addresses that are assigned to computer servers on the web. Most Internet 
will use foreign DNS servers set up by malicious third parties and translate certain 
domains into malicious IP addresses. As a result, victims are redirected to possibly 
(Trend-Micro, 2012, p. 2)
The standard for domain names is well documented (IETF, 1987b), (IETF, 1987a).
Hacquebord (Hacquebord, 2017, p. 17) documents that, following acquisition 
of administrator of DNS credentials, a change can be made to the MX
record so that it points to a proxy IP address controlled by the APT who can receive 
all incoming email.
The address resolution protocol (ARP) cache is a table in computer memory 
that maps a limited number of IP addresses to their physical adapter addresses. A 
computer's ARP cache contains its own entry, entries for machines that have made 
ARP broadcasts to it, and entries for machines to which it has made broadcasts.
(Microsoft, 2017a).
Cylance have seen ARP cache poisoning (Cylance, 2016, p. 41) while
Kaspersky have seen an APT C&C where a second-level domain was created 
without a DNS A-record, i.e., there was no IP address assigned to it. Where there 
was an A-record, the IP address assigned was typically 127.0.0.1. Some of the 
second-level domains created by the APTs for their C&C had similar names to the 
domain hosting the site of a certain real company. The domain was resolved 
to the same IP address of the real company and the third-level domains resolved to 
(Kaspersky, 2013e, p. 6).
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The Windows hosts file (C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts) allows the 
mapping of any website to any IP address. DiMaggio notes DNS hi-jacking 
performed by modification of the host file  (DiMaggio, 2015, pp. 12-13).
Kaspersky have seen a URL which looks very similar to a legitimate social 
network URL (Kaspersky, 2015a). They also note that sometimes the malware had a 
local IP address (e.g. 192.168.1.136) for the C&C. They speculate that there may 
have been infected machine with no Internet connection, but the APTs needed 
control over it. The APT had deployed a dedicated local C&C with Internet 
connection on another compromised machine within the same local network. From 
this C&C the first machine could be controlled. System administrators try to isolate 
critical computers from the outside world to decrease the probability of random 
infection, but this does not always help in a targeted attack (Kaspersky, 2013e, p. 7).
ETags (or entity tags an optional HTTP header) can be used to check if 
different URLs (webpages) have the same content or not (Damballa, 2015, pp. 10-
12).
Domain name construction may be manipulated: Domain Fluxing, also 
known as Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) has been seen generating over 1900 
domains in four days (Manos Antonakakis, Roberto Perdisci, Yacin Nadji ,
2012, p. 1) Damballa also assert that 
DGA is to: 
Make it impossible for static reputation systems to maintain an 
accurate list of possible C&C domains.
Allow the cybercriminals to evade perimeter based network 
filtering technologies. 
Maintain a small but agile physical C&C infrastructure that only 
needs to be configured and turned on for short periods of time.
Provide "just-in-time" registration of domain names to avoid 
reactive counter-measures and law enforcement. 
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Allow crimeware agents to propagate and establish a large 
infection base without exposing the C&C infrastructure.
(Damballa, 2012, p. 2)
and that some APTs that employ DGAs are able to register their C&C domain and 
configure DNS in less than an hour to the DGA generating the domain. This DGA 
domain is then closed within 24 hours (Damballa, 2012, p. 2).
DGA has also been seen by F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 11) and 
Fidelis Cybersecurity (Fidelis-Cybersecurity, 2015b, pp. 4-10). While McAfee report 
seeing the use of the Mersenne Twister algorithm random number generator to 
generate domains (McAfee-Labs, 2016, p. 34). Sophos have seen IP addresses 
generated randomly (Marosi, 2016, p. 9) while F-Secure have seen malware 
filenames generated randomly (F-secure-Labs, 2014b, p. 7).  However, malware-




The LMKC presents weaponization as:
Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a deliverable payload,
typically by means of an automated tool (weaponizer). Increasingly, client
application data files such as Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft
Office documents serve as the weaponized deliverable.
Trojan (horse) malware is software designed to hide its true intent and takes 
its name from the Ancient Greek story of the Trojan Horse which, after delivery to 




Imperva suggest that the initial detection rate of a new virus is less than 5% 
and that for some AV companies it may take up to four weeks to detect a new virus 
(Imperva, 2012, p. 1). This thesis has already discussed length of time of 
compromise and has described an assertion that attackers spend an average of more 
than 200 days inside a network before being discovered (InfoSec-Institute, 2017).
There is no inconsistency between this statement and the four weeks example. The 
new virus detection time may denote the maximum time otherwise another time 
would have been used and some organisations may have poor, or no, anti-virus 
software, policies, procedures etc. so it could take, on average, 200 days for 
en years (eset, 
2016a, p. 28) in spite of the malware having been seen in the wild since 2008. This 
APT did not display technical sophistication or novel techniques but they did just 
what was necessary and sufficient (needed) to succeed. Malware may remain 
effective for a number of years with, eight years being seen (Fireeye, 2014d, p. 2).
Note: effectiveness of malware is not the same as malware being on a system.
A number of APTs (Fireeye, 2016, p. 6), (Singh, Gomez and Malik, 2014),
(Fireeye, 2015f, p. 5), (Fireeye, 2015e, p. 6), (Fireeye, 2017a, p. 10) -the-
modified it. This means that the same malware may be used across APT and 
campaigns. Fireeye demonstrates co-ordination and similarities across attacks, 
producing a report on the subject (Fireeye, 2014f).
Others (Panda-Security, 2015), (Mandiant, 2013, p. 35), (Wüest, 2012, p. 22)
provide evidence of attackers using little to no bespoke software; only freely 
available software provided by Microsoft for Windows 8.1 machines. This is an 
Living Off the L (Wüest and Anand, 2017, 
pp. 7, 15-16) and again may be used by different APTs in different campaigns. This 
re-use makes forensics analysis harder.
Kaspersky have observed (Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 9) Persistence implemented 
as Windows service dynamic-link library (DLL), registered inside the group of
Network Services (netsvcs).
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McAfee categorise fileless malware: Memory resident; Rootkit; and 
Windows registry; with the memory resident malware using a legitimate Windows 
file memory space. One piece of malware loads the code into that memory space 
and remains until accessed or reactivated. Execution occurs within the legitimate 
and there is a dormant physical file that initiates or restarts the 
execution which means that the malware is not completely fileless (McAfee-Labs, 
2015, pp. 9-11).
One Fileless APT does not exist as a file on disk but in the registry. It does 
this by hijacking a valid CSLID which is run when the machine is restarted and uses 
a protected registry subkey preventing it being opened. This is done by invoking  
NTCreateKey 2015, pp. 9, 17).  Malware injected into the 
browser ensures persistence should the registry be cleaned. It also has the ability to 
inject itself into other executables. -7, 11-12).
6.4.3 Zero Days 
Zero Days (0-days) are attacks which are not publicly known but which are 
known to malware writers (Hacquebord, 2017, p. 30). The term zero day refers to the 
number of days that the attack has been in the public domain. They have been found 
by analysis and may be sold in the hacking community. As they are not in the public 
domain, they are unknown to the wider IT community and hence may not be 
mitigated, although the philosophy behind this thesis allows some zero days to be 
treated.
Kaspersky (Jacoby and Jartelius, 2013) do not put a figure on the number of 
zero days used. From analysis of some of the previous breaches, zero-days have been 
the entry point - the number of attacks where zero-days have been used are 
still quite low but rising.
6.4.4 Bundlers, Packers and Self-Extracting Files 
One method of weaponization (and hence deployment) is to combine at least 
the initial attack malware into one package. The software that performs the 
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combining ma, generically, be called bundler, packer or self-extracting file; 
examples of which are a zip file or iExpress.
The use of this type of weaponization is varied. Panda Security have seen a 
disguised self-extracting file which gives the appearance of being a .pdf file, using 
the .pdf icon. When clicked on, it extracts six files into a folder which it creates 
(Panda-Security, 2015, p. 4). Similarly, other bundlers have been seen in attacks, 
such as ZIP and RAR files (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 10) and a self-extracting RAR file 
with a .pdf extension (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 11). Kaspersky have also seen this same 
technique (Kaspersky, 2015a, p. 11). Sophos have also seen malware contained in a 
zip file as well as using regsvr32.exe (Wyke, 2014, p. 3). regsvr32.exe is a Microsoft 
utility to register and unregister controls such as DLLs in the registry (Microsoft, 
2017p).  Zip files may contain self-extractor software (Wyke, 2012b, p. 6). A zip file 
with a self-extracting RAR file has also been seen by F-Secure, although the ZIP file 
was hosted on a website (F-Secure-Labs, 2015a, pp. 2-3). Elsewhere three different 
Industrial Control System (ICS) equipment providers had malware inserted into the 
software bundles which had been made available for download from their websites
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2014, p. 7). Doherty et al have seen malware bundled 
with legitimate software (Doherty , 2013, p. 21).
A packer is a file which contains the code for decompression as well as the
data (Fireeye and Mandiant, 2014, p. 15) and packers may be found using the free 
tool PEiD (Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, pp. 4-5). Yan et al reference a now broken 
reference which claims that in a sample of 735 malwares from in March 2006, more 
than 92% were packed by packers and crypters from 30 different families (Yan, 
Zhang and Ansari, 2008). Pan observes that two APTs use the same custom packer
(Virus-Bulletin, 2012, p. 25) which, presumably helps link APT groups.
6.4.5 Digital Certificates 
The legitimacy of software, if signed, may be verified by digital certificates. 
The fraudulent certificate attack is specifically highlighted by (Sancho, Hacquebord 
and Link, 2014, p. 3) where a new root SSL certificate is installed which allows the 
attackers to display secure content from phishing sites without producing a warning 
from the browser. Fraudulent digital certificates may be used to make malicious Web 
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sites and malware look legitimate. In one attack, valid certificates were obtained for
some of high-value domains, including Yahoo, Mozilla, and Google. Google
discovered the use of the certificates in a large-scale, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) 
attack for eavesdropping on over 300,000 Gmail users. This attack had been in use 
for weeks before it was detected (Trend-Micro, 2013b, p. 4). This is a modern IT 
attack similar to the historical example previously discussed -
against the plot to overthrow Elizabeth I, discussed earlier in this thesis which 
discusses fraudulent signing of messages. Symantec report that another APT gained 
Trojans and malicious scripts (Doherty , 2013, p. 9).
For many years McAfee Labs has followed the growth of digitally signed 
malware and they believe that the threat is rapidly expanding while becoming more
complex. During this 2103Q4 McAfee discovered more than 2.3 million new and 
unique malicious signed binaries - a 52% increase over the previous quarter For 
2013 as a while the number was almost 5.7 million, more than triple the 2012
number.
The set of fraudulent certificates came from stolen, purchased, or abused
certificates, the vast majority of growth is due to dubious content distribution 
networks (CDNs). CDNs are websites and companies which allow developers to 
upload programs, or URLs which link to an external application, and wraps it in a 
signed installer. This provides developers with a distribution channel a cloak of
legitimacy (McAfee-Labs, 2013, pp. 9-10). This technique is not restricted to 
programs as a signed Java applet has been seen (Katsuki, 2012, p. 3).
Symantec have noted one APT modifying certificate registry values to 
disable the certificate revocation check and warnings about invalid site certificates as 
well other values -14).
Weak 512-bit keys have been noted (Kaspersky, 2014a, pp. 9-11) while
signed with two fake digital certificates
which were supposed to belong to Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom 
Corporation. In the infection phase, the APT injected a trusted Certificate Authority 
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(CA) in the certificates chain (Kaspersky, 2014e, p. 6). CAs instruct the system to 
trust their signatures. More worryingly, Kaspersky have seen a CA compromised 
which would allow the generation of digital certificates (Kaspersky, 2015b, p. 43).
Kaspersky have also seen one APT extract digital certificates and signing malware. 
(Kaspersky, 2013e, pp. 2-
4).
F-Secure have also seen the use of  a false root path and certificates to give 
the impression of legitimacy (Palumbo, 2014b, pp. 4-5). F-Secure have seen two 
APTs with the ability to harvest PKI certificates and associated private keys by using 
PFXExportCertStoreEx (F-secure-Labs, 2014b, pp. 2-3, 8). However, Mandiant have 
seen an APT using unsigned malware in C:\Windows (Mandiant, 2017, p. 25).
Clearly using fake digital certificates is a problem, the use of which allows 





-2010 being email 
attachments, websites and USB removable media. This section will discuss and 
review a range of delivery methods. It will demonstrate that a range of attacks and 
ingress points may be used anywhere where the system or machine interacts with 
the rest of the world.
One definition states that delivery may be achieved by any one of: Phishing;
Unpatched vulnerabilities; DDos; SQL injection; Cross site scripting; Malicious 
Websites; Malicious Browser extensions (Organization-of-Amercian-States, 2015, 
pp. 27, 37).  However, this thesis asserts that neither Unpatched vulnerability nor
Malicious Browser extensions are delivery methods; the former is a weakness and 
the latter is deployed malware. The list is incomplete as there are more delivery 
methods (Phishing and social engineering (Oxford-Dictionaries, 2017) attacks, 
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Vulnerability exploitation, Watering hole attacks, System misconfiguration 
exploitation, Drive-by-download attacks, Malvertising, 3rd party vendors, Man-in-
the-Middle (MitM), Infected equipment, Insider job) discussed by Huq (Huq, 
2016, pp. 30-32). Again, two items are not delivery methods: Vulnerability 
exploitation, and System misconfiguration exploitation, are weaknesses not methods 
of delivery.
Even these combined lists may not be complete as there is a least one APT 
where the method of delivery is unknown (Palumbo, 2014a, p. 3). Browsers may 
also be injected with malware in what is also known as man-in-the-browser attack 
(RSA, 2011)
mentioned earlier.
One attack had three different attack methods: In addition to infected 
websites (an infected medical website), a real-time file-sharing service and a direct 
transfer via a virtual networking computer (VNC). (Trend-Micro-Cyber-Safety-
Solutions-Team, 2016, p. 1). It is not clear why this was the case. It is possible that 
the APT wanted to ensure that they were successful. APTs will use social 
engineering to get victims to click on items which contain malware in emails that 
contain information in which the targets would be interested, (Sancho and 
Hacquebord, 2016, p. 3). Such emails may contain Word documents with macros 
enabled so that when the document is opened the malware is delivered. Another 
common, and old, technique is to use macro-based malware (Yaneza, 2015a, p. 3).
Macros were more highly favoured because of their ability to bypass traditional
antimalware solutions (Trend-Micro, 2015, p. 17). This view is shared elsewhere 
where it is asserted that one of the few significant tradecraft differences is that 
system that the once-dominant exploit kits (DeSombre and Byrnes, 2018, p. 16).
However, Microsoft later changed the default Microsoft Office configuration to
prevent macro execution which protected most users. However many large
organisations use macros leaving this method of entry open and malware authors 
have taken advantage of this with simple social engineering tricks, leading to the 
return of macro malware (McAfee-Labs, 2015, p. 34). McAfee have stated that it is 
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unclear as to whether the malware can change the macro run default setting 
(McAfee-Labs, 2015, p. 41). This Microsoft Office macro attack view is re-enforced 
simple social 
(Szappanos, 2014b, p. 1). Elsewhere, Microsoft Word 
documents containing obfuscated code have been seen (Insikt-Group, 2019, p. 11).
The subject of obfuscated code will be taken up later in this thesis.
Another type of social engineering is in the form of fake ,
or using stolen documents suggesting a legitimate cause and 
sender. Social media accounts may be used (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 11).
A Denial of Service (DOS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack 
(sometimes known as Email Based Bounce Attack) may be used to hide the real 
customers accessing their accounts so being unable to see that monies are missing. A 
DOS attack may also be used to swamp the security logs making it more difficult to 
find the attackers entries (Candid Wüest, 2014a, p. 16). Wüest goes on to speculate 
that there might be more DDOS attacks from mobile devices or the Internet of 
Things (Candid Wüest, 2014a, p. 25). However, Toro et al (Toro, Griffin and Settle, 
2016, pp. 12, 17-18) point out a DDOS malware (which has a backdoor that allows 
), where for every ten minutes attacking 
websites, users receive a point and these points can be traded in for rewards. The 
malware waits 10 minutes to download the backdoor. On failure with further 
attempts are made every 1 hour and 10 minutes.
Although not Windows, the Apple App store may have contained from 30 -
300 apps infected by software (one of which showed no evidence of data theft or 
harm) which had been inserted when app developers used one of a number of 
compromised app development tool. (F-Secure, 2016, pp. 18-19). One cannot rule 
out the possibility of infected Windows apps especially given the malware, 
previously highlighted in this thesis, which has no known method of entry onto the 
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6.5.2 Pre-installation 
One form of m (Trend-
Micro, 2015, pp. 7-8). Pre-installed malware may be more difficult to find as 
malware has been deployed well before any external connection by the victim. It is 
inferred that this is a supply chain phishing attack or a well-directed specific attack. 
Modification of disc head controller micro code to support infection has been seen 
and this may be a supply chain attack.
6.5.3 Watering Hole and Infected Browser  
Potentials victims may be encouraged to visit legitimate websites which have 
been infected (Hacquebord, 2017, pp. 29-30). Compromised sites have been injected 
with malware scripts, the Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) (BeEF, 2020)
: BeEF is useful to an APT when the 
potential victim leaves browser inactive tabs open. When a user opens a browser tab 
and visits a compromised website there is a link to a BeEF exploit URL, The APT 
then has time to perform reconnaissance and try different attacks until the browser 
tab is closed. Attacks seen are social engineering attacks, password grabbing, and 
vulnerability exploit (Hacquebord, 2017, pp. 29-30). Browser infection is supported 
elsewhere (Molinyawe, Hariri and Spelman, 2016). Fireeye note that APTs are using 
well-known websites which they do not need to compromise to host C&C IP 
addresses. The APTs use the website for legitimate purposes, such as creating profile 
pages or posting forum threads (Fireeye, 2015d, p. 3).
Legitimate website may also be compromised using iframes in the HTML 
code which point to malware on other servers  (Kharouni , 2014, p. 11)
(Goncharov, 2012, p. 23), (Goncharov, 2014, p. 7),
2012b, p. 3), . Once the non-trivial 
action of compromising a legitimate website has been done there are no visible signs 
of malicious activity to the victim and such a website may contain links to sites 
controlled by the attackers. (CrowdStrike, 2014a, pp. 7, 19)
The iframe may have a small area, for example 1x1 with a visibility of  
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2014, p. 10), (Huss, 2016, p. 6) or 2x2, also 
with a v (Symantec-Security-Response, 2016, p. 15). The iframe 
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may be in an infected banner or popup ad (MalwareBytes, 2016). They also may be 
used to drop a Java applet, possibly in conjunction with social engineering 
techniques (Katsuki, 2012, p. 2). One way of directing users to malicious websites is 
the use of homophones in website names and misspellings (Nikiforakis , 2014).
malicious HTML (.hta) application files. The ,hta files contained links to legitimate 
job postings on employment websites , 2017).
Use of SMB (Server Message Block) protocol in a watering hole attack has 
been seen (Insikt-Group, 2018a, pp. 4-8,10,13,17-18). SMB is a network file sharing 
protocol and in Windows is known as Microsoft SMB Protocol. The set of message 
packets that defines a particular version of the protocol is called a dialect and the 
Common Internet File System (CIFS) Protocol is a dialect of SMB (Microsoft, 
2017w).
6.5.4
Some APTs check to see if the system on which malware is to installed is 
exploitable or in the right geographic regions. In order to do this some malware 
fingerprints the system. One such piece, written in JavaScript, identifies
installed browser plugins. The victim is then redirected to a URL which, based on
the information collected, determines the best exploit to use. (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2014, pp. 7, 10). Such redirection needs a compromised website and may 
(Wrolstad and Vengerik, 2015, pp. 4-
7).
Fireeye have observed an APT checking system information using 
GetSystemInfo. Should there only be one CPU core then the attack terminates. 
Fireeye suggest this is to evade sandboxes and other virtualised environments as well 
as other analysis environments used in reverse engineering (Haq , 2014, pp. 5-
6). F-Secure have also seen malware not running after checking for a sandbox (F-
Secure-Labs, 2014d, pp. 9-10).
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Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2014c, pp. 3-4) collection of systems 
information - hardware, OS information, computer name user name, group disk 
space usage, user accounts, TCP and UDP information, processes, directories.
WatchGuard assert that runs in user mode (either as a regular 
user or administrator) (WatchGuard® Technologies, 2016, p. 7) and that virtualised 
sandboxes look at Windows Application Programming Interface (API) and system 
calls from the user mode programs. System calls or function calls capture all 
interactions between a program and its environment (e.g., file reading, writing to 
registry keys, and the production of network traffic). However, the sandbox is unable 
to see everything that happens between these calls. It is this blind spot that is targeted 
by malware authors.
6.5.5 Default Passwords and NetBIOS Credentials 
Sophos have observed one popular exploit delivered using an encrypted 
Excel spreadsheet. Excel will automatically decrypt a spreadsheet with a certain 
password. The exploit uses more than this but it highlights the use of default 
passwords (Chantry, 2016, p. 6).
NetBIOS credentials have been obtained (Mandiant, 2010, p. 5) and used to 
perform NETBIOS log-ons. Mandiant has seen attackers using compromised 
credentials on as few as 10 compromised systems, as many as over 150 with an 
average of 40 systems.
6.5.6 Phishing 
NIST (NIST, 2013, p. 142) provides three definitions of phishing, one of 
which is:
-looking but
bogus emails to request information from users or direct them to a fake Web site 
(NIST, 2013, p. 142)
Forcepoint state that 81% of email scanned by Forcepoint was unwanted 
(Forcepoint-Security_Labs, 2016, p. 18) while IASCA observed that Spear Phishing 
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(direct targeting of an individual) became a very common method used by those 
launching malware as an entry point to an enterprise. All it takes is a single user to 
click a link and open an attachment for the malware to begin to the first phase of an 
attack (ISACA, 2013, p. 7). Phishing attacks against home emails get around lack of 
home peripheral protection (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 13). This allows them to take 
advantage of any blurring of business and private lives. Trend Micro observe that
email is used as the initial infection vector in 74% of targeted attacks (Hipolito, 
2016, p. 4). Fireeye have spear phishing that directs the victim to fake Outlook Web 
Access (OWA) login pages (Vengerik , 2014, pp. 5,7,11,13,14), (Nart  
Villeneuve , 2014, p. 5).
Although spear-phishing is considered a successful form of attack, and in at 
least one 500 respondent survey respondents cited it as the single biggest attack 
method against which they had to defend, Unpatched vendor software vulnerabilities 
was a distant second (Organization-of-Amercian-States, 2015, pp. 6, 46). No figures 
were supplied for the success rate but a collection of phishing attempts is collated in 








(Symantec, 2013, p. 
11)
2011 299 232
(Symantec, 2013, p. 
11)
2012 414 291
(Symantec, 2013, p. 
11)
2013 392 196
(Symantec, 2016b, p. 
8)
2014 965 244




(Symantec, 2016b, p. 
8)
Table 6-1: Phishing and Email Viral rates
Many phishing emails may contain attachments that, when opened, install 
malware on the host. The attachments have names that look like valid file names 
(e.g. MS Word) but on closer inspection are files that are not. This theme is taken up 
later with the Benign Ware developed in support of this thesis.
CISCO state that only 3% of spam has an attachment, against 25% of
legitimate email. In the cases when a spam message has an attachment, it is an 
average of 18% larger than a typical attachment in a valid email. Therefore these 
malicious attachments tend to stand out (CISCO, 2013, p. 65).
authentic with 
ing real company names matching the region of 
-13).
However, some spear-phishing emails may not include attachments; they 
include a link to a website redirect as described by Kapsersky (and discussed earlier 
in this thesis).  The APT campaign discovered relied on spear-phishing e-mails with 
links to a malicious website. This website contains several exploits designed to infect 
the . Following a successful infection, the website redirects the user 
to a benign website. The malicious websites do not automatically infect victims;
instead, the malware is hosted in specific folders on the website, which are not 
directly referenced anywhere, except in spear phishing e-mails (Kaspersky, 2014f, p. 
5).
6.5.7 SQL Injection and Cross-site Scripting (XSS) 
This attack manipulates the input of a website to gain access to data or the 
system  (Kaspersky, 2016b, p. 7) by making entries to webpage forms to send 
unexpected commands to database using SQL (Akamai, 2020). Cross-site scripting 
is when malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign websites and has been 
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seen in legitimate processes e.g. via comment boxes in forums and discussion 
boards (TrendLabs, 2015a, p. 24). It is claimed (Goncharov, 2012, p. 17) that XSS is 
not easy to perform. 
6.5.8
Remote Desktop Connection (Microsoft, 2017c) is a Microsoft® service that 
allows connection between one machine over a network (possibly the internet) to 
another using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). In order to work certain permissions 
are need but it has been used by attackers (Lion Gu, 2014, p. 9). Weak passwords 
and a default port make this easier to use but also easy to identify as does port 
binding (Chiu, Weng and Chiu, 2014, p. 3) which requires the absence of a firewall. 
It has also been seen being used with tools to patch RDP servers which support 
multiple user logins, as well as other hacking tools e.g. Proxy installers and sysinfo 
collectors (Kaspersky, 2016c, pp. 2, 13). Weak passwords were the cause of another 
successful attack which brute-forced RDP (Insikt-Group®, 2019b, pp. 10,12,16)
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2010, p. 5) have seen attackers users legitimate 
software that are seen on other systems. Mandiant conclude that the attackers have 
installed this software using valid credentials. While Symantec (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2012a, p. 18) have seen unique certificate weaknesses used to hijack the 
Windows Update feature to spread across networks.
As previously discussed, three different ICS equipment providers were 
compromised and malware was inserted into the software bundles they had made 
available for download from their websites (Symantec-Security-Response, 2014, p. 
7). This observation was confirmed by Langill who states that three different ICS 
suppliers had their support websites compromised. The APT replaced legitimate 
installation software on the sites with software that added malware (Langill, 2014, p. 
10).
machine while others in Symantec note something similar 
(Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b, p. 15), (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, 
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p. 5). It is not clear from the papers if VNC is legitimate VNC software, modified 
legitimate VNC software or purpose built.
Even supply chains have
in one such attack the update was compromised by a Trojan malware (Candid Wüest, 
2014b, p. 15); in another conference proceedings were mailed to conference 
participants on a CD after the conference and the CD used autorun.inf to execute an 
installer and attempt privilege escalation (Kaspersky, 2015c, p. 15).
Most PE file infectors change the entry point of the PE file to point to the 
virus body. This is easy to spot as the malware entry point lies outside the legitimate 
code section (Symantec, 2005). Entry Point Obscuring (EPO) replaces certain call 
instructions, with a jump/call as Symantec go on to say, or replace ExitProcess() API 
calls to point to the beginning of the malware code  (Perriot, Ször and Ferrie, 2003, 
p. 4). Trampoline code, where execution traverses different pieces of code, is 
discussed later in this thesis in Extended Attributes under the Exploitation part of the 
LMKC.
Svchost.exe is a process which is a shell for loading services from .dll file 
and uses parameters at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Micro-
soft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\netsvcs in Windows Services
(Microsoft, 2017b)
McAfee have seen a unmodified copy of the Windows command line 
executable cmd.exe copied, using a remote command line shell, to the compromised 
system, renamed svchost.exe, and used. (McAfee®-Foundstone®-Professional-
Services and McAfee- . The use of svchost.exe as a program 
name to add a Run registry key has been seen elsewhere (Chang , 2015, p. 24)
One APT has been seen using a legitimate package, TeamViewer, which is 
used for remote administration and online meetings with the APT writing custom 
components for further exploitation (Kaspersky, 2013d, pp. 1-2).
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6.5.9 USB devices 
APTs can use USBs to infect machines (Symantec-Security-Response, 
2015d, pp. 4-5) and may also use rate limiting code which is where the malware will 
delete itself after a number (three) of infections (Falliere, Murchu and Chien, 2011, 
pp. 7, 10).
One study found 29 different USB-based attacks and constructed  a 
taxonomy to classify them into four major categories. (Nissim, Yahalom and Elovici, 
2017). These categories are: Programmable Microcontrollers; USB Peripherals (sub-
divided into malicious reprogrammed and not reprogrammed) ; and Electrical (an 
example of a modified USB stick capable of destroying sensitive components 
through a power surge attack). The paper also presented a description of the USB 
protocol. Not only may the USB device deliver the attack, but it may also be used for 
data exfiltration.
One APT used a unique USB-based C&C mechanism: basic information is 
stored on a hidden area of the USB stick. When the USB stick is later connected to 
an internet connected machine the data is extracted from the hidden area and sent to 
the C&C infrastructure. When the APT wishes to run commands on the air-gapped 
un when the 
USB stick is later plugged into that network (Kaspersky, 2015c, pp. 13-14).
Another APT has a toolkit, to be used on removable USB devices, which has 
a module that moves data from air gapped networks to Internet-connected systems. 
Once networked systems are compromised, the APTs wait for a USB drive to be 
connect to the infected machine. The USBs are formatted to reduce the USB 
partition size and reserve several hundred megabytes of hidden data at the end of the 
disk for malicious purposes. This reserved space is used for a new custom-encrypted 
partition that will not be recognized by a common OS, such as Windows. The
partition has its own semi-filesystem (or virtual file system, VFS) with two 
attack also bypasses many DLP products, as
software that disables the plugging of unknown USB devices based on DeviceID 
would not prevent an attack or data leakage because a genuine recognized USB drive 
was used (Kaspersky, 2016a, p. 8).
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6.5.10 Firewalls 
It is to be expected that firewalls are deployed and employed however with 
most ICS/ SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition) systems firewalls are a 
rarity (Wilhoit, 2013, p. 2)..
by modifying registry entries subkeys relating to firewalls (Symantec-Security-
Response, 2015d, p. 12). While others have seen have seen modifications to firewall
rules (Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 28), (Manos  Antonakakis , 2012, p. 5).
6.5.11 Java
It is claimed (Jain, Gomez and Singh, 2014) that Java is widely used by 
developers to the point where many websites and applications will not run without it 
with three common vulnerabilities making up 93% of the observed total.
6.5.12 JavaScript 
Hacquebord  (Hacquebord, 2017, p. 16) has seen JavaScript, which was 
obfuscated, hosted on an APT. It may also be embedded in a pdf document to make 
an HTTP request to download malware (Singh and Bu, 2014, p. 16). McAfee Labs 
Threat Advisory have seen obfuscated JavaScript delivered in a .zip file as an email 
attachment (McAfee, 2018a, pp. 1-2).
6.5.13 Attachments, Office Documents, RTF and Flash 
With Automation, you can do programmatically almost anything that the 
user can do manually in Microsoft Office Word. However, if you have lots of text 
that you want to enter and to format, it might require lots of code. If you can 
represent the data as a Rich Text Format (RTF) string, you can frequently reduce the 
Automation code. You can create an RTF string, copy the RTF string to the 
clipboard, and then paste the RTF string into the document.
(Microsoft, 2018n)
TrendLabs (TrendLabs, 2014, pp. 5,7) note that a variety of attachment types 
may be used for infection and Hacquebord (Hacquebord, 2017, p. 28) notes an APT 
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that started to use RTF and other Microsoft® Office® documents embedded with a 
Flash file. The Flash file uploads information on the victim
server and the remote server may respond with a chain of exploits, zero-days and 
privilege escalation that infects the victim While Sophos have also seen 
the use of RTF (Chantry, 2016, pp. 6-11).
warning about the file (Sancho, Hacquebord and Link, 2014, pp. 2-3)
6.5.14 Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP), Potentially Unwanted 
Application (PUA) and Malvertising 
Malware may be delivered through infected, or malicious, advertisements 
(malvertising) (Huq, 2016, p. 31), (Trend-Micro, 2015, p. 4). This method allows 
APTs to promote malware laden advertising on legitimate websites on which victims 
then click. Trend Micro (Trend-Micro, 2015, p. 10) asserts that for normal users
malvertisements are one of the worst threats as they can hurt users even when the
right things are being done. Malvertisements can affect users who do not click links, 
have updated security and only go to trusted sites. Trend Micro assert that the only 
defence is luck. This thesis shall demonstrate otherwise.
This thesis asserts that malvertisements are particularly bad as they make use 
of the advertising 
doing the reconnaissance for the APTs by highlighting users that have the attributes 
that the APTs are looking for.
In 2014 Panda Security (Panda-Labs, 2014, p. 4) reported a rise in PUPs 
through the use of software bundlers which install PUPs along with software that the 
user wishes to install. This rise continued into 2015 (Panda-Labs, 2016, p. 8)
At least one piece of malware generates fraudulent click to generate revenue 
(Wyke, 2012b, p. 22), (Damballa, 2014b). Although not necessarily an issue for the 
users of the host computer it could be for the entity which wishes to advertise their 
products or service.
Sophos have seen fake-AV promulgated by malvertising (Chandraiah, 2012, 
p. 5) while Kaspersky have seen malvertising redirecting to malicious websites 
(Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 6). In another click-fraud attack botnet
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Gutierrez, 2015, p. 3) the malware silently uses a hidden browser window to visit 
web pages and display advertisements in that window. The APT gets paid for every 
advertisement shown and although the amount per advertisement is small, the 
compromised computers are able to show thousands of advertisements each day. A 
complication for victims is that the advertisements can contain malware which 
means that a compromised computer will often contain other threats, including 
ransomware.
6.5.15 MBR 
Mandiant (Madiant-Consulting, 2016, pp. 30-31) have identified at least one 
MBR bootkit which iterates over all NTFS formatted logical drives and attempts to 
store malware, in two places one as a disk file and another in unallocated sectors 
near the end of the file system. The latter is a backup in the event the former is 
removed. The installer then overwrites sections of the malicious MBR over the 
legitimate MBR, preserving the original partition table and error messages. The 
malware ensures that the MBR is only modified on the physical drive that contains 
the file system where %WinDir% (i.e. where the Windows operating system is 
installed) is located and that the MBR has not been previously modified.
6.5.16 Insiders 
Last, but not least, of the specific delivery mechanism is the insider. A 
human who places malware onto a machine and who is either willing (Kaspersky, 
2016b, pp. 10-11), or not (Falliere, Murchu and Chien, 2011, p. 7).
6.5.17 Miscellaneous 
Trend Micro (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 7) have seen a malicious version of a 
legitimate penetration testing tool which has been infected using a malicious 
Microsoft® Office® macro and in another similar case (Chiu, 2015, pp. 3, 4, 9)
the ring 0 port re-
also is able to check the system tray (systray) to see if there is any anti-malware 
protection and clean event logs to make incident response more difficult. Ring 0 
(kernel) use was previously highlighted - Backdoors with this capability use the 
Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) or Windows Filtering Platform 
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(WFP) to listen to already- (Chiu, Weng and Chiu, 
2014, p. 14). Those backdoors with port re-use in Ring 3 can be used in user mode
(Chiu, Weng and Chiu, 2014, p. 15). Other malware intercepts WinAPIs in 
UserMode, Ring 3 (Goncharov, 2012, p. 11). This means that the malware (bot) does 
not need drivers or calls in Ring 0.
A Ring 0 (kernel) rootkit subverts the Windows kernel and ca hide files, 
two different binaries (one SYS driver and one EXE that installs the dr
Moreover, the installation process requires interaction with the Windows Service 
Control Manager (SCM), or alternatively uses the undocumented API 
presence or can be bloc (Florio, 2005, p. 4)
Luo and Yan provide an overview of Fake Apps (Luo and Yan, 2014) and at 
least one piece of malware originated from Yahoo! Instant Messenger (Lee, Ahl and 
Hanzlik, 2014, p. 17). While Rodionov et al provide an overview of  bootkits 
(Rodionov, Matrosov and Harley, 2016). A Volume Boot Record (VBR) is the boot 
record for a partition as opposed to a MBR which is the boot record for the device 
and contains the partition table. The Initial Program Loader (IPL) is the first 15
sectors after the VBR. One attack
while all the other data and code of the VBR and IPL remain intact (Rodionov, 
Matrosov and Harley, 2014, p. 322).
The use of decoy documents has been seen by F-Secure (F-secure-Labs, 
2014b, p. 5). In this case an order receipt is used as the decoy.
Finally, Microsoft promulgate end of life dates for their software (Microsoft, 
2017ak). However at least one previous, out of support Microsoft operating system 
(Windows XP), was still causing problems accounting for around 18% of infections 
(Kaspersky, 2014d, p. 51)
Kaspersky have seen the creation of directories to support the attack 
(Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 39).
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One APT uses multiple delivery methods e.g. torrent file-sharing sites for 
indiscriminate distribution, social engineering, lures and websites, and a video 
downloaded (FireEye, 2020, p. 7)
6.6 Exploitation
6.6.1 Definition 
This may be to exploit the users or leverage the OS feature which auto-executes the 
code (Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 2011).
6.6.2 Victim Selection 
Not all malware that arrives on a system needs to run the APT needs to 
check if the potential victim is one that can, or should, be exploited.
One piece of malware displays unique info to product ID and CD-Key of 
certain software if it is installed (Organization-of-Amercian-States, 2015, p. 34).
Although not elaborated on, this thesis infers that identification of such products aids 
attack selection. 
S server at 8.8.8.8 (Google, 2019a) allows network 
administrators to change DNS operator from the ISP to Google Public DNS and has 
been seen as a method of geolocation  (Wyke, 2012b, p. 19). A legitimate global 
machine abuses this server to obtain the address of the legitimate website and then 
sends a request to that website. The website responds with geolocation information. 
With another attack it is not clear to what use 8.8.8.8 is being put (Kaspersky, 2015b, 
p. 35).
6.6.3 Booting 
APTs may delete system files in such a way that means that Windows fails to 
boot up (Madiant-Consulting, 2016, p. 11).
There are two safeboot registry keys which allow the minimum set of device 




One APT deletes entries in both of these keys (Virus-Bulletin, 2012, pp. 22-23)
claimed that the release of the Secure Boot technology heralded 
the end of the bootkit era. In practice, Secure Boot just switched the focus of the 
attackers towards a change in infection strategy. There are still many active 
machines in the world with old operating systems where Secure Boot is not
supported. For non-targeted attacks, just intended to build botnets, cybercriminals 
will continue to use old bootkits and bootkit techniques for MBR/VBR infection 
until a critical mass of users have switched to modern hardware and operating 
(Rodionov, Matrosov and Harley, 2014, p. 325)
6.6.4 Privilege Escalation 
Privilege Escalation may be divided into Horizontal Privilege Escalation and 
Vertical Privilege Escalation (ICANN, 2020). The former is access to accounts with 
the similar privileges; the latter is elevating the single user privileges possessed.
F_Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014a, p. 6) have seen an APT using social 
engineering to install their malware. Originally the APT preferred to use the name of 
the Windows registry editor (regedt32.exe). It is presumed that this is because the
editor needs administrator rights and would try to request for the highest available 
rights. This process produces a notification message to the user who, it is asserted, is
more likely to grant permission if it appears. However, experienced users may be
less likely to be taken in, hence decreasing the likelihood of success. This same APT 
also tries to bypass UAC default settings by getting a SHIM database to instruct 
dows executables that will be automatically 
instead, which can then be used to install the malware while in an elevated state (F-
Secure-Labs, 2014a, p. 8), (Fireeye, 2017b).
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Kaspersky have seen an APT check the EnableLUA value of the 
"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Policies\System". Should it 
be enabled then the installation defaults to user installation to evade any user 
notification (Kaspersky, 2014f, p. 11).
F-Secure have a observed an attack related to TESTSIGNING option (F-
Secure-Labs, 2014a, p. 8). On 64-bit Windows, Microsoft enforces a security policy 
requiring signed drivers. Signing identifies drivers to its author, reducing the number 
of malware developers willing to take the risk. To allow developers to test drivers 
during development, Microsoft provides a TESTSIGNING boot configuration 
option. In this, a watermark is displayed on the screen to making it obvious to users 
and to prevent malware from exploiting the option. One APT uses the 
TESTSIGNING option to load malicious driver components and to hide this change 
from the user, the malware deletes the watermark by removing the relevant strings in 
the user32.dll.mui of the system. In Windows 8 and up, the strings are no longer 
stored in user32.dll.mui, so this attack will not work
In another attack F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014a, p. 9) have observed an
APT looking for an existing inactive driver service that is disabled or set to start on 
demand. The APT drops the driver component using the corresponding path of the 
service, overwriting the existing driver if necessary. This service is then set to start 
automatically enabling it to persist after a reboot. Using a legitimate service, the 
APT hopes that malicious driver will be overlooked by administrators or 
investigators. The driver component of this APT uses IOCTL (I/O Control) buffer 
command codes (Code 6 loads a driver into memory) with the 32-bit version 
containing additional, incomplete routines for hiding processes via DKOM Direct
Kernel Object Manipulation
Another APT seen by F-Secure embeds objects in .docx email attachments. 
This requires the recipient to action a prompt to execute the embedded executable 
malware which, for the first stage, gathers basic system information and screen shots  
(F-Secure-Labs-Malware-Analysis, 2017, p. 4). This technique is not uncommon 
(Sardiwal , 2017)
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One way to bypass Windows User Account Control (UAC) for 64-bit 
Windows is for the malware to use the Windows Update Standalone Installer 
(WUSA) to copy its DLL into a protected folder ( as 
It will then execute to side-load the malicious 
instead of the legitimate one. For 32-bit Windows this is a mixture of  IFileOperation 
code and (Settle, Griffin and Toro, 2016, p. 31). See 
Section 6.6.6 for a definition of side-loading.
Proof of concept UAC elevation by code injection is available (Davidson, 
2009), if a little old and Sophos have seen one dropper inject dll malware into all 
running processes for which it has permission (Wyke, 2014, p. 9) while Kaspersky
have seen (Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 48) one piece of malware replicate itself with 
several names, to several locations, the final location residing in the All 
Users\Application Data directory and a run key for itself added.
Use may also be made by malware of GetCurrentProcess (Microsoft, 2018t)
to which the system returns a pseudohandle with the maximum access that the
A DACL is a Discretionary Access Control List
(Microsoft, 2018i).
6.6.5 Directory Traversal 
Symantec report (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, pp. 21-22) one APT 
recursively traverses the directory searching for files to infect. While Symantec 
observe (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012c, p. 3) an APT re-routing OS APIs by 
changing the address of these APIs to point to their own code. McAfee have seen  
(McAfee®-Foundstone®-Professional-Services, 2017, pp. 1-2) malware with the 
capability to spread via Admin$, C$ and D$ shares as well as trying to spread to 
other machines in the network by trying to connect to the hidden shares ADMIN$, 
C$WINDOWS and D$\WINDOWS
6.6.6 DLL Side-loading etc. 
It should be noted that DLL side-loading, DLL Search-Order Hijacking, 
DLL-Hijacking and DLL pre-loading, are related.
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The nature of windows is such that the OS will attempt to find the required 
DLL by searching, in order, a well-defined set of directories (Microsoft, 2017k).
Microsoft further state that:
control the location from which a DLL is loaded by specifying a full path or using 
another mechanism such as a manifest. If these methods are not used, the system 
(Microsoft, 2017j)




Stewart (A. Stewart, 2014, p. 3) states that DLL side-loading takes 
-by-side (SxS or WinSxS) assembly feature, which 
helps manage conflicting and duplicate DLL versions by loading them on demand 
And later notes that the malware under analysis placed a
system loaded it instead of the legitimate file. The SxS listing is in the registry keys 
%TEMP%\RarSFX%\%ALLUSERS PROFILE%\SXS\
\RarSFX%\%ALLUSERS PROFILE%\WinSxS\
Mitre comment (Mitre, 2015-2019) that programs may specify the DLLs to
be loaded at runtime and that any programs that improperly or vaguely specifies a
DLL may be open to a vulnerability where an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-
loading occurs when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests are not explicit 
enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded and APTs may take advantage 
of legitimate programs that are vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.
APTs are thought to this technique to mask actions they perform under a legitimate, 
trusted software process or system.
172
Harbour asserts (Harbour, 2010) that on a 64-bit laptop Windows 7  there are 
no less than 1032 path and DLL name combinations where a DLL could be placed 
such that it would automatically load at some point during normal boot-up. Harbour 
further asserts, without evidence, that with 64-bit malware DLL the number would 
be higher as there are more 64-bit processes running at boot time.
Side-loading has been seen as method of placing code into signed Java 
executable (Settle, Griffin and Toro, 2016, p. 22) and also seen by Mandiant (Glyer, 
2010, pp. 3-4), pwc (pwc-BAe, 2017, p. 18) and F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 
5).
Kaspersky (Kaspersky, 2013e, pp. 10-11) have observed that for one APT 
the mechanism of action for the malware is that if a benign application depends on 
Windows winmm.dll (located in %WINDIR%\System32\winmm.dll) and the 
malware with the same name (winmm.dll) is in the folder of benign application, the 
malicious library will be loaded instead of the system one. For example, the APT 
place a malicious library in the %WINDIR% folder. This folder also contains 
explorer.exe. Kaspersky go to note that this enables the APTs to ensure that the 
malicious DLL is loaded at system start-up: explorer.exe loads the malicious 
winmm.dll from the %WINDIR% folder when it launches during system start-up.
The APT used a tool which had been developed by security researchers to analyse 
malware:  The program facilitates the analysis of malicious libraries. Input is a DLL 
and it produces C code which hooks the functions included in the library. This C 
code is then compiled back into a DLL, which can then be used as a proxy and 
provide a way to analyse behaviour of malicious files.
6.6.7 Stub Malware 
Stub malware leaves a minimal forensic footprint on a machine and can allow 
an APT to upload C&C software dynamically. This software can be uploaded as and 
when needed and, when no longer needed would only leave a footprint in virtual 
memory (Mandiant, 2010, p. 20).
Stub malware may also decrypt other malware which is used for the main 
part of the attack (Goncharov, 2012, p. 1), (Goncharov, 2014, p. 8).
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6.6.8 Browser related Malware 
Malware may insert itself into browsers (Kruse, Hacquebord and McArdle, 
2012, p. 10), (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 26) or flaws in browsers (TrendLabs, pp. 7, 8),
(Chen and Li, 2015, p. 5), . Kaspersky have seen one APT 
inject malware into EXPLORER.EXE (Kaspersky, 2014b, p. 12) as does another 
(eset, 2015, p. 16).This is called a Man in the Browser (MITB) attack. However, as 
Chen and Li point out Internet Explorer patches had, at that time, driven APTs to 
Adobe Flash Player. This thesis notes that Internet Explorer is not the only browser 
available.
Symantec reports (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b, pp. 8-9) that one 
APT has at least two MITB methods. The first checks every webpage visited by the 
user and when there is a match the user is redirected to a malicious server which 
sends the user a fake web page and harvests credentials before being redirected again 
to the genuine webpage. With the second attack the APT alters the legitimate 
webpage in the fly with malicious code. Again, the APT harvests credentials.
In 2014 Kaspersky saw browsers accounting for 42% of vulnerable 
applications (Kaspersky, 2014d, pp. 24-25) while Damballa have seen malware 
running under explorer.exe child and also execute its own child explorer.exe 
(Damballa, 2014b, p. 7).
Sophos have observed one piece of malware which determines which 
(Wang, 2013, p. 4).
The orchestrator (part of the malware suite co-ordination software) for one 
APT is injected into explorer.exe (eset, 2017, pp. 7,16); a technique is known to 
academia (Nissim, Yahalom and Elovici, 2017).




have also seen modification of Internet Explorer registry keys during installation to 
prevent any prompt related to running Insafe ActiveX (F-Secure-Labs, 2016, p. 11).
Many sites, including those of financial institutions, fingerprint machines as 
an anti-fraud technique. However software is available to customise fingerprints to 
get around these anti-fraud techniques (Insikt-Group®, 2020b).
Attacks against Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data 
Execution Prevention (DEP), which include leveraging Use After Free (UAF) 
(Fireeye, 2013, p. 19) are noted.
Malware may turn off browser warnings (Kruse, Hacquebord and McArdle, 
2012, p. 7) and may use the
(Villeneuve, 2011, p. 10).
6.6.9 Extended Attributes 
Windows 8 as a way to boost the performance of image file signature validation. It is 
an expensive operation to verify an images signature. Therefore, storing information 
about whether a binary, which has previously been validated, has been changed or 
not would reduce the number of instances where an image would have to undergo a 
(Microsoft, 2017t).
For Extended Attributes (Ciubotariu, 2012) and Alternate Data Streams 
(Palumbo, 2014a, p. 4), the former example uses ZwSetEaFile to write the malware 
into the Extended Attributes (EA data) of the %System%services.exe file and 
ZwQueryEaFile to retrieve and execute it.  While the latter also notes the use of 
Trampoline code which will traverse different pieces of code before executing the 
required external subroutine before returning to the payload (Palumbo, 2014a, pp. 
6,8-9).
Kaspersky have seen (Kaspersky, 2014e, p. 5). an APT use the EA to hide 
stages. Originally, EA were implemented in Windows NT for compatibility with 
OS/2 applications but they are also in later versions of Windows: 2000, XP and 
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Vista. The malware hides its modules in NTFS EAs and splits large files into several 
limited size blocks. These are then dynamically joined, decrypted and executed in 
memory.
6.6.10 Buffer Overflow 
Buffer overflow is when data being written to storage overflows the allocated 
area into adjacent storage areas (Arpaci-Dusseau and Arpaci-Dusseau, March 2015, 
p. 5). Malware may also take advantage of buffer overflow to help with the attack 
(Werthmann, 2006), (Fireeye and Mandiant, 2014).
C buffer overflows may be mitigated. For example two program 
transformation fixed buffer overflows which originated in unsafe library functions 
and operations involving bad pointers (Shaw, 2014). The software automatically 
fixed all buffer overflows on over 4,500 programs involving over 2.3 million line of 
code in a NIST reference dataset.
6.6.11 Heap Spray 
The heap is used for dynamically allocated memory. Such space, in C, is 
requested and freed by the routines malloc and free, respectively (Arpaci-Dusseau 
and Arpaci-Dusseau, March 2015, p. 5). The heap is vulnerable to a heap spray 
(Fireeye and Mandiant, 2014, p. 14) where the APT places code in the heap to 
allocate storage which may then be filled with the required data.
6.7 Command and Control (C&C)
6.7.1 Definition 
Lockheed Martin assert that malware must beacon outbound to a control 
server to establish a C2 channel (Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 2011). Not all 
malware will need a C2 channel as the action on objective may be denial of service 
through MBR overwrite, for example.
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6.7.2 Topology 
APTs need a command and control infrastructure. This may mean registering 
websites and a DNS. NO-IP (no-ip, 2020) is a dynamic and managed DNS service 
that has been used by at least one APT (Yaneza and Mendoza, 2015, pp. 4, 20, 30).
machine is the server and the client is the C3 controller (Villeneuve and Bennett, 
2014).
Use of IP addresses linked to Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) -
http://computer.yourdictionary.com/cable-dsl-gateway) networks (Sancho ,
2012, p. 1) can make it harder to identify attackers. For the purposes of this thesis 
identification is not necessary but commonality or linkage between APTs may aid 
analysis of attack.
Unique identifiers are used by APT campaigns (Villeneuve and Sancho, 
2011, p. 8) (Hacquebord, 2017, p. 28), (Trend-Micro-Incorporated, 2015, p. 3).
These may include the registration of computer name, IP address and service pack 
(Dela Paz, 2012, p. 6).This is presumably an APT business governance and project 
control technique.
C&C topology ranged from the very simple, as in the no-ip example above, 
to complex and numerous as described by Sancho et al (Sancho , 2012, p. 1): in
this case the APT aggregated at least 60 C&C servers. This allowed the APT to
means very little C&C traffic leaves them. The use of compromised machines 
and dynamic DNS services allowed them to hide their presence by confusing their 
activities with data from legitimate individuals. C&C servers may include dedicated, 
registered, DNS servers (Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011, p. 5) to compromised 
servers. (Sancho , 2012, p. 1). However geographic location of server is not 
necessarily a reflection of user location. An IP address in one country was used by a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) provider in another (Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011;  
p. 6). The number of instances of separation of user from server geographic can only 
increase with the take up of cloud storage.
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Other C&C servers change over time (Ciancaglini , 2015, p. 16) but bots 
can use the same pattern strings over time (Ciancaglini , 2015, p. 19). One piece 
of malware uses the C&C server to change the URL of the doorway for redirection 
every 10 minutes (Dela Vega and Ingal, 2010, p. 9) while another uses a site 
redirection service (Dela Paz, 2012, pp. 8, 10).
Fireeye report (Nart Villeneuve , 2014, pp. 13-14) seeing C&C
infrastructure which relies primarily on domains obtained from dynamic DNS 
providers. The APT frequently changes IP addresses and often point their C&C
domains to legitimate IP addresses when they are not in use.
Some botnets make use of The Onion Router (TOR) which contains a 
network of more than 3,000 volunteer nodes to allow for anonymous 
communications by public key cryptography (PKC) enabling concealment from 
network surveillance tools (Ciancaglini , 2013, pp. 5, 21).
Analysis of one C&C server (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015a, pp. 10, 
13) found that the APT used encrypted virtual machines and multi-staged C&C 
servers to make it difficult to investigate their activities.. Virtual Box (virtual 
machine software) and Truecrypt (which can encrypt a file system or single file) 
were installed on the server. Analysis of the attack is slim but it is likely that the 
ich contained a Virtual Box 
virtual machine. The APT decrypted and ran the virtual machine, redirecting SSH 
traffic from the physical hosting server to the virtual machine. This meant that the 
APT could control compromised systems from within the virtual machine. This type 
of attack hinders analysis without a live memory image of the C&C server.
While F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 2) found that in one attack the 
payload is a kernel-mode driver protected and obfuscated by VM code, which cannot 
be executed natively by Windows. The VM code is a series of byte code that needs
an interpreter to translate it to native Windows machine code. The byte code cannot 
be disassembled by a common disassembler tool. This is effective at protecting the 
malware, as it prevents functionality, 
or at least increases the analysis time needed on the problem.
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Mandiant observed (Mandiant, 2010, p. 16) one APT continually moving 
laterally through the corporate network starting and stopping backdoors. This 
reduced the likelihood of a compromised host being identified, as the systems 
lly changed. Multiple 
backdoors allowed the APT to maintain a presence on the network.
Finally, registry keys may be used to store C&C information (TrendLabs, 
2013c, p. 12), or APT configuration data (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 35) and F-Secure have 
seen the use of the cloud to host malware (F-Secure-Labs, 2015b, p. 7).
Kaspersky noted (Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 7) t of 
the hosts analysed were not directly controlled via a C2 server - they connected to 
another internal host that relayed TCP connection to the C2 using mechanism 
TCP Tunnel Tool . This tool allowed the APT to chain the
internal hosts and relay communications to the real C2 server. This
technique made it harder for administrators to identify compromised hosts as local 
connections usually seem less suspicious.
Fireeye report an APT receiving tasking via POP and exfiltrating data by 
email attachments using SMTP (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 23).
6.7.3 Anonymous FTP Server 
An anonymous FTP server allows attackers to connect remotely 
compromised machine and browse the file system, upload, download, or delete files
and execute commands. (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, p. 6). This is
analogous to TOR which has been used as a data exfiltration vehicle (Villeneuve, 
2011, p. 14).
Sophos have seen cryptomining software try to spread in the manner of a 
worm to other machines using FTP (Marosi, 2016, p. 9), while Kaspersky have also 
seen cryptomining as an aside to other malware (Kaspersky, 2016c, p. 14)
Fireeye have seen the use of HUC Packet Transmit Tool (HTRAN) which 
proxies connection through intermediate hops to help disguise true geographic 
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location (Haq , 2014, pp. 17-20). Mandiant have also seen HTRAN (Mandiant, 
2013, pp. 41-42).
6.8 Installation (and Uninstallation)
6.8.1 Definition 
Lockheed Martin define installation as the part of the Kill Chain which 
allows APTs to maintain persistence (Hutchins, Clopperty and M., 2011).
6.8.2 Persistence 
Installation malware may delete itself without leaving a trace (Sancho, 
Hacquebord and Link, 2014; Trend-Micro, 2012, p. 4) making it more difficult to 
detect as the result looks like a system configuration change. However some must 
leave a trace otherwise researchers would not be able to state that an APT existed on 
the machine (Chang , 2015, p. 26). Kaspersky have seen an APT using an 
integrated timer which, it is presumed, is designed to self-destruct if commands are 
not received from the C&C after a period of several months (Kaspersky, 2015c, p. 
9). Kaspersky have also seen a multi-stage malware with the ability to delete itself 
from the system but it does leave artefacts the encrypted Virtual file system (VFS) 
from which the malware is loaded - (Kaspersky, 2014e, pp. 8, 22) as well as a self-
delete after execution of a main procedure (Kaspersky, 2013d, p. 46).
Kaspersky have seen an APT gaining persistence on domain controllers using 
a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) (Microsoft, 2017v) password filter. This 
runs every time any domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a 
password and enables the APT to harvest the password in plaintext (Kaspersky, 
2016a, p. 6). |At least one VM has been seen to be infected (Katsuki, 2012, pp. 9-11)
which indicates that not all malware runs on the host system.
However not all APTs have the ability to remove all of their malware 
(Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 5) which may indicate an absence of, or incomplete, asset 
register of their malware.
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6.8.3 Ports 
Unless the APT is destructive there is a need for C&C and to exfiltrate the 
required data. However, for APTs who need C&C, and whose Action on Objectives 
is data exfiltration, ports are will be needed unless it is an insider attack using storage 
devices e.g. USB memory stick. This methodology may be constant over time and 
therefore easier to detect. Exfiltration may done using standard ports (e.g. 443) or 
non-standard ports (Villeneuve and Bennett, 2012, p. 4). Port numbers may be 
checked with IANA (IANA, 2020) for the reasons for their use.
Mandiant state that 83% of malware used TCP port 80 or 443 with 17% 
using another port (Mandiant, 2010, p. 8). For example, Fireeye have observed the 
use of port 55555 (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 28). However, in 2013 Fireeye (Fireeye, 2014c, 
pp. 5-6) saw a victims machines sending C&C to 33,697 different port numbers, 
which is almost 50% of the available ports assigned by Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) process for standards-track protocols. The most frequently used ports 
were under 5000, with a large concentration of use of ports in the 15,000 to 16,000
range. This suggested to Fireeye that many corporate and government networks were 
infected by the malware known as ZeroAccess which uses these port numbers for 
peer-to-peer communications. In the 1 1,000 range, Fireeye found very limited 
usage in the 400s, which is often used for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). There is no 
inconsistency between the Mandiant and Fireeye observations; Mandiant present 
density of the concentration ratio of port numbers while Fireeye presents spread.
Firewall protection may be by-passed by using ports that are being 
legitimately used, i.e. not blocked, by the system (Chiu, Weng and Chiu, 2014, p. 
4).or FTP and SOCKS Bot (Goncharov, 2012, p. 4)
High level language access to ports is done using the winsock.h (Microsoft, 
2019h) and winsock2.h headers (Microsoft, 2019g) which contain the sockets and 
binding WSA (Windows Sockets API) functions (Neville and Gibb, 2013, p. 36).
This will be returned to later in the thesis.
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6.8.4 Timing 
Some attacks may be timed (Villeneuve and Bennett, 2012, p. 11),
(Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011, p. 8) and some remain quiet for a time after infection 
(Sancho and Hacquebord, 2016, p. 12), (TrendLabs, 2014, p. 12). One, after 
ackdoor to take advantage of OS features such as sleep timer. It
could accept a sleep command allowing it to be dormant for varying periods of time
before contacting C&C servers (TrendLabs, 2014, p. 4). Mandiant identified 
(Mandiant, 2010, p. 15) malware configured to sleep for anywhere from a few weeks 
to a few months, with one piece of malware able to sleep for over a year. Symantec 
(Suenaga, 2012, pp. 20, 27-28, 43-46) and 
elsewhere (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015d, p. 20) where it would sleep for 
0x7530 milliseconds (30 seconds) at a time. While Kaspersky (Kaspersky, 2013a, p. 
59) have seen malware trying to connect to the C&C infrastructure every 150 
seconds.
One APT uses KillTimer to destroy the specified timer (Microsoft, 2017u)
and then SetTimer to create a timer with a specified time-out value (Microsoft, 
2017ad).
Symantec (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015a, p. 19) discovered that one 
APT had two parametric delay methods: one was a delay loop which could be 
execu
was at different points in the code.
Fireeye report the use of Sleep to evade file-based sandboxes as well as using 
it to invoke malware (Singh and Bu, 2014, pp. 12-13), and C&C communications 
failures (Nart Villeneuve , 2014, p. 11). Fireeye also note the capture of user 
data every 500 milliseconds (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 37) as well as sleep for a random 
amount of time using rand() (Fireeye, 2015b, p. 22). Kaspersky have seen a sequence 
of useless Sleep API calls, probably to break detection of some signature-based AV 
engines (Kaspersky, 2013d).
will not start C&C server call back until the file is 180 days old - this ensures that a
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critical malicious component was removed during this period. The module backs up 
and restores system access within six months (Kaspersky, 2014a, p. 16). In another 
Kaspersky observation, after installation the main modules start working as sleeper 
cells . They display no activity of their own but
(Kaspersky, 2016a).
APT sets up a 
C&C, create a malware sample to use it, attacks and infects the victim,
communicates with the victim machine and moves on. Shared hosting would expire 
in a month or two and the C&C disappears (Kaspersky, 2013a, p. 24). Kaspersky go 
on to say that the attacks were focused and that the APT knew what they were 
looking for; this author wonders if the reconnaissance had previously been 
performed? Kaspersky later note (Kaspersky, 2013a, p. 49) that t
nature of this operation makes it unusual. In other cases, victims remain infected for 
months or years, and data is continuously exfiltrated. The APT appears to know what 
they need and after the information is obtained, the victim is abandoned.
Although this is a Windows-based thesis it is noted that one Unix based 
system opens the back door for three minutes every hour and then uses a unique 
combination of TCP headers on the correct port to enter (Chohan, DeSombre and 
Grosfelt, 2018, p. 5).
6.8.5 Use of Commercial Products 
Fireeye report (Fireeye, 2015c, pp. 7-11. 13) an APT using Twitter to 
facilitate C&C: The APT generates a Twitter handle for a specific day ahead of that 
day.
that tells the malware to visit a specific Twitter handle a specific day. The APT posts 
obfuscated instructions before malware attempts to access it. Should contact not be 
made, the malware waits until the next day to try to again communicate. 
Communications attempts may be configured to occur on weekdays or after a 
tweet contains a URL, which has been observed as a GitHub or a compromised 
website URL, and a hashtag. The URL contains a varying size image or images. The 
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hashtag contains decryption details for the instruction which can be found in the 
image(s). 
Virus Bulletin report hijacking of internet satellite links for C2 by sniffing 
and spoofing (Virus-Bulletin, 2015, p. 7).
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2010, pp. 7, 8) observed that the malware for one attack 
did not listen for inbound connections (it only initiated outbound connections) so 
unless defenders were monitoring outbound traffic for beaconing it would not be 
discovered.
6.8.6 Protocols 
C&C may be detected by: Consistent URL paths; Detectable packet headers; 
Identifiable network communications; Unusual ports and protocols. Secure sockets 
layer (SSL) certificates (TrendLabs, 2013b, pp. 3-4). Unusual port use has been seen 
elsewhere (Kharouni, 2015, p. 4) and commented on in Section 6.8.3.
A Component Object Module (COM) is a system for creating binary software 
components that can interact (Microsoft, 2018g) and which provides an interface to 
allow developers to control and manipulate objects of other applications 
(Rascagneres, 2014).  A Class Identifier (CLSID) is a globally unique identifier to 
identify a COM class object (Microsoft, 2018f). APTs have been seen hijack or 
create CLSIDs , (Mcafee-Labs, 2012, p. 2) as well as 
hijacking COM entries (Neville and Gibb, 2013, p. 18), (Wyke, 2012b, p. 8) and 
(Rascagneres, 2014).
More straightforwardly, Symantec report HTTPS for secure communications 
to the C&C server (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b, p. 16). This APT even 
encrypts the IP address of the C&C server (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b, p. 
20) using a simple XOR with the byte 0x14 for all characters of the IP address. 
Sophos have seen  an IP address XORed with 0x4E8F9AF4 
with 0xF5AD (Wyke, 2012b, p. 28).
McAfee report the use of an IRC channel to receive real-time commands 




these popular code protection mechanisms is (Pontiroli and
Martinez, 2015, p. 16).
Encryption and obfuscation can be rudimentary: Some APTs encipher their 
malware and/or retrieved data stored on disc. Different attacks from the same APT 
can use different encryption keys (Kaspersky, 2013b, p. 6). The table, below, 
summarises some straightforward encryption schemes:
Encryption Algorithm Key White Paper Reference
XOR Repeating 0x66 (Trend-Micro, 2013a, p. 13)
XOR Repeating 0x02 (Dela Paz, 2012, p. 6)
XOR Repeating 0x90 (with a 16-byte 
key also being used)
(Alintanahin, 2015, p. 3)
XOR Repeating 0x95 (Gross and Cylance-Spear-
Team, 2016, p. 4)
XOR Repeating unreported byte value (Villeneuve and Sancho, 
2011, p. 7)
XOR Repeating (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 16)
XOR Repeating 0x3E (Kaspersky, 2013c, p. 26)
Multiplication One-byte key (Alintanahin, 2015, p. 7)
Unknown Machine specific 
variables e.g. MAC 
address
(Villeneuve and Bennett, 
2012, p. 5).







2015a, pp. 5, 7).
XOR Repeating 4-byte key (Wyke, 2011, p. 8) as have 
RSA (RSA, 2014, pp. 13, 25-
27, 29)
XOR Repeating after 




(said to be random)
(Haq , 2014, p. 13).
XOR Repeating 32-byte key (the first 
32 bytes) from one file 
for two other files.
(Symantec-Security-
Response, 2015b, p. 13).
Table 6-2: Selected List of APT Developed Encryption Techniques
It can be seem that many APTs use very simple encryption with some being a 
simple substation. This knowledge for the defender allows the defender to counter
simple encryption scheme using categorisation techniques. It will be shown later in 
this thesis that use of the Index of Coincidence and Vigenère Square analysis 
techniques are necessary and sufficient to identify such encryption. The deification
and publication of these techniques should force APTs to change their encryption
scheme and hence increase their business costs.
The thesis will now summarise less straightforward encryption schemes.
Although strictly encryption, using a Caesar (simple) substitution (single 
character encryption) data may be obfuscated using different Base64 alphabets 
(Sancho , 2012, p. 3), (Mandiant, 2010, pp. 12, 14-16), (Fireeye, 2014a, pp. 31, 
38), (Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, p. 19), (Clearsky, 2016, pp. 5, 10, 16), (McAfee-
Labs, 2015, p. 13) with part of the last example decoding to hex characters e.g. 
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For one APT encryption scheme each byte is XOR-ed by a letter in the string, 
YHCRA, and rotated three bits to the right after every XOR operation (Villeneuve 
and dela Torre, 2013, p. 5). This encryption scheme is commented on in detail in
Section 6.8.7.
Multiple key lengths (10, 6, and unknown 
the paper) have been seen in one suite of attack software (Benchea , 2015, pp. 
20-21). None of the algorithms is a straightforward XOR of key and text. The 
pseudo-code for the 10-long key is incomplete so it is hard to see what might be the 
intent.
Encryption may be used with filename extension obfuscation For example 
saving scrapped data as a .dll made to look part of a wider .dll family (Yaneza, 
2015b, p. 4). The encryption algorithm is not given. Sophos see filename extension 
renaming in a ransomware attack. This then stops other ransomware enciphering the 
same files  (Loman, 2019, pp. 8-9).
GET and POST requests may contain obfuscated data, for example an 
obfuscated MAC address (Trend-Micro-Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 3) later in 
the attack the obfuscated MAC address is used as an RC4 encryption key to 
(Trend-Micro-
Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 5).
Some APTs encrypt their malware, only decrypting at run time and being 
held in memory producing what is called fileless infection (described in Section 5.8).
Others may decrypt to disk (Chen and Li, 2015, pp. 6,7)
2015, p. 18)
APT context is that which has no image on disc but the definition has been expanded 
to include registry and reflective code injection. Symantec define fileless as:
Memory only threats, such as SQL Slammer
Fileless persistence, such as VBS in the registry
Dual-use tools, such as psExec.exe, which are used by the 
attacker
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Non-PE file attacks, such as Office documents with macros or 
(Wüest and Anand, 2017, p. 10)
Wüest and Anand go on to show a JScript inside malicious SCT file that 
contains a large amount of hex code (Wüest and Anand, 2017, p. 12). This will be
discussed later in the thesis.
Trend Micro observe being used as an innocuous as 
decryption key for RC4 (TrendLabs, 2013c, p. 13).
Another APT uses RC4 for encryption of elements of its attack. At least one 
element is stored in the registry as a wide character string and is converted to a 
multibyte character string before the key use. The conversion varies depending on 
the region of the 
22) notes the use of RC4 encryption for communications with the C&C server. RC5 
has also been seen (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, p. 14) as well as RC5 and 
RC6 (Kaspersky, 2015c, pp. 27-30) and (CrowdStrike, 2014b, p. 35) also use a 
relatively simple XOR based method of encryption with a 16 byte long key.
AES128 has also been seen (Katsuki, 2012, p. 9) as has RSA and functions 
imported from the Microsoft Cryptography API library (Sherstobitoff, Liba and 
Walter, 2013, pp. 11, 16). Sophos have also seen the use of RSA (Wyke, 2012b, p. 
14).
Symantec report seeing the use of a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) for 
encryption (Symantec-Security-Response, 2016, p. 10) and 128-bit CAST in CBC 
mode (Symantec-Security-Response, 2016, p. 13). While Sophos have seen malware 
(Wyke, 2014, p. 4). An 
encryption scheme that may be a poorly implemented (deliberately or otherwise) 
LCG is discussed later in the thesis.
Kaspersky point out that 
other signature- (Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 6).
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F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 5) have seen a decryption scheme 
decoding encoded strings based on a shuffled jump table. Tantalisingly no further 
information is provided. F-Secure further noted (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 10)
nidsSendNetBufferLists as part of encrypted TCP data.
Privacy is becoming more important and users are moving to secure 
communication partly through legal pressures (Blue-Coat, 2013) but partly through 
personal choice. Encrypted traffic allows malware to bypass perimeter checks. In 
2014 Blue Coat (Blue-Coat, 2014, p. 2) observe that SSL-encrypted traffic, which 
makes up 30%-40% of all Internet traffic, is used by APTs and cannot be deciphered 
by IPS and web gateway defences.
6.8.8 Steganography, Obfuscation and Polymorphism 
Steganography, hiding messages in text or pictures,  can play a part 
(TrendLabs, 2015a, pp. 20, 23) and also set up a second C&C channel to counter 
incident response. Fireeye also report the use of steganography (Fireeye, 2015c, p. 
11), (Fireeye, 2014c, p. 7) as does (Mosuela, 2016), however an installer file is 
needed.
Obfuscation may be layered and not just once instance. Unique counterfeit 
certificates may be registered under legitimate corporations, without the knowledge 
of those corporations. The uniqueness may be independently tested (Barysevich, 
2018, pp. 1-2).
Obfuscation has been seen during the reconnaissance and delivery part of the 
Kill Chain by such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Virtual Private Servers 
(VPS), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and The Onion Router (Tor) (Moriuchi, 
2018, p. 2).
Symantec have observed APTs obfuscating a domain name e.g.
(Suenaga, 2012, pp. 28, 46) with further examples at (Symantec, 2016a, pp. 12, 15-
18) and JavaScript (Selvaraj and Gutierrez, 2010, pp. 11-13). While McAfee have 
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(McAfee-Labs, 2015, p. 40). As previously discussed, McAfee have 
seen obfuscated JavaScript code delivered by email in a .zip file (McAfee, 2018a).
N-gram checks for the probability of occurrence of certain 
sequence based upon the good and the bad sample set;
Entropy checks for the distribution of the used bytes codes;
Word Size checks if very long strings are used;
(Jain, Gomez and Singh, 2014, p. 30)
This thesis notes the existence of The International Obfuscated C Code Contest 
exists. There are five goals of the contest, the first of which is to write 
Obscure/Obfuscated C code (Broukhis, Cooper and Noll, 2019).
Goncharov describes polymorphism as:
Polymorphic crypters are considered more advanced. They use state-of-the-
art algorithms that utilize random variables, data, keys, decoders, and so on. As such, 
one input source file never produces an output file that is identical to the output of 
another source file. This can be achieved by using several algorithms, including:
ability to run: Blocks of code are encrypted using a specific 
technique. Several decoders are then created for the malware 
body, which is randomly decoded. This applies also to variables 
and other data. 
Creating macros: A macro is created during preprocessing. When 
invoked, it repeatedly performs an instruction.
Inserting garbage code: Blocks are split into sections, in-between 
which garbage instructions are inserted. These instructions do not 
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a
garbage instructions used in code blocks, these are also used to 
execute helpful actions that complicate the work of an anti-
malware analyzer in every possible way. 
Combining all of the above-mentioned methods: All of the 
aforementioned methods, along with dynamically generating 
algorithms after encrypting a specific block of code based on 
random conditions, may also be used.
(Goncharov, 2012, pp. 1-2)
and the data is encrypted and decrypted offline by the attackers using keys unique to 
each client. (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012a, p. 3).
Sophos state that:
In a polymorphic attack, code is typically encrypted to appear meaningless 
and paired with a decryptor that translates it back into a form that can be executed. 
lymorphic viruses are self-contained and 
(Sophos, 2013, p. 31)
6.9 Actions on Objectives
6.9.1 Definition 
Lockheed Martin state that the objective is typically
involving collecting, encrypting and extracting information from the victim
machines. They also state that potential objectives are violations of data integrity or 
availability. The APT may only access the victim use as a hop point to 
compromise other systems and move laterally inside the network.
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6.9.2 Types of Communications 
Actions on Objectives are as varied as motivations and are the logical 
extension on motives. For example one APT disabled direct database manipulations 
(Kaspersky, 2017b, p. 5).
Fireeye report (Fireeye, 2015c, p. 12) the use of cloud storage to hold 
exfiltrated data prior to a final downloaded
noted (Carr, 2017) an APT tracking their deployments with the use of cloud-based 
email analytics which had been designed for sales organisations on legitimate cloud 
storage services as well as the use of native webpage functionality linked to images 
hosted on infrastructure monitored by the APT.
Exfiltration of data is by many means: from the simple, unencrypted method 
(Trend-Micro, 2013a, p. 9), (Trend-Micro-Cyber-Safety-Solutions-Team, 2016, pp. 
4-5) to use of TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP etc (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015c, 
pp. 11, 15) (Neville and Gibb, 2013, p. 8), (F-Secure-Labs, 2014a, p. 12).
The original intent of DNS tunnelling was to allow machines to resolve a 
53, are left open. This allows APTs to use a, generally, unscrutinised port (Insikt-
Group®, 2020a, p. 19).
6.9.3 PowerShell 
PowerShell allows commands that enabled it to download files and 
b (TrendLabs, 2014, p. 4) with a 
(Symantec, 2016a, p. 9).
Symantec go on to list the 10 reasons why attackers use PowerShell:
It is installed by default on all new Windows computers;
It can execute payloads directly from memory, making it stealthy;
It generates few traces by default, making it difficult to find under 
forensic analysis;
It has remote access capabilities by default with encrypted traffic;
192
As a script, it is easy to obfuscate and difficult to detect with
traditional security tools;
Defenders often overlook it when hardening their systems;
It can bypass application-whitelisting tools depending on the
configuration;
Many gateway sandboxes do not handle script-based malware 
well;
It has a growing community with readily available scripts;
Many system administrators use and trust the framework, 
allowing PowerShell malware to blend in with regular 
administration work.
Of 49,127 PowerShell scripts submitted for malware analysis, Symantec found that 
95.4% were malicious (Symantec, 2016a, p. 8) . 55% of scripts were started through 
cmd.exe on the command line (the next highest was msiexec.exe  at 8%) with 95% 
of scripts executed through cmd.exe (the next highest being wmiprvse.exe with 9%) 
(Symantec, 2016a, p. 12).
Symantec have observed one APT downloading updates and tools, including 
powershell, 
flags to keep them hidden .
To restrict powershell use the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_ 
MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ PowerShell\ should be set to but
this may be bypassed by use of (Kazanciyan and Hastings, 2014). This will 
(Microsoft, 
2020). Fireeye have observed an APT using powershell powershell -
ExecutionPolicy bypass -WindowStyle hidden encoded (Fireeye, 
2015c, p. 12) which allows an APT to bypass without changing the registry key.
Sophos have observed one piece of malware using PowerShell in conjunction 
with a Registry Run key. The malware first checks to see if PowerShell is running; if 
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not, it downloads and install it and then creates a blank or NULL Autostart entry 
using the ZWSetValueKey (Santos, 2014). Sophos subsequently saw more use of the 
registry for storing payloads but with registration in one registry key and the payload 
(dropped) into another (Szappanos, 2015b, pp. 15-16, 19-20).
Although Powershell offers the ability to be fileless , it does need Registry 
Keys for persistence (one of which is 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\(null
). It could be argu
key (Rivera and Inocencio, 2016, pp. 71-74), (Rivera and Inocencio, 2015).
seemed to be an innocent 
spreadsheet, a password-protected macro would then decode and execute the 
(Pontiroli and Martinez, 2015, p. 13).
execution 
policy. In this case, merely invoking the script with
the (Pontiroli and Martinez, 2015, p. 15).
It is suggested (Pontiroli and Martinez, 2015) that it is possible to aggregate 
Powershell into a framework. One such framework, PowersSploit, can integrate a set
of PowerShell scripts and modules to be used in the attack post exploitation phases. 
PowerSploit executes scripts to perform administrative and low-level tasks without 
the need to implant malicious executables with the aim to evade timely AV
detection. This is another example of Living Off the Land . Panda Security observes 
(Panda-Security, 2015, p. 6) the same phenomenon without PowerShell as the 
peculiarities indicate that the proactive protection layers included in most 
AV solutions would not be able to detect its apparently harmless behaviour.
Mandiant have also see PowerShell mailbox harvest using EWS (Mandiant, 
2017, p. 19).
The .NET Framework is a development platform for app building for various 
platforms. It has a common language runtime (CLR) and .NET Framework class 
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library with broad functionality and industry standards support. It provides services 
which include memory management, type and memory safety, security, networking, 
and application deployment. It also has data structures and APIs that abstract the 
lower-level Windows operating system. It can be used with different programming 
languages (Microsoft, 2019e) and may be used maliciously with PowerShell 
(Pontiroli and Martinez, 2015).
6.9.4 CPU Memory (RAM Scrapper) 
Trend Micro have seen credit card details scrapped from Point of Sale (PoS) 
RAM (Trend-Micro-Cyber-Safety-Solutions-Team, 2016, pp. 3-5). The malware 
looks for international credit cards that are unrestricted for authorization not 
requiring a pin. In a report summarising such attacks Trend Micro assert that weak 
PoS security allows APTs to breach networks but not necessarily for targeted 
attacks. The malware does provide instant, huge, profits (Trend-Micro, 2015, pp. 27-
29).
6.9.5 DDOS 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks use multiple machines to 
attack one victim. One DDOS attack has been seen using connectionless LDAP 
(CLDAP). CLDAP is typically used on networks for accessing active directory 




example one APT encrypts random position of files, deletes Volume Shadow 
Copies, disables recovery reboot and then reboots the machine after 300 seconds 
(Solad , 2018, pp. 9, 13).
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6.10 Malware Languages
Web Shells have been seen written in JSP, CFM, ASP, ASPX, or PHP (RSA, 
2014, p. 9). The advantage of Web shells is that they have: low detection rates; the 
inability to block or monitor an IP and no beaconing.
A means of detecting file type is needed.
6.11 APT Errors
6.11.1 Introduction 
APTs are made up of computer architects and software engineers who too 
make mistakes they are not super-human. It is observed that it may be easy to 
decompile their executables or enter their C&C infrastructure as they too make 
similar mistakes to their targets (Sancho and Hacquebord, 2016, pp. 4-5),
(Villeneuve, 2011, p. 5). Villeneuve later goes on to point out:
day vulnerabilities exploits for vulnerabilities for which there is no patch available. 
While some might believe that the threat actors behind targeted malware attacks 
have mythical capabilities, both in terms of their operational security and the exploits 
and malware tools used, they, in fact, often use older exploits and simple malware. 
The objective of these attacks is to obtain sensitive data; the malware used in the 
attacks is just an instrument. They will use whatever is required to gain entry based 
on reconnaissance. In addition, they will adjust their tactics in reaction to the 
(Villeneuve, 2011, p. 8).
It is known that some malware is used across campaigns (Trend-
Micro.Forward-Looking-Threat-Research-Team, 2012, p. 2). This allows defenders 
to spot similarities and if necessary, disrupt more than one infection should that have 
occurred. However one should be cogniscent of false flags (Bartholomew and 
Guerrero-Saade, 2016), (Guerrero-Saade, Moriuchi and Lesnewich, 2018, p. 3)
which may fool a defender and take up a lot of time and effort.
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bad actors do not often take any extraordinary means to hide data beyond, perhaps, 
(Berghel, Hoelzer and Sthultz, 
2006). This has been explored earlier in the section on encryption where cycling 
single or multiple bytes are used as the encryption or, at the other end of the scale, 
for example, AES. Software to flag possibly encrypted files has been developed for, 
and will be discussed later in, this thesis.
6.11.2 Domain Registration and Email Addresses 
Fireeye have observed the use of the same email address to register domain 
names used in attacks (Nart  Villeneuve , 2014, pp. 13-14, 17). While elsewhere 
two different emails addresses have been used to separately register a C2 domain and 
egister 125 IP addresses (Guerrero-Saade 
and Chohan, 2018, pp. 3,11, 23, 25-26).
It is possible to check historical ownership of internet domains as well as for 
example registrant names (Kruse, Hacquebord and McArdle, 2012, pp. 15-16)
however fake or comprised email addresses may be used as well as non-standard 
telephone and fax numbers (ICANN, 2017).
Agari note the use of linked Gmail accounts (Agari, 2019, p. 14).  Any Gmail
address with the same name but a dot in a different place directs to the same Gmail
inbox. For example, my.name@gmail.com , m.yname@gmail.com and 
myn.ame@gmail.com direct to the same inbox. Agari go on to note that the vast 
majority of the internet treats these three addresses as three separate accounts. This 
makes the life of APTs easier in that they can control many victims from the same 
inbox - it also makes a de Gmail addresses are easier to 
identify.
6.11.3 Typographical Errors (Typos) 
It is asserted (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 13) that APTs do not seem to put 
much effort into content QA - emails and phishing pages formulation hence 
making a lot of typos and grammatical errors. This is supported (Clearsky, 2015) by 
the observation of another APT, not new to hacking, displaying grammatical errors, 
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exposure of attack infrastructure, anti-analysis techniques that were easy to bypass, 
6.11.4 Compiler Traces and Date Related Issues 
information that allows incremental linking of a Debug configuration of your 
program. A PDB file is created when you build with /ZI or /Zi
(Microsoft, 2017z)
Some APTs leave traces of their development work within their code. For 
example leaving the PDB path in the malware (Villeneuve and Sancho, 2011, p. 10),
(TrendLabs, 2014, p. 13), (TrendLabs, 2013c, p. 14), (Fireeye, 2014b, p. 5), (Nart  
Villeneuve , 2014, p. 10), (F-Secure-Labs, 2015a, p. 7), (Cylance, 2016, pp. 8, 
26, 28-29) or debug strings (Pernet and Sela, 2015, pp. 15, 16), (Pernet and Lu, 
2015, p. 10) both of which use the same malware.
Timestamps of when code was compiled may be analysed (Pernet and Lu, 
2015, p. 4) as there are very few different samples in the wild and close timestamps 
may indicate small changes in APT code (Florio and Kasslin, 2009, pp. 1-2).
Compile times may also be used to as supporting evidence towards identifying the 
origin of APTs (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 27), (Fireeye, 2015c, p. 5) although it would not 
be difficult to spoof this by changing the date and time of the clock where the code 
was compiled. The power of timestamp analysis is highlighted by Kaspersky 
(Kaspersky, 2014b, pp. 35, 37) who were able to analyse the compile times of 154 
binaries from one APT. Elsewhere Trend Micro noted (Trend-Micro-Incorporated, 
2015, p. 14) that two related APTs had similar behaviours which may or may have 
been a coincidence, as binaries significantly differed. 
Analysis of compilation time of binaries is taken up by Fireeye (Fireeye, 
2014f, p. 13) who point out that although the compilation time of binaries can be 
easily forged, analysis of them is still useful. The timestamp may not reveal when a 
binary was compiled, but it can be used to cluster samples by compile times.
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APTs have been seen to leave the name or nickname of developers in 
compiled code (Symantec-Security-Response, 2012a, pp. 8-9), (Katsuki, 2012, p. 
12).
Fireeye have observed one APT changing the modification date of files. This 
date is earlier than the creation date (Lee, Ahl and Hanzlik, 2014, p. 9). The 
unreliability of timestamps on the Windows OS is taken up in Section 6.11.4.
Kaspersky (Kaspersky, 2017a, p. 15) have seen one piece of malware with a 
fake PE file timestamp; however, the authors forgot to change a timestamp inside the
debug directory which pointed to: 2016.11.14 21:16:45. A fake timestamp has also 
been seen by F-Secure (F-Secure-Labs, 2014d, p. 9).
(Pernet and Lu, 2015, p. 9).
6.11.5 Natural Language Remnants 
Fireeye have seen natural language as a passphrase and salt (Nart  Villeneuve
, 2014, p. 8) as well as RC4 with a salt (Fireeye, 2014a, p. 35). Elsewhere 
cultural references have been seen (Kaspersky, 2014e, pp. 13, 16), (Symantec-
Security-Response, 2015c, p. 13).
6.11.6 Use of Malware Scanners 
Online malware scanners may be used to check to see if AV software will 
identify APT malware as malware (Pernet and Lu, 2015, p. 4) (Goncharov, 2012, p. 
13), (Goncharov, 2014, p. 14), (Zetter, 2014). Zetter states that one can follow the 
development of malware but Goncharov in the later reference states that some 
attackers use web sites not connected with AV companies. Clearly, AV companies 
can build an advantage because as soon as, or even before, malware is deployed their 
products will have been updated. One may consider it imprudent to publicise these 
activities in this thesis but, once again, the idea is to increase the cost of business of 
the attackers. Even if attackers were to stop using these online malware testers, they 
would have to build their own, hence increasing the cost of their business.
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6.11.7 Encryption 
something down, you do it with multiple keys, layers of security, not this peekaboo. 
(Harkaway, 2017).
Shannon asserts that:
The amount of secrecy should be proportionate to the effort put in 
to securing the message;
The key size should be as small as possible;
Complexity of enciphering and deciphering should minimised;
Error propagation should be minimised;
The encrypted message should be no longer than the message.
(Shannon, 1949)
Using simple examples where the key is a single byte: 0x66 in binary is 
01100110, 0x02 is 00000010, and 0x09 is 00001001. Observe that the first 
encryption key will change half of the number of bits in the byte whereas the second 
will encrypt one bit and the third two-bits. The second and third encryption keys 
means that the first nibble of every byte is unencrypted.
Although one APT uses 0x2C and 0x7B as a double encryption, what they do 
not seem to have realised is this is equivalent a single encryption with 0x57 (0x2C 
XOR 0x7B = 01111011). Elsewhere in the attack they do the same with 0x70 and 
0x79 which is equivalent 0x09 (0x70 XOR 0x79 = 00001001).
As has been demonstrated many APTs a single repeating byte to encrypt 
malware. Such encryption is easily defeated: for example, a number of fields in a PE 
or .dll are reserved and always set to zero. When zero, in any position in a file, is 
enciphered with any key character, binary mod 2, the result is always the key 
character. One can just look at all of these positions and check to see that they are all 
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the same (and not zero) to recover the key character. This key can also be checked 
(Pietrek, 2002);
file may be decrypted. In addition, any bit that is enciphered by a zero will result in 
the original bit being the cipher. Interestingly:
was delivered encoded with a single-byte XOR against 
the byte 0x95, skipping both the key itself and zero in an attempt to avoid exposing 
the key. This method of obfuscation at the time would have ensured delivery of the 
payload past most IDS/IPS systems.
(Gross and Cylance-Spear-Team, 2016, p. 4)
Using a repeating key is for encipherment is, in effect, the same as using a 
Vigenère cipher (Gaines, 1956) and this too can be solved. However, this author 
asserts that APTs do not necessarily use encryption to secure their code but to 
obfuscate it. Minimizing CPU time means using a simple form of encryption which 
means a quick method of decryption.
One APT has been seen using an encryption scheme where each byte is 
XOR-ed by every letter in the string, YHCRA, and rotated three bits to the right after 
every XOR operation. However, this is equivalent to encrypting using the single byte 
11110110 as shown in the table below: 
Initial Text (Null) 00000000 P (01010000)
XOR Y (01011001) 01011001 00001001
Circular Right Shift 3 00101011 00100001
XOR H (01001000) 01100011 01101001
Circular Right Shift 3 01101100 00101101
XOR C (01000011) 00101111 01101110
Circular Right Shift 3 11100101 11001101
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XOR R (01010010) 10110111 10011111
Circular Right Shift 3 11110110 11110011
XOR A (01000001) 10110111 01000001
Circular Right Shift 3 11110110 01010110
Table 6-3
It can be seen that 11110110 XOR P (01010000) equals 01010110 which is 
the final value of the rightmost column.
Another way to view this is as set of streams of bits (circular left shift five equals 
circular right shift three) and to XOR (count the parity mod 2) of the last eight 
columns of each row to give the key:
Y         010110010101100101011001010110010
H                   0100000101001000010010000100





The point here is to demonstrate that one must be careful with encryption as 
i.e.
stronger, encryption. This example re-
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minimising complexity: the designer of the above scheme has picked a bit shift of 
three which is co-prime to eight but has five times the number of XORs needed plus 
five circular shifts for each iteration i.e. a workload of at least five times for each 
encipherment when all that is needed is to store 11110110 as the single byte key. 
Depending on the hardware and software implementation the cost could be as much 
as 10 times (10 clock cycles) as much as using one byte.
Jscript inside a malicious SCT file has been discussed (Wüest and Anand, 
2017, p. 12). This is, in effect, a simple form of obfuscation, it is also encoding but it 
does not should not be
longer than the original q.v. the \x52\x32\x56\
\ .
Malwarebytes (Malwarebytes, 2018a, p. 8) also observe script obfuscated using hex 
\x75\x73\
One APT has a 3-stage encryption: a rolling XOR encryption, followed by 
RC4 encryption of this stream, followed by Salsa20 encryption of the intermediate 
stream (Insikt-Group and Rapid7, 2019, pp. 16-18). Stage 1 (the rolling XOR 
encryption) is a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) with seeds of four and eight 
and a divisor of 255. Analysis for this thesis shows that this stream repeats after 360 
iterations (Appendix G). It is possible that the developers are aware of the short 
comings of RC4 and thought that three different encryption stages are better than 
one. However, the use of indicates, or a desire to indicate, lack of cryptographic skill 
and knowledge.
6.11.8 Certificate Re-Use 
Certificates may also be used to link attacks: Fireeye have observed six 
different certificates which linked a number of APTs (Fireeye, 2014f, p. 6), while 
Recorded Future mention the work of a rival AV company who have seen an SSL 
certificates shared across command and control (C2) domains (Gundert, Chohan and 
Lesnewich, 2018, p. 8) with later research elsewhere connecting the certificates to 




One keylogger was so badly developed that it leaked the attackers FTP 
credentials (Pernet and Sela, 2015, p. 15).
Fireeye assert (Fireeye, 2014b, pp. 3-11) that, although not fool proof, a 
number of things can be used to ascertain the origin of APTs: Keyboard Layout; 
Malware Metadata; Embedded Fonts; DNS Registration; Language; Remote 
Administration Tool Configuration; Behaviour. Fireeye have also observed one APT 
using English language Word documents being used with a foreign character set and 
the same DNS resolution (Fireeye, 2014d, pp. 18, 20).
Sophos (Wyke, 2014, p. 9) have seen one piece of malware with debugging 
left on. During normal execution victims will not see the debugging but if a 
particular registry key is created then a message box is displayed.
One APT relied on a second Lua-script (Pontifícia-Universidade-Católica-do-
Rio-de-Janeiro, 2017) for automatic wiping of stolen documents but this was not 
always done leaving the files in the APTs cache forever (Kaspersky, 2016a, p. 15).
Finally in an attack using decoy droppers of order and receipt (F-secure-Labs, 
2014b, p. 5) an image of a receipt taken with a mobile phone was sent and this image 





sources were aligned with the LMKC in sub-section 5.3 to 5.9 (inclusive). The 
chapter has also highlighted some APT errors.
This thesis concludes that malware may:
enter the system from malicious websites, USB devices, business 
documents or importing legitimate software;
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enter the system using default passwords on legitimate software;
hide in plain sight (i.e. the files may be known to the operating 
system or they be largely invisible to the operation intercepting 
communications between application and the operating system);
be standalone files or infect another file;
need a method of C&C and hence website with which to connect 
and ports numbers to use;
have the same name as a legitimate file;
be signed by legitimate software;
be of small size.
It is suggested that:
a means of analysing file length is needed;
a means of detecting file type is needed;
date analysis of the Windows files is needed;
certificate may be used to link attacks;
malware may be insidious and seductive e.g. malvertising.
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7 THE FOUNDATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF APTS
7.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the foundation for the solution how can data be 
categorised for analysis? It supports the third Aim and Objective. The thesis has 
discussed APTs and where the malware they deploy lie on the HDD. This chapter 
will discuss how an APT team may be organised for their business and discuss 
increasing their business costs. It will distil the information into a manageable form 
and present a structure for the software suite developed to treat malware on the 
HDD. As previously stated, this thesis is agnostic to the origin and intent of the 
APTs and malware. In some cases, it is not necessary to look for malware to treat it; 
in other cases, putative malware should first be identified. The chapter will also 
contain discussion of what pristine elements of the Windows OS should look like.
It has previously been stated the Windows Operating System is a file-based 
system. The analysis and subsequent programming will make use of this design 
philosophy. It will also make use of the Mechanisms of Action for malware, 
Attributes by Design and Attributes by Discovery.
7.2 Setting the Scene
few reasons:
The attackers have unlimited time.
The attackers have unlimited resources.
There is little recourse that can be taken across multiple 
international borders.
An organisation needs to focus on executing its business strategy, 
not solely pouring resources into defensive capability.
(Auty, 2015)
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For the first two points this thesis asserts that no-one has unlimited time or resources.
With the third point this thesis has asserted that potential victims could insert 
is valid and 
has been discussed earlier; if the cost of security is greater than the cost of the data 
being protected then the defensive capability is unbalanced. Furthermore, the last 
two points, above, are valid insofar as it has been seen that APTs take advantage of 
weaknesses in business process (and technical inconsistencies) to exploit IT security. 
This thesis further asserts that part of this problem is that manual business processes 
that are internal to the organisation contain checks and balances which have been 
transferred to IT rather than thinking about how the IT can facilitate the business and 
build new, relevant checks and balances into the new technologically based business 
processes. In other words, users have a legal and moral duty to protect information 
on their machines.
There is an opportunity cost associated with the disruption caused by APTs so
defenders should wish to minimise the amount of work, business disruption and 
overhead, to be done. Ideally, at the elemental level, making the disruption of an 
APT look like a Single Event Upset (Normand, 1996). However too many such 
events begin to look suspicious. Villeneuve points out that malware may exploit
specific software on the victi hine and can be modified so that it is not 
. One can turn Villeneuve ion (Villeneuve, 
2011, p. 14) on its head so that the victim becomes the attacker and the APT 
becomes the victim - one can ensure that the malware they send to the APT exploits 
software on the computer and they can modify the machine so that it is not 
detected by the security solutions. This is consistent with Detect, Deny, Disrupt, 
Degrade, Deceive, Destroy from the LMKC Courses of Action Matrix.  Such a view
makes the general-purpose solution all the more valid.
Finally, this thesis will assert that AV solutions are too obvious and the 
the AV software. All too often AV software may be found in a directory named after 
the AV company with associated reg \AV Company 
Name\Directory 1\
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random registry keys, innocuously (and named differently) Windows Services with 
fake, plausible descriptions and, where necessary, enciphered. Ideally, as far as 
possible, the defender needs to Live off the Land .
7.3 Business Software Investment
Business software investment may be either purchasing new, off-the-shelf 
software, or development by the organisation (IBISWorld, 2021). There is no 
mention of freeware which some APTs make use of. IBISWorld state that compound 
growth rate of business software investment for the UK for 2016-2021 was 2.4% and 
that for 2021-2026 it is estimated to be 2.82%. They acknowledge that this is an 
estimate as many services and software are priced in the local currency and are 
subject to currency fluctuations. 
inflation target rate of 2% (Bank-of-England, 2021, p. 13)
costs have to be increased by more than this or the inflation rate for the jurisdiction 
in which they reside.
Although this is for the UK it provides a benchmark for the world. Any 
attempt to increase the APT business costs must be at least this amount and 
preferably much more.
Pressman (Pressman, 2010, pp. 67-68) asserts that software changes are easier 
to make when gathering requirements and the costs escalate quickly much later in 
the project. By extension and APT which has deployed malware and then has it 
treated by the software in this thesis will have their business costs increased.
7.4 The APT Administrative Business Model
A view of the malware business model can now be built and this will be used 
to demonstrate how the business costs of APTs may be increased (IBISWorld, 2021)
perhaps building malware from ideas on the internet. Another is the well-financed 
and organised group. With knowledge inferred from the gaps it is suggested that an 
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organisational model would need reconnaissance of victims with any attack being 
based on the lowest perceived technical level needed for a successful attack. 
Business structure may be Reconnaissance, Plan, Development, Build, Test and 
deploy teams with tasks being built around division of effort. There seems to be gaps 
in QA of software and attack management. Management of attacks perhaps consists 
of each attack being given a different number for each part of the attack and unique 
victim identifiers. Acquisition of hardware and software including compilers. 
Support Facilities (HR: Recruitment, maintenance, reward, exit); Financial Facilities. 
Financial Accounting, Management Accounting. There would also need to be a 
Research Facility. A possible APT organisational chart is given the next page.
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7.5 Increasing the APT Costs
To re-iterate: this thesis does not claim that the work will lead to 100% 
identification and eradication of malware from the system. The thesis will claim to 
help:
preserve the O/S legitimacy, integrity and consistency;
increase the full life-cycle business costs (time, money, electricity, 
hardware and software) of malware writers and users. 
This thesis uses the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain (LMKC) to treat malware (we 
deliberately do not use the word disrupt as this has a specific meaning in the LMKC 
academic paper).
Earlier the LMKC Courses of Action Matrix was been extended from six to 
seven courses: Deter, Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy. Overall, the 
idea is to deter attackers but in order to do this it may be needed to employ a 
combination of the other six Courses of Action.
Simpler countermeasures which are used to increase the costs of the attacker 
should price out of the market the attacker with fewer resources i.e. the single person 
attacker who only has a PC and their brain. In reducing the number of potential 
attackers, the field can be reduced to more well-resourced attackers who may be 
more of a long-term threat to business and the intellectual property that needs 
protecting. These are the real Advanced, Persistent, Threats.
However, a defender does not want to increase the cost of defence to a point 
where these costs are disproportionate to the business. For example, if the cost of 
defence is greater than the cost of the Intellectual Property and its end use then the 




the difference is £(A-D). Relative cost is £(A/D). 
Two thresholds (£T1, £T2)
work to be considered a success. i.e. £(A-D) > £T1 and £(A/D) > £T2. Additionally. 
defender must also satisfy £D < £C. Both of these values (£D, £C) may be related to 
the value the defender places on the data or information they wish to protect. (£V). 
This thesis defines this data as the crown jewels, loss of which may put the 
erefore, be something like: 
£(A-D) > £1,000,000; 
£(A/D) > £10V; 
£D < £C.
For the attacker, measures will include return rates of a particular type of 
attack, number of LMKC Reconnaissance-stage probes, cost of maintaining and 
servicing a presence on th
This thesis is concerned with malware that has been placed on the system. 
This means that the attacker has achieved the first five of the seven stages 
(Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation and Installation) of the 
LMKC. During these stages traces of the attack may have been left on logs or the 
wider system and other methods of analysis (e.g. log file analysis) may help find 
these traces.
We are, therefore, left with the final two stages: C2C and Actions on 
Objectives. This can be distilled down to looking for external communications with 
the attacker and looking for persistence.
The LMKC stage C2C, by definition, needs to communicate with the 
malware administrators. Unless the C2C part needs to jump airgaps and it is not an 
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insider attack using, for example, open USB ports or CD/DVD drives, then the 
attacker needs to communicate over the internet. This means connecting to other IP 
addresses. 
using Visual Studio 2013, and then using Visual Studio 2019, except for the device 
driver which was completed on a University of Gloucestershire machine.
The goal of the work contributing to this thesis is never to have claimed that 
it will eradicate 100% of all malware. The goal has been to increase the cost of 
business to APTs. i.e. cost in people, time, hardware, new software, electricity.
To what 
been demonstrated early that it is difficult to cost software projects. 
incur over and above those Anything the defender can do to increase the costs of 
their business model through the non-standard operation of their operations 
management, development and data analysis. Ideally the costs should be high 
enough for them not to deploy, and where deployed, to terminate, their operation. 
and (Molinyawe, 
Hariri and Spelman, 2016, p. 5)
be considered a success. A complete success would be a non-monetary cost of 
This author asserts that increasing the cost of business varies with the needs 
of the attacker. This thesis has previously discussed the cost of personal records but 
it is further asserted that the value of intellectual property can be much higher, with 
its loss potentially putting a company out of business. This thesis has also 
highlighted the cost of the loss of personal records to a company and not to those 
whose records have been lost.
Increasing the business costs associated with an attacker who wishes to sell 
personal financial information i.e. identity theft and credit card numbers may simply 
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be a case of how much an attacker may receive for such information multiplied by 
the number of records sold. However, increasing the business cost of an attacker who 
wishes to acquire intellectual property may be increasing the cost to the cost of 
research plus the cost of sales and licensing of successfully marketing that 
intellectual property which may run into the millions of pounds.
ongoing or future attacks, it is 
essential for an attacker to always clear the bar with the 
.
military conservation of force and provides costs of exploits 
as well as taking advantage of attackers in a Red Team 
test -21)
was not a truth, previously discussed by Ellerton (ABC, 2019c). This deceit aligns 
Some of these models are complicated and complex. Elsewhere (Cohen, 
1994, pp. 143 - 146) provides a cost analysis of viruses and select defences. It is 
suggested that an easy, non-mathematical, way of costs is to simply add the salaries 
of IT security staff, the cost of their interaction with business staff, cost of defence 
software (e.g. capital costs, licences), and a proportional cost of hardware and 
electricity (although one may consider the coat of hardware as sunk cost). In 
addition, post-incident clean-up costs and business opportunity cost may be added.
One of the LMKC mitigations is deceit (Hutchins, Clopperty and Amin, 
2011). This thesis does not have to publish all of the research findings. 
Many AV products have known locations on the machine and names 
(Falliere, Murchu and Chien, 2011) p 14. Any such product should make use of APT 
techniques and hide anywhere within the system. Such a technique would increase 
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the cost of business for the APT as they would not know where to look for AV 
products in order to circumvent them.
Further work on this thread may be along the lines of the Nash Equilibrium 
etc. as highlighted by Fang at el (Fang , 2014).
This first is the disruption of the Mechanism of Action of the malware
7.6 A Model of Malware Existence and Execution The 
Mechanism of Action
The thesis will now turn to development of the concept of the Mechanism of 
Action with the practical benefits being described in the next chapter.




software which may be a consequence of the boot process or a user interaction with 
the machine e.g. program execution (e.g. browser), button push, mouse click.
It should be noted th
IT as further research highlights that it has been used in the IT industry as early as 
1972 (Lynch, 1972); although the term could only be found once and there is no 
mention of medical link. 
It is desirable to explore biologically link a little further but not to go too far 
down this road. It is noted that a virus and a bacterium are not the same.  What is 
meant by a computer virus? One biological definition is: 
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Living things are made up of cells, maintain homeostasis, move, feed, grow, 
reproduce, respire, respond to environmental stimuli and excrete waste, while 
nonliving things do not have all of these characteristics.
(Reference, 2018)
although a virus may not be a living organism.
Antibacterial action inhibits or relegates some enzymes and also disrupts (and 
interferes with) the membrane structure (Merck, 2018). Inhibitors may inhibit cells 
wall synthesis, cell membrane function, protein and nuclei acid synthesis; and other 
metabolic processes. (Unknown, 2018)
are based on the principle that compounds with the same mechanism of action will 
have similar behaviour across diffe (Schenone , 2013).
Elsewhere (Racchi , 2016) provide an example of the same effect (i.e. 
the therapy to the disease) but the mechanism of action of two products is different. 
machine but their mechanisms of action (i.e. malware selected and used, delivery, 
exploitation etc.in the LMKC) may be different. This medical analogy will be further 
explored.
A computer virus has a cell wall/covering (structure) and internal processes 
may, therefore, move (or be moved on the HDD), feed (take input) reproduce 
(propagate within a HDD or across computers), excrete (output). 
Furthermore, in biology, there is a gain of function which is 
A change in DNA that results in the synthesis of a protein with a new or 
different function. Gain-of-function mutations are typically
(Farlex, 2020)
Arguably malware which modifies the mechanism of action of software has a gain of 
function.
In the IT world this may be likened to interfering with the structure of the 
executable or dll; the input; the internal processes; and the output. The victim does 
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not have to destroy (overwrite) the malware: they merely have to disrupt its 
mechanism action; modify its input or output; or affect its structure or internal 
processes. 
In Section 2.6 of this
Procedures (TTP) has been discussed: different malware acts in different ways and 
the modus operandi of different APTs may be observed. There is an analogy in the 
sports world.
The Australian netball team produced an emphatic victory over their rivals 
New Zealand partly through the work of Mooney et al (Werner and Webb, 2017).
Mooney, inspired by the work of Ackoff (Ackoff, 1993), discovered that that each 
national team had its own quantifiable patterns of play and that these patterns were 
observable all the way down to junior level.  These quantifiable patterns are a 
function of each national system or philosophy of netball.
Ackoff defines a system as:
system, is dependant for its effect on some other part. In other words, the parts are
interdependent. No part of a system, or collection of parts of a system, has an 
they act taken
their organisations most of their efforts to improve their performance are doomed to 
(Ackoff, 2010)
Systems are not a sum of their parts but products of their interactions. A car 
carries at least one person from one place to another but not one part of a car can do 
that. In this way a Windows machine may be viewed as a product of its interactions 
and perhaps APTs have their own quantifiable patterns beyond the basic IOCs that
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AV companies observe. Developing this further, it may be possible to observe 
mechanisms of action that are quantifiable.
Working with the University of Sydney Mooney discovered individual fish in 
a shoal of fish a few basic rules for keeping at the right distance from each other and 
that this had been simulated by computer scientists.
Extending this work (biological analogy, systems and parts), this thesis now 
asserts there is necessary and sufficient grounding to treat malware. This aligns with 
the concept of the "Principle of Parsimony" of Ockham
discussed. This also neatly fits with the extended Lockheed Martin model discussed 
earlier for the Courses of Action Matrix: Deter, Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, 
Deceive, Destroy; specifically fitting in Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Destroy. By 
highlighting the attack with the Courses of Action matrix it can be seen that the 
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Deceive Modify Modify Modify Modify Modify
Destroy Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete
Table 7-1: Courses of Action
It therefore follows that breaking the sequences of the mechanism of action 
will break the attack. This thesis asserts that attackers, as a business, will do the least 
they can for the maximum action on objections (as described by the LMKC) :
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that malware persists or not, how 






WMI (Review); Windows 




Registry Run Keys (Hash and 
Clear); AutoRun (Hash and 
Clear)
Executable Injections: Valid 
Windows Software/directories 
(Hash/Sign and regularly 
check. Statistically check); 
Browser (Hash/Sign and 
regularly check. Statistically 
check)
Credentials (Frequently 
change all at the same time)
Table 7-2: Known to Operating System
This may now be reflected back on the other CKC models which were not 
selected for this thesis. It is not the intent to go over all 20 rejected models but just 
the IPA model.
s: attack infrastructure by establishing a backdoor, obtaining
device and configuration info. Stage 5 lists Penetration/Exploitation by invading 
other devices and obtaining admin info. Stage 6 is Mission Execution by stealing 
info and destroying systems. Each of these threads of attack may by treated by the 
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model in the table above. For example, all of the attacks are software that runs on the 
sm of action.
Identification of simple encryption techniques such a Caesar cipher or 
repeating key as in the Vigenère Square should force APTs to change their 
encryption scheme and hence increase their business costs.
7.7 Categorising the Data
This thesis has demonstrated that Windows system programs may be 
replaced by malicious programs. Although it should be possible to check the 
integrity of these programs through hashes and signing this thesis assumes that any 
software not written specifically for this thesis may be suspect. Therefore, analysis 
programs were written for all of the analysis supporting the thesis. Ideally these 
programs should be compiled using different compilers and their functionality 
compared but this thesis uses Microsoft Visual Studio 2019. The programs are 
written in C++ but not using Object Orientated code: the code is, in effect, C code as 
this author prefers C and uses Visual Studio for its functionality and ease of use.
Routines used were as close to the OS and ANSI C as possible. For example, using 
fread and fwrite rather than the Microsoft routines ReadFile and WriteFile. One of 
the underlying philosophies of this thesis is to trust no-one and trust nothing.
It has been shown earlier in this thesis that compartmentalising data is 
common to both attack trees and data structures and so it is now possible to 
categorise (and hence analyse) the data. A schematic for this process is given on the 
next two pages.
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File is What it 























Without a structure and means of process the operating system would not 
function. Each part of the operating system has attributes as it has been designed. 
However, this is not the universe of attributes. There are those attributes which have
not been designed or are at least the design is unknown to the designers. This thesis 
notes the format and attributes of files, specifically PEs and DLLs, and has denoted
is deliberate and is therefore
known to the designer. Attributes which are unknown to the designer and have been 
determined by analysis this thesis denotes s
As discussed, this thesis is concerned with malware on a HDD. It is restricted 
to the platter with microcode on the HDD controller out of scope.. It has been 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis that the Windows OS family is file-based and so, 
at any one time, there will, conceptually, be N files known to the OS i.e. N active 
files listed in the MFT. and at this time 
there will be N0 files. Our count may be the number of files at login or at every 
second or minute. At time one there will be N1 files, at time two N2 files and at time t 
there will be Nt files. At each time the rest of the HDD is unused space for further 
use and consists of files marked for deletion and other free space. Philosophically 
this thesis does not consider the latter two sets to be to be a set of files and free space 
but one big file that by inference is known to the OS i.e. it is not known to the MFT 
directly but may be inferred simply by not being listed in the MFT. The Windows 
OS groups sectors into clusters and marks clusters, in the cluster table, as being used 
or unused with the latter being available for use. Windows considers the cluster table
as a file and it is listed in the MFT. One can consider, therefore, the space available 
for use as a file. This extra file has no structure and no attributes (mathematically the 
null attribute), which itself is an attribute.
Therefore, at time t, conceptually, there are Nt+1 files on the HDD.
The Microsoft Windows system is file based, therefore, each file type (e.g. 
PE) has been designed and an analysis of a homogeneous group of such aggregated 
files might reveal Attributes by Discovery. Therefore, a way of producing such sets 
of homogeneous files is needed i.e. there needs to be a way of extracting for analysis 
(for example) all PE (.exe) files or all batch (.bat) files. After analysis and the 
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revelation of any Attributes by Discovery, these recently discovered attributes may 
be used for further categorisation. The program to categorise the data is called the 
categoriser.
Once the homogenous set of data (based on selection criteria) is collected 
there is a need for analysis. This program is called the analyser. Such an analyser 
will contain tests built from the white paper and academic paper review, attributes by 
design and attributes by discovery.
Symantec discuss the need for clean data and the benefits of profiling 
(Uscilowsk , 2008) which include Quality Assurance (QA) and detailed 
information for engineers and customers. It is expected that all data will, in this 
sense, be clean, as the integrity of data on the HDD is assured by the Windows OS.
Indicators of Compromise (IOC) are ways to identify APTs on a machine 
(Sancho , 2012, pp. 2-3, 7) with examples such as: Registry changes, file 
changes (Windows and other). Event log analysis, Service changes, Mutexes and 
network communications. IOC have been gathered for this thesis. Some mitigations 
will be explored later in this thesis.
7.8 Categorising the Malware
Historically Fireeye categorised malware by primary purpose and go on to 
note that advanced malware may have a combination of features. This is congruent 
with the mechanism discussion in Section 9.9. FireEye further note that the top 50 
malware families generated 80% of successful infections (FireEye, 2011, pp. 3-6).
It is suggested that there should be an avoidance of guesswork and that 
samples should be split into malicious and non-malicious groups.(Suenaga, 2009).
This may be done by categorising based on attributes by design and attributes by 
discovery. It may also be done by extrapolating observations and making educated 
guesses based on parameters and strings. This is a theme to which this thesis will 
return.
This concept may be extended to the legitimate software on the machine it 
is known and therefore may be categorised in some manner. From this one can 
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identify potential malware as it is not, in effect,
asset register. This narrows our malware search considerably i.e. It can now be 
suggested that one approach to the categorisation of malware is not to look for 
malware but to look for goodware and the rest is therefore suspect.
7.9 Modelling exe and .dll (What does an executable look like?)
It has been previously shown that attackers sometime encipher their data 
using a single XOR key or short multiplies of the same key. Schneier (Schneier, 
1996, pp. 14-15) highlights one way to categorise using the Index Of Coincidence 
(Friedman, 1935). This statistical technique can reveal the use of repeated key 
however testing for very long key lengths on every file can be computationally 
expensive. The structure of a PE can be used in our favour.
Although it is possible to identify short stretches of language (and by 
inference, malware) (Lui and Baldwin, 2014) the method selected for this thesis is 
that of n-grams. i.e. known strings
A simple method to identify encryption and obfuscation is needed. For 
base64 encode a simple count of the number of unique characters in a file is 
sufficient. A lot of encryption is by XOR-ing repeated hex keys. 
The first program developed assumed that the PE has been XOR enciphered 
by a repeating key. XOR is chosen as it takes less CPU time than other methods of 
encryption such as mod 26 or mod 256. This repeating key may be of any length but 
it is reasonable to suppose that is one repeated byte, a multiple of two bytes or a 
divisor of 64 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64). Given that the longest XOR encryption key 
recorded in the white papers is 32 bytes (Symantec-Security-Response, 2015b), as 
highlighted previously, this is a reasonable test. In addition the 4-bytes XOR was not 
on files but IP address (Wyke, 2012b, p. 28). Whatever the key length it repeats at 
the 65th character. Note that the key lengths 2, 4, 8, 16, 40 and 80 repeat at the 80th
position. It is possible, therefore, devise a cheap test for repeated XOR 
decipherment.
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A simple program to print out the first 100 characters of a number of PEs 
show that the first two characters of a PE are always MZ and that 0x0E, 0x1F are at 
79.
We now have a computationally inexpensive method for testing for 
encipherment with a repeated key starting K1, K2, K3, K4 etc. It is inexpensive as all 
that has to be done is to test the recovered key against its offset i.e. with a key length 
that is a divisor of 64 (C1, C2, C3, C4 etc. are the resulting cipher characters):
1 = C1
2 = C2
The key repeats after 64 characters, therefore:
0x0E XOR K1 = C3
0x1F XOR K2 = C4
XOR the cipher that is provided by the same key:
1) XOR (0x0E XOR K1) = C1 XOR C3




Therefore, the test is that these two questions are true for encipherment of 
repeated key with a key length that divides 64. However, such a method of 
encipherment used has only been seen to key length 4. Similar tests may be devised 
for other key lengths using the structure of a portable executable.
However, some files were found not to conform to this format and so another 
test was needed. The Index of Coincidence model, above, is ideally placed to find 
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characters e.g. 
Clearly sliding such a file any multiple of five characters with al
characters and hence highlight such obfuscation. Likewise, the string 
\x52\x32\x56\
multiples of four \
The approach considers the Vigenère Square properties of repeating keys,
referenced earlier in this thesis counting the number of repeated characters at given 
offsets.
7.10 Conclusion
The chapter distils the AV companies literature and aligned it with the 
LMKC for clarity. It supports the third Aim and Objective.
This chapter has discussed:
Dates contained within files may be analysed and grouped to 
highlight possible malware. Some sort of categorising software is 
needed;
the file against itself at various offsets, counting the number of 
hits and performing statistical analysis. Significant regulates occur 
at multiples of the repeating key length. This method will also 
highlight files with obfuscated code such as \x52\x32\x56\ ;
Base64 encoded may be identified by counting the number of 
unique characters in a file;
A keyword identifier is needed;
Mechanism of action and the concept of breaking this chain.
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The chapter concluded by developing an APT business model and discuss how the
APT costs may be increased.
The thesis will now be used the information gathered to develop the AV 
software.
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8 SOFTWARE DEVELOPED IN SUPPORT OF THE THESIS
8.1 Chapter Overview
This Chapter starts with a recap of the philosophy of the thesis and from this 
proposes a defender/attacker cost trade-off. It then goes on to discuss the analysis 
performed based on the software developed. The chapter follows with some simple 
mitigations that could be implemented as a result of the findings and how these 
mitigations could be used to increase the cost of business for APTs. The chapter 
concludes with some technical mitigations.
The philosophy of the thesis has been previously discussed and this is 
translated into a business process in this chapter. Some malicious software may 
replicate other available legitimate software i.e. as has been shown not all software 
developed elsewhere cannot be trusted. The chapter supports the third and fourth 
Aims and Objectives.
8.2 A Short Comment on YARA
limited to) helping malware researchers to 
identify and classify malware samples. With YARA you can create descriptions of 
malware families (or whatever you want to describe) based on textual or binary 
patterns. Each description, a.k.a. rule, consists of a set of strings and a Boolean 
(Unknown, 2019).
This thesis asserts that YARA does not fulfill of the requirements of a to 
identify malware. Unfortunately, there is little explanation of the underlying 
rns the mean 
of the string but is this with respect to an ASCII 256-bit alphabet or a base64 
alphabet which has been randomly chosen by the attackers? This thesis seeks to 
adopt a scientific documented approach to malware categorisation.
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8.3 Software Development Enabling Work
Over 50 programs were developed in support of this thesis. Many were 
enabling programs either to test ideas or create subroutines for the final programs.
Given that this is a thesis based on Microsoft Windows systems it was 
decided to write all programs using Microsoft routines in C. Visual Studio C++
was used but no use was made of the C++ facilities. Visual Studio was simply an 
enabler. Furthermore, it was decided that, as far as possible, software would be 
written using the lowest common denominator with respect to software development 
and that software would be written in ANSI C or something similar. Therefore 
_open, _read, _seeki64 etc. would be used instead of the Microsoft equivalents: 
OpenFile, CloseFile, SetFilePointer etc.
A number of enabling programs were written:
prints the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and compare
the output against Microsoft routines such as GetDiscFreeSpace; 
sec_check. Printing the VBR also allows the user to view the 
VBR by eye and look for an VBR infected with malware 
(Mandiant, 2017, pp. 14-15)
outputs the Master Boot record as a hex dump. Later 
incorporated into other programs;
lists all of the logical drives (A-Z) and if a drive 
exists then it outputs the raw MBR as a hex print with and 
printable characters as well as interpreted contents. It also lists the 
existence of the physical drove (0-15). This logical drive 
information is obtained using GetDiskFreeSpace, 
GetDiskFreeSpaceEx, DeviceIOControl using 
IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY and 
FSCTL_GET_NTFS_VOLUME_DATA, as well reading and 
interpreting directly from the MBR. The latter allows the defender 
to check the information against the same obtained from 
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Microsoft routines. This is because there is evidence (previously 
discussed in this thesis) of APTs modifying Microsoft software;
looks for all logical and physical drives by looping 
through A to Z and 0 to 15 respectively, Superseded by
, above;
outputs the given sectors as a hex dump. It is written 
using Microsoft routines, and is a program to print given sectors, 
in hex and ascii, 16 characters to a line; 
a program to list all ascii character with binary, decimal and hex 
values. 
lists any file as a hex dump. Each consecutive set of 32 
hex characters is preceded by a character count and followed by 
the 16 characters they represent in ASCII. was also 
coped into various other programs to view data;
was the first attempt to write directly to a sector It is 
written using ANSI C i.e. no Microsoft routines. 
walks the file directory and outputs file type and length. 
This formed the basis of later programs which needed to access all 
files but not by using the $MFT;
is an experimental program to get system information, 
change the computer name and modify a registry key;
is a program adapted from two others (Microsoft, 2017l),
(Various, 2012) to walk the registry tree and output key types and 
length;
converts date/time stamp from the format in the MFT 
to human readable form. It is incorporated into the program 
;
demonstrates that the CRC routines for work;
. Reads the master boot record of a given drive and 
prints its contents. Calling sequence is [drive letter] 
e.g. "ambrread C";
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. Reads and prints sectors in hex and ascii. Calling 
sequence is [drive letter] [sector length] [start 
sector] [end sector] e.g. " c 512 1 50". The sector 
length is obtained from the program ;
Microsoft routines, whilst functional, can be hard to use. This is borne out by 
internet comments. Early in the thesis development, therefore, it was decided to use a 
minimalistic programming with routines as close to the kernel as possible. C routines 
such as open, read and seek are much easier to work with than Openfile, Readfile, 
SetFilePointer etc. _int64 is a more descriptive definition than its Microsoft C code 
equivalent. Furthermore, any code needed to be portable should it be decided to test 
it elsewhere. An APT would, no doubt, think the same way, as should any developer.
A further problem with the Microsoft routines is that, when using them to 
read a HDD as a file, there are issues with the end of file. The C routines are able to 
handle this event gracefully.
8.4 The Programs Written A Summary
A variety of programs were written. They are summarised here with detailed 
descriptions of provided later in the chapter:
lists all files and directories from the $MFT whether active 
or deleted;
uses Microsoft routines to look at which IP addresses 
are being used with associated open IP4 and IP6, TCP and UDP 
ports;
looks for a given string in a range of sectors;
looks for IP addresses in the form of IPv4 in a range of 
sectors;
looks for email addresses in a range of sectors;
analyses HDD used and unused clusters;
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categorises the data according to parameters provided
for the Analyser (below);
Analysis file according to parameters provided
builds a corpus of subroutines from a pristine 
Windows OS with associated probabilities.
8.5 The File List Program
directly lists from $MFT all files and directories whether active or 
deleted (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007, pp. 215-275, 389-410), (Russon and Fledel, 
Undated), (Richard Russon, 2018), (Wilkinson, 2017). It also lists the start sector of 
with the existence of the file. is inspired by the program (kusano, 
2015). The program structure of f is different to that of and the output 
is slightly different. outputs readable, relevant, MBR information as well the 
whole MBR. True and relative data run lengths for the MFT are output. The 
existence of each file is output in in a form similar to but also includes the 
HDD sector number on which the information resides.
It has been demonstrated that APTs will modify the software to help hide 
their malware. For example, the DOS dir command and Task Manager. 
There are three ways which files may be listed:
Using Microsoft Windows OS commands e.g. dir, forfiles;
In a program using a directory walk;
From the MFT.
is a demonstration of the latter.
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There was a problem with the development of It is asserted (Sammes 
and Jenkinson, 2007) that in an Attribute Header bytes four to seven should be the 
attribute length. During analysis this author found that this did not function, as byte 
six was non-zero which made the program crash. This could have been a mistake on 
0xffffffff, i.e. 4GB? Is there really a scenario where an attribute can be this long? 
Clearly one byte is not enough as that would make the longest attribute 256 bytes. 
An attribute length using all of two bytes would give the maximum attribute length 
of 65535 bytes, far beyond the two-sector length of most machines. This author 
reduced the field length to two bytes and the program worked.
8.6 The Sleep Program
In support of this thesis a program was written and run from the Registry 
RunOnce and Run keys. The program was only made to sleep. The observation is 
that the Registry Key values may have run in a non-sequential order. It appeared that 
System32 and other folder calls ran first, before the sleep program. However, the 
RunOnce and then Run Registry keys order was demonstrated to be true through 
analysis of the order of the Process Ids. After signing on another program was started 
hypothesis is that PIDs that have completed and hence released by the O/S and 
reused within session. PID number is, therefore, not a good indicator of malware
identification.
For administrator access, the sleep program call from HKLM RunOnce and 
made the start-up process hang. Only on termination of the process would the start-
up process complete. It would not be too difficult to make this a recurring denial of 
service attack.
8.7 The Port Scanner
uses Microsoft routines to look at which IP addresses are being 
used with associated open IP4 and IP6, TCP and UDP ports. Running continuously, 
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IP addresses and associated ports have changed and outputs this information. Should 
information be unchanged then nothing is noted.  Using allows the 
defender to list gather information on IP addresses accessed with the associated 
ports. It may be used in conjunction with other logs.
To identify C2C it is necessary to analyse Port Usage and Associated IP 
Address. A program was written to check the opening and closing of ports in real 
time and list associated remote IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, process ID and program 
name. From this data may be collated that may be used in the disc search program. 
Use will also be made of the IETF Service Name and Transport Protocol Port 
Number Registry (IANA, 2020). Should there be a connection, or attempt at 
connection, to an IP address that the defender does not recognize, or allow, then this 
would be a possible Indicator of Compromise. This Registry also allows the defender 
to verify that the correct protocol is being used on any given port. Additionally, 
should there be a suspect IP address that cannot be found on the HDD then this may 
be an indicator that a program is using encryption or obfuscation to deny the 
defender viewing access.
Although some malware uses ports that are used for legitimate services, some 
malware uses specific ports. For example, many cryptocurrency mining uses ports 
3333 and 7777; the first for low-end machines, the latter for high-end, higher-
capacity machines (Insikt-Group®, 2020a).
Consideration should also be given as to how often this program needs to 
check for anomalous behaviour and what LMKC Course, or Courses, of Action need 
to be performed should potentially malicious behaviour be detected. The frequency 
of this checking should be a function of the size of the crown jewels divided by the 
internet connect rate. For example, if our crown jewels have size of 50GB and the 
internet connect rate is 250MB per second, then fastest the data can be extracted 
from the system is 50GB/250MB per second or 200 seconds. The defender, 
therefore, needs the ports program to perform checks at least every 200 seconds; any 
less frequent and the exfiltration may be missed. The defender also needs to consider 
how much data they are prepared to lose. Of course, the data should be encrypted but 
would the attacker be able to reconstruct the data from a proportion of the crown 
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jewels and if so, what proportion? The defender also needs to build in decision 
making time. 
50GB of data is a reasonable figure for this example: one attacker is thought 
(Chang , 2015, pp. 5, 51)
We now use the fictitious figures to demonstrate the strategy: assume that 
that the full set of data may be reconstructed with only 10% the known data and that 
it is assessed that no more than 6% of our crown jewels can be lost. Dividing the
data into segments, each segment being less than half of 6% (exfiltration of one 
segment of 3% may not be enough to come to valid decision). Choose 2% of the 
data. This gives 50 segments for the full set of data. It may be calculated that the full 
set of data can be exfiltrated in a minimum time of 200 seconds so it is concluded
that the program needs to run every four seconds (200 seconds divided by 50 
segments) with the outcome of exfiltration detection being internet shutdown or 
machine power down. This strategy allows for two adjacent loops of the program to 
agree that there is problem and another four seconds to perform our exfiltration 
detection action. The desired outcome has, therefore, been done in eight seconds. It 
is acknowledged that attackers may exfiltrate data in parts to different IP addresses 
but increasing their costs here means that 
strategy. A lot of different small data exfiltration to a number of (unknown to the
defender
one IP address.
The part-acquisition of data by an attacker may not be as fanciful as it at first 
appears. Data may be stored in RAID (Redundant Array of Independent Disks) disk
arrays (Patterson, Gibson and Katz, 1988) (SNIA, 2009), (Sammes and Jenkinson, 
2007, pp. 207-209) with data and parity stored on different disks. Acquisition of a 
subset of the data may allow reconstruction of the whole set of data simply by using 
the defender's legitimate error correction and business continuity techniques. This is 
a piece of work for the well-resourced attacker which could use the properties of 
CRCs e.g. n-bit error detection, (n-1) bit error correction etc. 
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The Port Scanner satisfies three parts of the LMKC Courses of Action
Matrix: Detect, Deny, Disrupt.
The IP addresses and program names can now be used an input to the Search 
program.
8.8 The Search Programs
The search problem may be segmented into two different search types: non-
IP address search; IP address searches. The former is split into searches for string 
provided by the user and searches for email addresses. The three programs are: 
, , and .










Table 8-1: String Search Comparison
There are two ways to perform a search: Should it be needed to search the 
data just once then a sequential search is best (Software Non-Distributed model);
however if there are multiple searches then an ordered table is better (Knuth, 1973, 
p. 406) (Software Non-Distributed model). Ordering a multi-gigabyte or terabyte 
may be prohibitively expensive. Each sector or cluster could be ordered but for non-
standard searches such as looking for the existence of an IP address such an order 
could be achieved by only sorting together numeric data.
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Knuth et al (Knuth, Morris and Pratt, 1977) later develop a fast pattern 
matching algorithm for strings but this appears to be better for small alphabets. In 
addition, the expectation for matching in the problem at hand is low and so a 
sequential search for specific strings is low. 
Fast pattern matching is possible using hardware such as FPGAs or ASICs 
(Woods, Teubner and Alonso, 2011) but this only possible is for wire-speed 
processing with predictable performance. This thesis is concerned with data resident 
on the HDD (Hardware Non-Distributed model).
The elapsed search time may be reduced by dividing the search area into n 
equal pieces and then using n networked computers in a distributed fashion as a 
SETI@home  (University-of-Berkeley, 2019) (Software Distributed model)..
Consider searching for a four-digit PIN. Instead of a brute-force attack of 
0000 to 9999 on one machine, each test taking a unit of time, for a total of 10,000 
units of time, 10 computers could be used with the first testing all PINs starting with 
zero, the second with all PINs starting 1 etc. Each computer performs 1,000 tests for 
a total of 1,000 units of time. Similarly, using the Seti example each computer could 
be connected to the HDD and each computer access a number of sectors: the first 
sectors 0 to n/10; the second (n/10)+1 to n/20 etc.
The search programs are programs to identify strings within HDD sectors.
Two programs were written: the first is used to identify specific strings within 
sectors. For example, ; the second 
look for IPv4 IP addresses.  The key for both programs is to write tight code. For 
example, in looking for IP addresses it may be decided to choose to look for specific 
IP addresses e.g. 127.0.0.1 but there is a need to search for all IP addresses which 
may range from 0.0.0.0 to 999.999.999.999 (in theory, in practice the upper bound is 
255.255.255.255) so the search only needs to look in any particular string for a ratio 
of full stops to numbers which is between 50% and 25%. Progressing the search and
moving along, drop one character off the start, add another to the end and change the 
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counts accordingly. Other searches include, but are not restricted to, software that 
malware writers use e.g. ZW routines, sleep, XOR etc.
Specific searches will be guided by academic literature and white paper 
highlights as well as what is uncovered by the Categoriser (below).
An IP address consists of four numbers in the range [0,255], no leading 
zeros, separated by full stops
0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255. It can immediately be seen that the structure is four dots 
and four numbers up to four dot and 12 numbers. The search, therefore, is for the 
minimum and to look for consecutive characters in sectors that have four dots and 
four numbers and print them out. For 1111111 512-bytes sectors this search took 
five elapsed minutes.  For 1.7GHz Windows 8.1 machine with 450GB this would 
take about 65 hours.
A new algorithm was suggested (Wood, 2019) to look for three dots, ensure 
that the difference the distance between them is one, two or three, that the characters 
in between and one after the first dot and one before the last dot are digits. For the 
same input test data, the program from above with this algorithm ran in three 
minutes i.e. 60% of the time. This would reduce the total time on the same machine 
to just under 40 hours. Segmenting the date equally over 10 similar machines would 
mean four hours i.e. half a working day. A later review of string matching algorithms 
did not produce a better algorithm (Cormen , 2009, pp. 985-1013).
The output of the more efficient program was just over 30,000 hits and this 
was imported into a spreadsheet, sorted, obvious false positives removed and the 
remaining data of just over 20,000 hits was put into a pivot table. There were just 
over 3,000 unique hits, the vast majority of which were false positives. It was more 
difficult to interpret some of the data: while 4.5.6.7.8.9 may be contain a false 
positive how does one interpret 54.186.106.100? Is that a valid IP address or should 
it be 4.186.106.100 or 54.186.106.10 or 4.186.106.1? All legitimate IP addresses, as 
categorised by a review, were compared against ICANN (ICANN, 2019)
registrations (ICANN, 2017).
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It is been demonstrated that APTs use repeated code, Mutexes, Zw routines. 
A search for any of these (which may take some time) would be an IOC.
The string search program looks for strings as any specified combination of 
upper and lower cases characters. For example, the ASCII c
byte. This is true for All ASCII alphabetic characters. The search program performs 
simple Boolean operation with all input characters to a common comparison. For a 
five-long string this means that 32 different combination of upper and lower case can 
be reduced to one string for comparison.
A search was done on a personal Windows 8 machine. It discovered the 
traces of up to three possible pieces of malware.
The search started by looking for the a given term used by many attackers. 
All of a certain family of commands contain the term.  It has been shown earlier on 
tis thesis that malware writers use these terms to identify systems which have already 
been infected by their malware.
The results of the search identified a number of associated interesting 
phrases. These were then included as search terms for further runs of the program 
and also kept for future reference to be used against other HDDs.
An iterative search such as this may be a candidate for an Artificial 
Intelligence solution.
8.9 The Cluster Analysis
analyses HDD used and unused clusters and is controlled by 
parameter variables. This program accesses the $CLUS file in the $MFT and 
compares and contrast cluster usage within and across logon sessions. By storing a 
copy of the cluster table from login and comparing this against the cluster table at 
logout it is possible to highlight clusters that were not used and later are, or were 
used, and are now marked as free. Of course, this does not highlight clusters used, 
freed and the re-used but the program could be run at irregular intervals during a 
session. It is anticipated that this program and the disc overwrite program will be 
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used in tandem. will also analyse run lengths of consecutive clusters used 
and unused.
may also be run in real time looking for clusters that have moved 
state from becoming free to being used and vice versa. 
8.10 The Categoriser and Analyser
categorises the data according to parameters for the Analyser. It 
is a collection of statistical analysis techniques. These criteria for the parameters are 
based on Attribute by Design (e.g. Portable Executable (PE) format) and Attributes 
by Discovery (q.v. PE file lengths discussion later in this thesis). The Categoriser 
and Analyser share a common parameter file design and some common tests. This
thesis is concerned with identifying malware in any format. This program be can be 
enhanced iteratively by feeding back Attributes by Design and Attributes by 
Discovery to develop new categorisation subroutines. These routines may be, for 
example, statistical scoring mechanism. The statistics may include but are not 
limited to:
Index of Coincidence IoC (to help group data);
Chi-squared (to help isolate statistically flat data);
Encryption identifier;
Analysis of n-grams;
Other statistical tests as needed once the analysis is underway.
(Uscilowsk , 2008)
however there is not necessarily a need for clean data. With statistical analysis a 
model of the machine under investigation may be built using just, and only, the data 
on the machines. For example: in a group of 10 PE files counts may be made of all 
10 files. Each file is then, in turn, analysed against the rest of the group creating two 
sets of data: one of the just one file and the other of all files minus the counts of the 
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file under investigation. This way a sample of collected malware is not needed and 
any tests are not constrained by comparing against a known, biased set of data. This 
idea was developed for the PE subroutine analysis program, discussed below.
For the Registry, this program could extract keys where programs and/or 
batches and scripts are listed. Any Registry key that contains a (executable path 
extension) will need further analysis and attract closer inspected by the Analyser,
below. Particular attention will also be given to Windows Service programs.
This program will also look at Registry key lengths and other Attributes by 
Discovery (yet to come to light).
Sharing the same parameter file format, these two programs were developed 
from the idea of a single program to perform analysis files which shared the same 
attributes. It is possible to categorise data by design or discovery and the module 
nature of both programs makes it easy to add subroutines for either type of attribute.
The original program became unwieldy and the decision was made to split 
the concept into two programs: one which would produce a list of files with the same 
required attributes ( ); the other would them perform the analysis
( ).
The parameter file uses a pseudo-html format with every parameter being of 
the form <Keyword [option parameters]>. Comment lines are of the form <#### 
comment>. For example, a parameter file which allows extraction of all files from a 
certain sub-directory whose file length is in a given range [20, 3768] would be
<#### Directory or sub-directory on which to work>
<Diry C:/Users/user1/Documents/>
<#### File length range>
<MinL 20>
<MaxL 3768>
With the categoriser it is possible to:
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Work on a sub-directory or registry;
Look for encrypted files which start MZ;
Performa count of file which start MZ, or not and match against a 
.exe file type;
Look for Base64 encoded files;
Highlight files in a given file length range;
name;
List files with their Index of Coincidence;
Calculate frequency counts for files with a given attribute for the 
analyser;
Perform subroutine counts on a set of files for the analyser;
List files with given strings in given fields.
analyses data categorised by the Categoriser (above). For example, 
may have produced a full path name list of all PE files (all file with the 
.exe suffix). The Analyser then is then able to perform various tests as defined in the 
parameter file, highlighting any files. With the analyser it is possible to:
Test files for a given frequency count using the chi-squared 
distribution;
Look files that are encoded with a repeated key;
Print selected columns from files.
8.11 Subroutine Count
It has previously been demonstrated that APTs use subroutines 
that developers might not normally use e.g. Zw routines, Hook routines, PsSetCreate
routines. This program builds a corpus of subroutines from a pristine Windows 
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OS with associated probabilities. The idea is that for each executable or perceived 
executable subroutines may be observed and an overall probability of seeing that set 
of subroutines may be calculated. A plethora of low probability subroutines, as 
calculated from the pristine Windows OS corpus will give a low probability of total. 
As any probability is small the score is calculated by summing the natural log of the 
probability.
This program analyses the frequency of subroutines used in a corpus of 
executables that have been selected by the categoriser. These counts are them 
compared against a putative set of malware to see if they are dissimilar form the 
corpus.
8.12 The Overwrite Unused Areas of HDD Program
degree. This idea was that all unused space should be overwritten by the operating 
system. 
Two independent studies, (Bentley, 2008), (Wright, Kleiman and Sundhar, 
2008), indicate that for all practical purposes, one overwrite should be sufficient. 
Bentley suggests that reading data by Magnetic Force Microscopy may be 
achievable but in reality, a lot of time, effort and money would have to be spent on 
the work; and the outcome would have to be worthwhile. A practical demonstration 
supporting these assertions was later demonstrated: 
a system to recover data from a hard disk drive through magnetic force 
microscopy was developed to do so from an un-degaussed hard disk under certain 
experimental conditions. The performance has been poor even under these
idealized conditions
(Kanekal, 2013).
This was without any overwriting of data.
It is suggested (Berghel and Hoelzer, 2006) It is clear that most disk 
wipers leave behind a lot of tell-tale information that may have proprietary or 
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security this thesis needs to
be concerned: the intent is to treatment of malware deployed by APTs and so all that
has to be done is to overwrite the least amount of code to break the mechanism of 
action. It is noted that as well as dealing with MFT entries in there will be a 
need to duplicate any work for the MFT mirror in .
It is possible to send ATA security group commands to perform secure erase 
(Microsoft, 2017ac) or the Microsoft utility cipher.exe (Microsoft, 2018e),
(Microsoft, 2018o), . Disc encryptors may be used to overwrite but recovery of the 
these encryptors encrypt the data directly on the HDD or write it to another file. 
leaving the original on the HDD. Other dedicated delete utilities are available 
(Russinovich, 2018) but seem to be recent i.e. later than the initial idea for this 
thesis.
This author tried to write such a utility but was unable to gain access to the 
kernel (Ring 0) to write directly to HDD sectors. It was possible to directly read disk 
sectors. However, given that there is commercially available software, this inability 
to gain access to the kernel is not considered a failure. The point of this thesis is to 
present a solution; any valid solution is acceptable.
HDD overwrite programs overwrite unused areas of disc. Microsoft now
have two such programs but these appear to have been written after the author had 
the idea. The software overwrites free sectors, clusters and subsectors. There was a
problem developing the overwriting software: initially it was thought that a device 
driver would be needed but internet research suggested that it could be done from a 
regular user, using admin privileges. Two programs were written: one using ANSI C
and when that did not work another using Microsoft routines. Neither was able to 
overwrite given sectors. Success was finally achieved using a Kernel mode driver on 
a virtual machine.
The kernel mode driver writes directly to a specific sector on a HDD. This 
driver uses some Zw routines: ZwCreateFile, ZwReadFile, ZwWriteFile and 
ZwClose. This family of kernel routines have been used by APTs, as described 
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earlier in this thesis. The program writes to a sector, reads back the sector and hex 
prints the sector with associated ASCII text to verify the write. It is a proof of 
potentially overwrite any area of HDD but in reality, would write to unused areas of 
HDD A guide to help reproduce this work can be found in Appendix B. It is built on 
a host Windows machine and runs in a Microsoft VMware Windows virtual 
machine. This is to ensure that, during development, the any bugs in the software 
only affect the virtual machine which can easily be rebuilt;
The overwrite program would overwrite any area of unused HDD, including 
hidden sectors and break the mechanism of action of any malware using clusters not 
being used by the operating system (Kaspersky, 2015c, pp. 16-18). It could also 
contain basic attribute by design and discovery as earlier described to highlight 
possible malware before overwriting.
Should an attacker Live off the Land it is not clear if the action of the 
program sdelete shows up in program filelist output. It is possible to amend the 
utput files with certain date/time stamps.
8.13 Benware Benign Software as an Educational Tool
In order to try to enter the mindset of an APT and malware developers it was 
considered that first some pseudo-malware had to be written. This thesis offers a new 
p
acts like malware but is benign. This benware  borrows from real world examples 
(Panda-Security, 2015), (Mandiant, 2013, p. 35), (Wüest, 2012, p. 22) and uses no 
bespoke software, only freely available software provided by Microsoft for Windows 
Living Off the L
(Wüest and Anand, 2017, pp. 7, 15-16). The benware collects operating system and 
user data and is only run as a demonstration on the standalone Windows 8.1 
machine. It is neither sent nor run over the internet. Malware which lives off the land 
may be easily changed to present different digital signature every time it is deployed. 
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A new comment may be inserted into each piece of the benware which contains a 
one-up serial number. As well as defeating digital signature this serial number would 
allow an APT to build a CRM System to track deployed malware. 
The benware is produced by gathering a collection of Microsoft routines into
the Microsoft Bundler, iexpress (Microsoft, 2017r) and is used to demonstrate to 
students, in lectures, proof of concept malware. The file is presented as a .pdf file 
                                         
would click to open what is thought to be a .pdf file but is the mechanism of action 
for deploying the benware. On clicking to open the bundler copies all of the files 
(Dummy.pdf; extract.bat; run.bat; and vbscript.vbs) it contains into a temporary 
\




.vbs script is used for the extraction as .bat file would produce a Windows cmd 
no indication that anything is happening other than opening a .pdf. At the next login, 
due to the Registry Key mechanism of action, the .vbs script calls a .bat file which 
runs and deletes the Registry Key (the RunOnce key could have been used as it 
automatically self-deletes but the chosen method was used for educational purposes) 
followed by collection of system information into a single file using the Microsoft 
(various times with different parameters), ping and tracecert. This provides date, 
time, open ports, list of users, Route Tables, IP and system information including 
patching updates. Again a .vbs script is used to as it does not give any sign to the 
user that it is running. Again, a batch file called from a .vbs script does not produce a 
command window.
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8.14 Some Suggested Mitigations and Gaps
There are many mitigation suggestions e.g.(TrendLabs, 2012a, p. 3), (Huq, 
2016, p. 45) covers the work of this 
thesis but this thesis suggests more that: it suggests actively managing secondary 
storage (HDD, SSD) to provide assurance that what present is what is expected to be 
present. What exists is necessary and sufficient to do what the business, IT 
administrators and users require of the machine.
A high level view of deleting data is available which helpfully mentions data 
in the cloud (TrendLabs, 2013a) while a de-obfuscation tool base on a number of 
obfuscation techniques has been suggested (Suenaga, 2009, p. 19).
Kelly suggests amongst other things a comparison of Autorun dataset per and 
post infection, (Kelly, 2017, p. 13)
Sans produce a 12-step guide to finding unknown malware of which it could 
be argued this thesis has three: Indictors of Compromise Search, Evidence of 
title and could be applied to all of the other eleven steps (SANS-DFIR, 2013). While 
Mitre provide a list of APTs and their persistence techniques (Mitre, 2019b).
8.15 Mitigations
It has been demonstrated that there is heavy use of the /Run ad /RunOnce 
Registry Keys. The mitigation developed is, at logoff, to take a copy of these keys 
for further forensics analysis in case they have been changed, delete them and install 
the desirable keys and values. This would ensure that future sessions would be free 
of an attack from this source. Similarly, with start-up folders.
Alternate Data Streams may be found using a one-line PowerShell script 
(Arntz, 2015) or programmatically though MFT analysis (Sammes and Jenkinson, 
2007, pp. 415-424) and a modification to the filelist program.
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8.16
Keep patches up to date;
Ensure permissions are setup correctly;
Block unused ports and check regularly for open ports;
Disable Microsoft RDP and any other remote access tool
Remove unused and unwanted services.
8.17 Sinkholes for Advertising and Malvertising
It has been previously stated in this thesis that tracking websites were 
blocked (Al-Fannah, Li and Mitchell, 2018) . The European Interactive Digital 
Advertising Alliance (EDAA, 2019) lists websites that can be online behavioural 
advertising preferences can be controlled (EDAA, 2019) and at least one of these 
websites is in the Al-Fannah et al list and is in the EDAA list. However further 
analysis demonstrated that simply blocking websites was not enough. Three 
websites, including one from the Al-Fannah et al list were analysed. Each website 
had a unique IP address but this was one of a larger block of 128, 256 or 768 of 
academic work was blocked by website and IP address identification sites because of 
too many requests.
Bruneau (Bruneau, 2010, p. 5) discusses the uses of sinkholes to block traffic 
attempting to reach the internet. A simple sinkhole may be produced by resolving 
DNS web address names to the hosts file using, for example, 127.0.01 as the 
redirect. For further forensic analysis other IP addresses may be used. More complex 
ones involve other servers with the added complication of DGAs or malware which 
connects to IP addresses and not DNS web address (Link and Sancho, 2011).
www.websitename.xx
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts file with a loopback IP Addresses for each
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website to be blocked e.g. 127.0.0.1 blockthiswebsite.com. Appendix E provides an 
indicative list of such sites built from the Al-Fannah et al list. 
Additionally, the use of a mask e.g. *.*.xx or *.xx to block all websites 
ending xx would be sensible. A proof of concept Firefox browser add-on written for 
this thesis may be found in Appendix H. In this way websites from whole regions of 
the world or whole type of businesses could be excluded by system administrators. 
This is a known solution (The-Ohio-State-University, 2019), (Hofstetter, 2019).
However, work supporting this thesis found that of the FANG companies (Facebook, 
Amazon, Microsoft and Google) Facebook.com and Microsoft.com could not be 
blocked by this method. It is obvious why Microsoft should not be blocked 
(operating system updates) but not Facebook and this, perhaps, throws some light on 
the business relationship between the four companies. As an aside, developing this 
piece of analysis found that the hosts file would be overwritten by a default hosts 
file, presumably by Windows Defender as this program produced pop up indicating 
threats.
Another way to stop malvertising would be to block all advertisements at the 
HTML request level. This would mean writing an internet facing parser to edit data 
returned from the internet. At the higher, browser, level, browsers could perform 
basic checks on web page source code: for example, it should not be too difficult to 
identify iframes that would be below the threshold for the human eye and produce a 
warning.
Google tag Manager (Google, 2019b) is for measurement and marketing tags 
codes and links to Google Analytics and Google Ads. Blocking this may help reduce 
the level of malvertising.
It has been shown earlier, that false information is used for registering some 
websites. DNS registrars could perform basic integrity checks on the information 
provided for registration, perhaps borrowing counter-fraud techniques from the 
financial industry.
It may be possible to harvest more websites from data broker links. In at one 
US state it is possible to request personal details that data brokers hold on the 
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applicant (vermont.gov, 2020). California may soon be the second state (Becerra, 
2020).
8.18 More Technical Mitigations
Some more technical mitigations are:
check the Executable path extensions (.COM; .EXE; .BAT; 
.CMD; .VBS; .VBE; .JS; .JSE; .WSF; .WSH; .MSC) list;
check the DLL loading order list (Microsoft, 2017j);
run a free sector eraser program;
use a tool to list possible 32-bit DLL locations from a clean 
system (Harbour, 2010) based on the criteria discussed;
(Macaulay, 
2014). It is possible for malware to intercept commands in the 
kernel and not return information about that malware;
consider the concept of automatic overwrite is not new (LaBarge, 
Mazzuchi and Sarkani, 2014). This idea has been explored 
(Gutmann, 1996), (Bentley, 2008) with the latter being more 
directed;
use FireEye suggestions for a number of defences based on WMI 
(Ballenthin, Graeber and Teodorescu, 2015, pp. 30-32);
monitor the registry (Microsoft, 2019f), (Microsoft, 2019c)
especially the /RUN keys. Use a logoff script to install only 




No record was kept of the costs of software development. However, an attempt 
will be made, using industry standards.
The US Government Accountability Office (Persons, 2020, pp. 17-25)suggests
a Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) for projects. This represent all costs from 
inception to disposal. Other models are: Independent Cost assessments (ICAs); Budget 
Estimates; Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) Estimates; Estimates-At-Completion (EACs), 
and Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCEs).
This set of models is similar to those contained within an independent review 
(Shekhar and Kumar, 2016). Elsewhere Lee (Lee, 2013, pp. 63-64) suggest that 
decomposition is needed in cost estimation for example hardware, software, salaries, 
rents and utilities. 
8.20 Conclusion
The chapter supports the third and fourth Aims and Objectives. And has
presented the software developed in support of the gaps identified in previous 
chapters the concep
comparison between them and the amount a defender should spend.
It is relatively easy to write malware by Living Off the land. Combine this 
with an email with a link to a malicious website that contains a malicious script and 
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9 ANALYSIS OF HDD
9.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the analysis performed, the outcomes of that analysis 
and the ideas subsequently developed. It fulfils the criteria of the third Aim and 
Objective: treat APTs on Windows based IT systems in such a way that the malware 
is negated. It supports the third and fourth Aims and Objectives.
Courses of Action Matrix from six to seven courses of action by the addition of 
-
from its 
hardware use and introduced it to software (and by analogy with the medical term 
). It has also 
bring together all of these concepts and use the software devised, designed and 
developed to help increase the costs of APTs.
The chapter does not provide a full step-by-step analysis of any one HDD but 
provides a flavour of the nature of the software and analysis presented at the business 
level.
This thesis has presented a number of observations which now need to be 
brought together into a coherent whole.  Fundamentally, this is a Systems 
Engineering problem.
9.2 Cluster usage check
Although Windows is a file-base OS, a view of how files are grouped by the 
OS was considered necessary.  Appendix F tabulates three tables of counts of the 
consecutive unused and used clusters. The second table is a full count, while the 
third table is the same with the extreme counts removed. All counts over 100 are 
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Increased counts may be seen around powers of two for used cluster lengths. 
No ideas could be developed at this stage with the thesis hypothesis. Use of a single 
cluster, 128 clusters from the end of the logical drive, was noted on at least three 
HDDs. It has been highlighted earlier in this thesis that at least two APTs place 
malware at the end of the HDD. Cluster run usage may a suitable topic for an 
academic paper.
9.3 Port Scanning
The port scanner was run on a personal Windows 10 machine and found at 
least three connections that were unknown to the author. Two connections were to 
two different data analytic companies and the third to business ISP - not this
blocked using the Windows hosts file explicitly using the web address not IP 
address. This connection was by IP address and seemed to be from a block of IP 
addresses but not one directly linked to the website address. The same was true of 
the business ISP. A search of the C drive was run using most significant digits of an 
IP address as a search term on the business ISP. For example, if the block of IP 
addresses were in the range 127.0.1.0 to 127.0.1.256 then the search was for 127.1.1. 
This search yielded no results. It is possible that the program is installed somewhere 
other than the C drive or the IP address is encrypted or obfuscated. It has been shown 
that APTs perform such an action but not a business IP addresses. The use of blocks 
of IP addresses was true for the other two connections.
This demonstrates that simply blocking a web address is not enough to 
provide unwanted internet connectivity. None of the companies which perform these 
9.4 Filename Extensions
It has previously been demonstrated that some malware makes use of the 
Windows OS LTRO filename extension parsing and uses deceptive extensions with 
more than two dots on them. A review of all filename extensions (316308) on a 
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Windows 10 HDD gave the following counts of dots in the filename extension from 
0 to 12: 22607, 129903, 48607, 10585, 66617, 8512, 19787, 7161, 1333, 922, 241, 
29, 4.
A review of one HDD of 191127 files gave 16746 different filename 
extensions made up of 12716 unique extensions and 4030 non-unique extensions. 
The filename extension list was reviewed by eye and several files would be worth 
further analysis either for their extension name or a combination of the extension 
name and number of occurrences.
Windows Files may be considered as one of four types: starting with 
or not; suffix of .exe or not. Clearly, there are other ways to subdivide the file space.
Analysis of 442665 files on a Windows 8.1 machine gave:
File does not begin 
File Extension is not 
.exe
357657 77218
File Extension is .exe 898 6753
Table 9-1: File Extension Analysis
The range of file lengths was arbitrarily set to between 0 and 999,999,999. 
There were 139 files outside this range which accounts for the difference of 139 in 
the total for the counts, above, and the total number of files on the system.
An analysis of 896 .exe files on the Windows 8.1 OS which did not start 
started 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00; 451 files which started 0x44, 0x43, 0x44, 0x01 
total count above, but at a slightly different time.
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9.5 What do Different Filetypes Look Like Statistically?
The Index of Coincidence parameter from the categoriser highlighted ranges 
of values for different file types on a sample taken from all files from the program 
directories. These files are Visual Studio 2019 files and examples are:
File Extension Minimum Index of 
Coincidence Observed




.exe 19.5 150.6 (but there was a 




.user (all 168 bytes long) 7.902 7.902
Table 9-2: Index of Coincidence of Selected Filetypes
Although there is overlap for the Index of Coincidence of the different file 
extensions it can be deduced that any file encrypted with a single byte will give the 
same value and hence a range of file extensions can be inferred. This, or a more 
powerful single value statistic, could be used to identify file types regardless of the 
extension provided. Should all .user files be the same then they can be uniquely 
identified.
9.6 Registry Data Extraction
It has previously been demonstrated 
17) that programs may reside (hide) in the registry and this is given the misnomer of 
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fileless malware. A program was written to extract data from the Registry and put it 
On a Windows 8.1 development machine, a search for the 11 executable path 
extension plus .PS produced:












HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT 195184 2 3894







HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG 2 0 0
Table 9-3: Registry Analysis
The program was run twice (less than 24 hours apart): the first time did not count the 
number of registry values extracted; the second did after program modification. 
Figures for both runs matched except in the two parenthesised cells where the figures 
in parenthesis are for the first run. Not all data extracted is valid for further analysis. 
For example,
Although any registry value which contains an executable path extension 
(.COM; .EXE; .BAT; .CMD; .VBS; .VBE; .JS; .JSE; .WSF; .WSH; .MSC; which 
thesis) is of interest for further analysis, also of analysis is this registry value which 
could not be read as it is known that APTs are able to limit access.
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9.7 Looking for the existence of Malware
Approximately 12 HDDs were analysed and every HDD contained at least 
one Indicator Of Compromise, some in the form of malware. Possible malware
discovered is listed in Appendix D.
Some HDDs had sectors which could not be read (a possible indicator of 
malware hiding) while at least one Windows Registry file had keys which could not 
be read. Again, a possible indicator of malware existence.
Looking for key phrases and IP addresses respectively yielded results. There 
was evidence of malicious mutexes, keyloggers, banking harvesting details, email 
addresses and cryptocurrency mining.  A review of IPv4 addresses on HDDs 
produced many false positives e.g. what appeared to be software version numbers 
but this set of putative data was reduced by a good old fashion human review 
followed by use of online tools to identify the registrants. This revealed IP addresses 
associated with possible malicious actors. Even the key phrase results were human 
reviewed.
Base64 encoding highlighted files but on further review they turned out to be 
.bat or PowerShell files which only used 64 characters. A search for repeated key 
encryption highlighted unencoded files with repeated characters. 
Reviews of executable file length odd/even parity highlighted a small number 
of files, one in $RECYCLER, one claiming to be an AMD file the only odd length 
AMD file on that HDD.
.exe files were also analysed using the Chi-Squared test for statistical 
roughness and by extension non-statistical roughness. This is to test for a more 
powerful encryption scheme than XOR with repeated key. The hypothesis here is 
that should an APT used an encryption scheme which produces output with no 
statistical features then that is worthy of further analysis. Alternatively, a file which 
has statistical roughness then that is also worthy of further analysis. 
The use of subroutines in executables was analysed. The hypothesis is that 
APTs will use subroutines that will have a low probability of normally being 
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observed e.g. Zw routines, DeviceIOControl and so an executable using a number of 
these low probability subroutines may be malware. A probability table of observed 
subroutines from executables in the Windows OS was built. This was then used as 
the base distribution to analyse subroutines use in other executables. For ease of 
programming all subroutines names were hashed using a 32-bit CRC (Kientzle, 
1995, pp. 276-277). As storage is a premium the least significant 16 bits were used 
as the unique hash. Unfortunately, this led to clashes and so the least significant 20 
bits were used. Also extracting the names or subroutines was problematic as many 
different formats were used. However, notwithstanding the outliers from format 
issues t can be seen that this line of research of worthy of further work.
Figure 9-1: Subroutine Score Distribution
The use of subroutines in executables was analysed. The hypothesis is that
subroutines which are used in malware are rarely used subroutines. This work 
proved to most intricate than first imagined. There are subroutines dependencies -
there is not an issue with routines calling routines for the data for which is being 
searched (the .exe is split into sections and there may be calling of routines across 
sections but the search should be looking at within section). However, some routines 
are related; For example, for every fopen there should be an fclose and also an fread 
or fwrite. On the data analysed there is some mismatch of the malloc/free pair. This 













may be the program not working properly and hence not picking it up correctly. It 
may also be an indication of poor programming by the developer(s).
The choice of logs is based on the reasoning that if there are, say, a corpus of 
100 subroutines with the frequencies: sub(a) 50, sub(b) 10, sub(c) 10, subs(all the 
rest - 30) 1, Total 100, then seeing 10 out of the rest may be more significant than 
just seeing sub(b). Adding the frequencies both give 10 and a reasoned choice cannot 
be made between them.
The null hypothesis corpus comes from a Window system that has not been 
used. Any hard drives presented (i.e. those which may be infected with malware) 
may be tested against this corpus.
The outcome, looking at the results by eye, both the "pristine data" and the
"possibly infected sample" looked similar. What was highlighted, as mentioned 
above, was mismatched subroutine calls (malloc/free) and routines than in the 
"infected" sample not being in the "pristine" data. I have more work to do on these 
results, as my analysis has not been scientific.  
This approach was not complete. Analysis by eye of PE files lead to a 
program to extract the dlls and create the counts for the above test. Every PE file had 
the same format i.e. used the dll GetCurrentProcess, and it was just a case of finding 
this dll and extracting the dlls close to it for the counts. When the counts software 
was developed it was clear that the counts were wrong. Further analysis of more PE 
files showed there that there was another format. The counts software was amended 
but still the problem persisted. Further analysis of PE files using the source code of a 
PE viewer (LaserMedia-AS, 2007) showed that there were many ways to parse the 
subroutine list (LaserMedia-AS, 2020). More ways that could be accommodated in 
the time left available for the development of this thesis. This idea could also be 
modified to build a set of counts of dlls used in malware samples (GitHub, 2020) and 
use those counts to statistically identify malware with the analyser program. This is a 
subject to which the author will return in the future.
261
9.8 Does the Microsoft Supply Chain Use a Different Compiler to 
the Rest of the World?
9.8.1 Background 
Any file on a computer has a number of attributes, one of which is the file 
length.  For Portable Executables (PEs) the file length is determined by the compiler. 
The outcome of the research described here, supported by statistical techniques
described later in this chapter, finds that file lengths in Microsoft operating systems 
are overwhelmingly of even length. An odd length PE, therefore, is an indicator of 
not being written in the Microsoft supply chain and hence may be an IOC for 
malware.
It is possible that at least one compiler which Microsoft uses in its Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) supply chain for the compilation of constituent 
parts of the Windows operating system is different to other compilers which are 
available to the IT profession at large. This difference is that the Microsoft OEM will 
produce executables of even length whereas other executables may be odd or even 
length. It is noted that Microsoft reserves at least one field in the PE format for 
Borland (Microsoft, 2018r). The analysis was carried out using freely available 
Microsoft and OpenOffice software.
The format and attributes of PEs are noted and this thesis denotes them as 
which is unknown to the designer and has been determined by analysis this thesis
denotes For this particular piece of analysis, an 
Attribute by Discovery is the parity of the file length is the file length odd or even 
and questions what this means in aggregate across certain file types.
This thesis proposes a technique for analysing the distribution of file sizes on 
Windows based machines. It postulates that Microsoft, and its OEM supply chain,
use at least one family of compilers for the compilation of constituent parts of the 
Windows operating system. It also postulates that this family of compilers is
different to other compilers which are available to the IT profession at large. This 
difference is that the Microsoft OEM will produce executables of even length 
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whereas other executables may be odd or even length. The analysis was carried out 
using non-bespoke software i.e. using available Microsoft software.
9.8.2 Most and Least Significant Digit Analysis  
Most significant digit analysis consists of analysing the first digit of each 
number in a set of numbers. For example,
selected for analysis. Least significant digit analysis consists of analysing the last
digit of each number in a set of numbers. For example, if the number is 12345 then 
5 . This would, in effect, look at the parity of the 
file size - is it odd or is it even? Clearly the expected result of a random set of digits 
is that there should be an equal number of odd and even numbers. 
9.8.3 Data Collection and Analysis  
Two ways of collecting the data were used: the first used the Microsoft 
XP machine and it was decided not to download it. Also, the different ways of data 
collection provide some independent assurance that the results are valid.













































(Microsoft, 2018l). This batch recursively outputs, one 
item per line, a list of all .exe files with associated size and full path name. The batch 
was modified for .dll in place of .exe and was run on Windows 7, 8 and 10. The 
command used within the batch is:
forfiles /p c:\ /s /m *.exe /c "cmd /c echo @fsize @path"
and,
respective text files and then imported into separate spreadsheets.
Another one-line batch was written which contained the line:
Dir C:\ /S  
(Microsoft, 2017h)
Again, the output was written to text files and then imported into a spreadsheet. 
However, in this case a lot of hand editing and sorting was needed to produce data in 
the required format. The filetype extension was extracted using the formula:
=MID(cell containing file name],LEN(cell containing file names])-2,3)
The full path name was not retained. As well as extracting only .exe or .dll files the 
data was split between C:\Windows and all other subdirectories by hand for separate 
analysis. Within the various worksheets the first digit of each file size was extracted 
using the formula:
=INT([cell containing file size]/POWER(10,INT(LOG([cell containing file 
size],10))))
and the last digit of each file size was extracted using the formula:
=MOD[cell containing file size],10)
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Each set of data was collated using the Pivot Table function and statistically tested 
using the relevant Chi-Squared test for the spreadsheet type. Spreadsheets used were 
Microsoft Excel and the OpenOffice equivalent. This author had admin or user rights 
























Table 9-5: First Digit Statistics









XP 135 of 2690 10 of 7945 148 of 5760 343 of 5445
7 1 of 4134 19 of 1327 14 of 36416 348 of 14614
8 377 of 3422 10 of 9033 2966 of 26053 10 of 12852
10 0 of 2138 0 of 39 6 of 14123 0 of 235
Table 9-6: Count of Odd length files
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It can be seen that there is a dearth of odd length files.
During this analysis this author purchased a new Windows 10 machine: 
internet) the methodology was performed. The .exe counts were:
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Count 609 5 660 11 651 8 659 9 654 16
Table 9-7: Least Significant Digit Count
(New Windows 10 Machine - .exe.Files.
Count of Odd length files)
9.8.5 Discussion 
to the work of Evans and found that popular distributions fit 
poorly in terms of statistical reliability, and that anomalous spikes in distributions are 
(Downey, 2001). It is clear from the odd/even analysis of data that there 
is a significant split between the counts of odd and even file sizes across Windows 
operating systems.
(Pietrek, 
1994). It appears, therefore, that file sizes are based on multiples of the field 
ould be a power of two between 512 and 64 K, 
SectionAlignment is greater than FileAlignment, and an odd number, the file size 
could end up as an odd number. 
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Information from Microsoft is mixed: although Pietrek does not shed light on 
a PE file size, Pietrek (Pietrek, 2002)
only need to use the 32 or 64-bit specific versions of the structures if you're working 
with a PE file with size characteristics that are different from those of the platform 
. Pietrek (Pietrek, 2002) n between 
and files is entirely one of semantics. They both use the exact same PE 
format. The only difference is a single bit that indicates if the file should be treated 
as an or as a 
Further analysis on the machine from which the data was harvested reveals 
that many of the odd length files have names that contain x86 (e.g. C:\Program Files 
subdirectory. Why would this be the case? One inference which can be drawn from 
this that they could have be written by another set of developers using a different 
compiler.
The Windows XP and Windows 8 machines were personal 
recent files. They also contained duplicates of files and files of similar name and 
identical length.  However, if there were a non-biased odd/even split of file lengths 
this should be reflected in the data. There is still a distinct odd/even split in file 
lengths. This observation is consistent with the work of Evans and Kuenning:
-
sized files, such as icons or configuration files associated with a particular 
(Evans and Kuenning, 2002)
However, this contradicts work (Downey, 2001).
It appears that the compiler Microsoft is using in its OEM supply chain 
compiles code to multiples of two for the file size (i.e. even length executables) but 
at least one other compiler, Visual Studio 2013, compiles code to both odd and even 
length.
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No previous analysis of and files could be found. Assurance for the 
work in this thesis is gained by the methodology. Using two different ways of 
collecting the data ( and ) means that it would be difficult to make the 
same mistake across all operating systems. Similarly, using two different 
spreadsheets (Microsoft Excel and OpenOffice) across operating systems provides 
independence: The Chi-Squared function calls are different in each. Digit extraction 
from the file length field is easily checked across the data sets.
It is concluded that using two different sets of analysis software (Microsoft 
Excel and OpenOffice) provides an independent check within the analysis of the 
methodology. The only commonality across both sets of analysis is the Microsoft 
program .
There is strong evidence that the compiled length of files in Microsoft 
Windows operating systems is restricted to an even length by at least one complier 
used by Microsoft in their supply chain when creating and files. It is 
possible that all compilers used by Microsoft have this feature. This feature may, or 
may not, be present in different compilers used by the wider IT profession but it has 
been shown that at least one these compilers will compile and files to an odd 
length as demonstrated above.
This analysis leads this author to assert that although an even length file size 
does not rule out infection by malware (the software could have been written and 
compiled by Microsoft OEM or a non-Microsoft OEM developer), an odd length file 
size may indicate malware i.e. The PE has been produced by an entity other than 
Microsoft and members of their OEM supply chain. This feature may be used as part 
of a wider indicator of compromise for APTs.
9.9 Mechanisms of Action 
9.9.1
Malware is placed on machines and persists in various ways. To recap from 
earlier in the thesis:
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Most organisations are breached, mainly by spear-phishing (directly through 
email attachments or linking to a website with malware. Most malware is, at least, 
added by start-up folders or registry keys. Simply checking the latter two at logoff or 
of success of attack.
A program could be developed to hash every file in a pristine Windows 
system. Alternatively the hashes of software are publicly available (NIST, 2019),
(GetData-Forensics, 2020).
9.9.2 Mechanism of Action: An Examination of Registry Keys 
The use of the \Run and \RunOnce Registry Keys is public
knowledge. However, there may be other Registry keys which act in a similar 
manner but which are not publicly known. It was hypothesized that there must be
a list of all such Registry keys somewhere on the system.
A suite of programs was written to add a new subkey to every Registry Key.
This suite, although tested on a sub-set of Registry Keys, when run on
all Registry Keys crashed the machine which then ha to be completely re-built.
Fortunately backups had been made as discussed earlier.
Program search was then written to search for a given string within a set
of HDD sectors. The maximum number of sectors was taken from the last
sector used in the MFT as provided by the program filelist. search was
run twice: once looking for "\Run"; and again, looking for "\Run" with
each character separated by once character. This was to look for Unicode
use of the string. This gave over 150,000 lines and 500,000 lines of output 
respectively.
A program to identify how programs are called, and from where they are 
called e.g. Registry /RUN keys, Windows Services, calls from other programs. 
9.9.3 Background  
Malware, or a computer virus, does not run of its own accord; there has to be 
some a process to trigger, or initiate, it. 
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thesis builds on 
this parallel. In a similar way that malware needs to be able to initiated, run and have 
an effect on a computer, in the medical world there is a definition for drugs which 
The means by which a drug exerts its effects on cells or tissues
(Farlex, 2018)
There is a Mechanism of Action which exerts its effect on malware so that 
mechanism of action is not always well-known.
term used before by Lynch to describe Hard Disk Drive (HDD) arm movements 
(Lynch, 1972).
As there is a Mechanism of Action there must, by analogy, be one of 
inaction. This thesis calls this an Inhibitor of Action.  
The work described in this thesis was performed on the 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) 
registry hives on a Windows 8.1 machine.
9.9.4 Where are the Mechanisms of Action? 
Nothing happens without power and activating the On switch starts the boot
process. From this all other actions flow. The On switch may be labelled the primary 
mechanism of action and all others, secondary, tertiary etc. but for the purposes of 
this thesis all mechanisms of action are equally labelled. The chain of events from
switching on the computer through to initial use this thesis calls
this cascade.
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At the end of various branches of this cascade are a number of malware 
mechanisms of action, which are the illegitimate use of legitimate features of the 
operation system. 
Which way to follow the data? One could start with the On switch and follow 
the boot process or one could start where one believes the last mechanism of action
to be and work back. This thesis has already seen that these mechanisms of actions 
may include the Windows Service, start-up folder and Registry Keys. In many cases 
these Mechanisms of Action are persistent i.e. they persist across logon and boot 
sessions. These shall be explored the latter in this thesis.
A Mechanism of Action is not restricted to making use of the actions of the 
operating system. This thesis has previously shown (Villeneuve, 2011, p. 13) that in 
many cases, the persistence mechanism will consist of methods such as adding the 
start-up
Windows Registry or installing an application as a Windows Service etc.
Yet Kaspersky have seen browsers accounting for 42% of vulnerable 
applications (Kaspersky, 2014d, pp. 24-25). These two figures (97% and 42% 
provided by Mandiant and Kaspersky respectively) may be consistent: they are 
measures taken at different times and different anti-malware companies may have 
different talents, and core skills.
Each of these forms of persistence has to start somehow. To include start-up
information in the Windows Registry is fine but there must be a mechanism of action 
to run the contents of these keys. It is noted that there are other mechanisms of action 
but for the purposes of this thesis there is focus on registry keys.
9.9.5 Looking for the Mechanism of Action in the Windows Registry 
This research took two routes: the first was to add values to every subkey in 
the registry to emulate the \Run and \RunOnce Registry Keys which are public
knowledge:
Run and RunOnce registry keys cause programs to run each time that a user 
(Microsoft, 2017ab)
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There are at least four registry keys that are mechanisms of action for 
software and it is hypothesised here, and others (Skoudis and Zeltser, 2004), that 
there may be more Registry keys which act in a similar manner but which are not 
publicly known. It was hypothesised that there must be a list of all such Registry
keys somewhere on the system but where might this list be stored? The list could be 
integral to the Registry or in a file external to the Registry. It is important to 
understand which registry keys can be used as they can also be used as mechanisms 
of action for malware (Symantec-Security-Response, 2013, p. 14), (Gross and 
Cylance-Spear-Team, 2016, p. 13). This list could also contain lesser known 
Registry keys performing the same action and it might be possible to add to this list.
The hypothesis is that this Mechanism of Action is in the machine boot or
Windows start-up procedures. The order of loading software and actioning registry 
keys is important. 
\...\RunOnce key is loaded 




One might infer that the list of registry keys to be actioned at start-up or 
logon would be listed in in the hive of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control
Registry Key (Microsoft, 2017o) but a review of this sub-tree of Registry using 
regedit (Microsoft, 2012) suggests this does not appear to be the case.
The second route was to look for a list of keys on the HDD which contained 
the \Run and \RunOnce Registry Keys. This list should also contain other registry 
keys that perform a similar function.
9.9.6 The Software Written  Approach 1 
The first approach was to test if live Registry keys were used in the manner 
of the \Run and \RunOnce Registry Keys. It is acknowledged that other registry keys 
not currently used and, which did not exist on the machine, could be available but 
there are infinite number of these and so this line of research was not pursued. 
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A program was written to add a new subkey to every Registry Key on a 
Window 8.1 system. This subkey contained a value that would action a program at 
login if that key were an unknown registry mechanism of action. Although tested on 
a sub-set of HKCU Registry Keys, when it was run on all HKCU Registry Keys it
crashed the machine. The machine then had to be completely re-built.
Rethinking the implementation produced a reduced set of software. Two 
programs were written the result of which, at login, if a registry key were to be used 
in a similar manner to the /Run keys then this would be logged. A third program 
reversed the action of the first two and deleted all of the values that were produced.
The successful process was applied to the HKLM. This again crashed the 
machine but this time recovery was from a checkpoint.
9.9.7 What was Found - 1 
When implemented for HKCU, the only registry keys which were actioned at 
login were the known \Run and \RunOnce Registry Keys.
It was not possible to successfully to do this HKLM due to the system crash.
9.9.8 The Software Written  Approach 2 
The second approach was to try to find an area on the HDD that held a list of 
registry keys to be actioned at start-up or login. It was hypothesised this list of 
registry keys would contain the \Run and \RunOnce registry keys and hence other 
registry keys which would perform the same action at start-up.
A program ( ), which had been previously written by this author for 
other research was used. This program lists, from information in the Master File 
Table ($MFT), all sectors where files are held. This program has was inspired by 
K (kusano, 2015) but includes the sector number where the data 
resides as well as filenames and status as known to the operating system. Although 
the programs are functionally similar, the code for is completely different 
having been researched from various sources (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007, pp. 
215-275, 389-410), (Richard Russon, 2018), (Russon and Fledel, Undated),
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(Wilkinson, 2017). However, the output of both programs was assured against each 
other.
A Program ( ) was written to search for a given string within a range of 
HDD sectors and output a hex print of the containing sector. This set of sectors was 
taken from the program and, in effect, listed all active and deleted files. Large 
files were only viewed to, at most, the first 1024 characters (two 512-byte sectors). It 
was reasoned that any file containing the desired list of registry keys would be 
relatively short. was run looking for "\Run". This gave over 150,000 lines of 
output which were scanned by eye.





grouped together and that malware writers could insert additional registry keys into 
this file. These extra registry keys could contain links to malware. In one instance the 
\R
registry keys. This is not surprising, as for there to be other registry keys the machine 
would have to be infected with malware.
A powershell script file was discovered containing a clear indication of the 
Registry keys to be run. However, these registry keys were not in a specific list as 
hypothesised but hardwired into conditional statements. The registry keys were 
\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" both for 
HKCU and HKLM. The omission of \RunOnce is not surprising. As has already seen 
the order of loading matters (Microsoft, 2018p).
Other registry keys and fragments of keys were found. A batch was written to 
add registry key values for all 14 new keys that were found. As some registry keys 
274
were incomplete, there was extrapolation to the full key name. Of these registry key 
values, only the HKLM Wow6432Node key ran at start-up. Microsoft state that 
(Microsoft, 2011). However, the 
wider forensics community is aware of the use of this key value as a mechanism of
action (Karp, 2010).
The file containing the group of four registry keys was analysed, as were the 
surrounding sectors on the HDD. This file was part of a set of similar files stored 
within just less than 500 512-bytes sectors. Each file started on a cluster boundary. 
No file contained obvious, readable, identifying data such as filename, checksum, 
size etc. At the end of each file the sector was padded and the rest of the cluster 
padded with apparent random data, which was not analysed. This padding allowed 
the next file to start on a cluster boundary. If a file contained enough data to extend 
into the 8th sector of a cluster then this sector was padded and a full cluster of 
apparent random data was inserted before the next file.
As all files were over 1024 bytes in length it would appear that they are 
$MFT non-resident files (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007, pp. 215-275, 389-410),
(Richard Russon, 2018), (Russon and Fledel, Undated), (Wilkinson, 2017).
9.9.10 An Unexpected Discovery 
An unexpected outcome of inserting HKCU registry values was that after 
running, at login, the first set of software (the registry key value insertion program), 
Visual Studio 2013 did not run. Once the inserted registry values were deleted it was 
possible to run Visual Studio 2013 again. The same effect was seen for HKLM 
registry key values.
It is inferred that Visual Studio 2013 has a built-in integrity check based on 
the Windows Registry to inhibit tampering. i.e. Visual Studio runs if and only if a 
given set of registry keys and/or values exist. It is further inferred that other software 
may have this capability. This thesis calls
of service attack
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In a similar way to the effect the changes had on Visual Studio 2013 it is 
further inferred that modifications to HKLM hive registry keys and/or values act as 
an inhibitor of action and that at least one version of Windows will not run if there 
has been at least a certain, but unknown to this author, HKLM modification.
9.9.11 Discussion and Way Forward 
Given the different outcomes and of registry changes to HKLM and HKLU 
hives this thesis speculates that they are different teams within Microsoft and that 
one has better software quality control. After all, the operating system is just another 
program and all programs should terminate gracefully. There may also be an issue of
inhibitors of action on programs. Surely a program should only action legitimate 
parameters and report anything unexpected?
The next stage should be to identify the name of the file containing the 
registry keys, the names of all files within the associated 500-sector area on HDD 
and to identify the mechanism of action for all of them, all the way up the branch of 
this part of the mechanism of action cascade. At each node in the cascade there can 
be a check for other mechanisms of action and progress down that part of the 
cascade, repeating for all nodes until all Windows mechanisms of action are found.
This is a similar to walk a directory tree.
It is acknowledged that a scan of data in active clusters could have been 
performed but, again, this would probably produce a lot of output. This could have 
been done programmatically using DeviceIoControl (Microsoft, 2018k) with the 
FSCTL_GET_VOLUME_BITMAP control code (Microsoft, Unknown) or directly 
through the MFT .
It is thought that the reason that the first approach to registry key 
modification failed was that the registry key name being stored as a parameter value 
was the full registry key name and that, in some cases, this was too long for a 
registry key value. The shorter node registry name worked so the hypothesis was not 
followed up as it did not add value to the thesis.
This work has re-
work has 
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attacker could place malware anywhere within the Mechanism of Action Cascade 
and this would be something against which it would be more difficult to defend.
It has been demonstrated that there is mechanism of action for registry keys 
and that there is at least one lesser-publicised Microsoft registry key (but known to 
the wider forensic community), Wow6432Node, which acts as such at login. 
Arguably, the forensics community highlight the use by attackers of HKLM and 
HKCU \Run registry keys but there is less publicity surround the Wow6432Node 
\Run key. System Administrators should be aware of this registry key.
It has also demonstrated that at least one version of Windows and one piece 
of software, Visual Studio 2013, has a registry-based inhibitor of action. This 
inhibitor of action consists of simply adding a new registry value, which the software 
does not recognise. It would be possible to develop this inhibitor of action as a denial 
of service attack.
9.10 Analysis of a Malware Corpus
The software package was brought to bear on a corpus of 228 files known to 
be associated with malware:
Test Number of Files Identified
Zero Length 16
Existence of GetCurrentProcess 134
Base64 1
Odd Length 46
Length [0, 4096] i.e. short files 3
Possible Encryption 22
Table 9-8: Count of Malware Identified from Software Developed
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and a score associated with each test.
Score Number Percentage
No Score 79 34.65%
Low Score 87 38.16%
Good Score 62 27.19%
Table 9-9: Summary of Malware Identified from Software Developed
i.e. almost two thirds of the files had some score attached to them designating them 
as worthy of further analysis with just over a quarter being of higher interest. At this 
stage one has to consider that these files are known to be associated with malware 
and there may be unconscious fitting of the score to the data by the author. However, 
it remains that the existence of possible malware of has identified using software 
developed from reading and hypothesis development. At the very least this may be 
considered a success.
9.11 Differences in Compilers
rogram (Kernighan and Ritchie, 1988, p. 6) was 
compiled using three different compilers: Tiny (Bellard, 2018), Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2019 (Microsoft, 2019d) and Pelles C (smorgasbort, 2003-2020). The latter 
two in Debug and Release modes for x86 and x64. This gave seven different 
executables for analysis.




Microsoft Visual Studio Debug x64
(hellowmdx64.exe)
59,904
Microsoft Visual Studio Debug x86 38,912
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(hellowmdx86.exe)
Microsoft Visual Studio Release x64
(hellowmrx64.exe)
10,752









Table 9-10: Summary of Executable Sizes with Source Compiled with Different 
Compilers
The size of the Tiny compiler PE adds weight to the argument that APTs are 
able to produce malware of a small size.
Additionally, the program was compiled on different computers with Visual 
Studio 2019, at least twice on each. The Visual Studio PEs were then analyzed using 
the hexprint program a PE viewer (LaserMedia-AS, 2007). The PEs appear to 
contain machine specific, or Visual Studio 2019 specific, information in bytes 128 to 
approximately 239 and 4608 to 4879.
9.12 Putting it all Together
It is now possible to put this all together into software that will increase the 
business costs of APTs. This is over and above hashing techniques to validate files 
which claim to be legitimate Windows files. IT is also in addition to that which an 
organisation or individual would implement as part of their intelligence, threat driven 
mitigations. The Anti-APT Structure Data Flow is provided in Figure 6-1.
For analysis, any program should be written as close to the hardware and 
operating system as possible. This means minimising Windows specific routines and 
using, for example ANSI C. POSIX C is also acceptable. 
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An overwrite program to overwrite unused areas of disc based on cluster 
usage can now be written as well as a file-based analysis program. The use of both 
programs on the computer would be obfuscated using APT obfuscation techniques.
The overwrite program would be in two parts: analysis of unused clusters; 
analysis of used clusters. For unused cluster analysis, using the cluster table
($CLUS) obtained from the MFT, any unused cluster can be overwritten with binary 
zeros. However before overwriting the data can first be analysed for IOC of 
malware. These IOCs may be use mutexes, IPv4 and IPv6 address and keywords. 
The statistical properties of the cluster may be analysed at the binary and character 
level. Data which is too flat or rough can be highlighted. Any results may be sent to 
a central corporate server. Similarly, any clusters which are partially used may have 
the unused part (i.e. after a xFFFFFFFF terminator) overwritten, after analysis.
The analysis program would run perform statistical analysis on files based on 
the filetype. It would include, but not be restricted to, base64, Index of Coincidence, 
file length, encryption by repeated key, chi-squared (is it too rough or too smooth?), 
again sending results to a central corporate server.
Any compiler used to compiler these programs should not draw attention to 
itself and the paradox is that these programs should not highlight themselves on the 
systems. Should they be able to do that then APTs may copy the technique.
However, if they can highlight themselves then an APT may be able to become 
aware of their existence as an AV feature and react accordingly.
9.13 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the analysis of HDDs on a variety of machine 
sand standalone HDDs. It supports the fourth Aim and Objective. The existence of 
malware has been identified using software developed for this thesis. Dubious IP 
addresses and port usage can be identified as have the existence of mutexes, key 
loggers crypto-currency mining. A corpus of files known to be associated with 
malware has identified at least a quarter of the files as malware related and as much 
as two thirds worthy of further analysis. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that:
The software developed from analysis of academic papers and
White papers is able to identify potential malware on HDDs;
Microsoft and its legitimate supply chain may use a different
compiler to that available to developers and the parity of .exe and
.dll files can be used a malware IOC;
By using the mechanism of action flow, it is possible to hide calls
to malware earlier on in the boot process in the OS;
It is possible to apply a denial of service attack by manipulating
keys in the registry
treat APTs on Windows based IT systems in such a way that the
malware is negated;
This chapter has fulfilled the criteria of the third Aim and Objective: treat 




This concluding chapter starts with a gentle critique of the thesis. It then 
follows with a broad discussion on the future including of the Internet of Things 
(IOT.
10.2 Fulfilling the Research Objectives
Recall that the research objectives are to:
discover where APTs lie on windows-based systems;
create/build generic views of where APTs lie on Windows based 
systems using an appropriate Cyber Kill Chain (CKC);
treat APTs on Windows based IT systems.in such a way that the 
malware is negated;
increase the cost of doing business for APTs, for example by 
overwriting unused disc space so APTs cannot place malware 
there.
10.2.1 Fulfilling the First Research Objective 
This thesis has been produced following reviews of a range of academic 
papers and white papers produced by AV companies. It has also reviewed a large 
number of other sources including webpages and podcasts. From these sources has 
been collated a time bounded view (mainly the 2010s) on the work of APTs and 
malware placed on Windows based operating systems. This has been limited to 
Windows 7 and above.
10.2.2 Fulfilling the Second Research Objective 
The thesis has been agnostic towards the origin and intent of APTs. To distil 
the information into a manageable form, the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain was 
selected from a number of candidate Cyber Kill Chains. This allowed the author to 
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have a view of malware on Windows systems, however this view was sometimes 
blurred by the used of the same malware by different APTs and analysis by different 
AV companies of the same APTs. It is possible that apparently independent evidence 
from ostensibly different attacks is the same hence giving a false sense of evidence 
re-enforcement.
10.2.3 Fulfilling the Third Research Objective 
The research used the file-based concept promulgated by Microsoft and 
developed the concept of Attributes by Design and Attributes by Discovery. This 
philosophical view helped to guide the theory and software development. The 
concept of Mechanisms of Action was borrowed from the pharmaceutical industry. 
This is a non-random connection as it builds on the concept of a computer virus. It 
also allows us to introduce the idea that malware does not have to be found, it merely 
has to have its mechanism of action severed. This is one of the inexpensive ways for 
a defender to increase the business costs of an attacker.
The research introduced the idea of benware (Benign Software) and 
developed a proof of concept attack based on the attacks of two APTs. This attack 
used the concept of Living Off the Land. Although not a new concept it 
demonstrated the ease with which malware may be written using only legitimate 
Microsoft software and how this may be modified for each attack to defeat AV 
software. It also demonstrates the idea that an attacker could, and should, use the 
least expensive and
system.
10.2.4 Fulfilling the Fourth Research Objective 
The research has produced a business view of the organisation of an APT 
with associated costs. It demonstrated the difficulty of providing a single monetary 
cost but did offer a high-level view for consideration.  These costs were then used to 
justify the business techniques and software produced to mitigate the observed 
attacks. 
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10.3 A Critique of this Work and Future Research Direction 
The scope of the thesis is an HDD. To provide produce proof of concept 
software the HDD was viewed as a single partition and file system on a single HDD. 
It is acknowledged that there may be multiple partitions on one HDD and that file 
systems may span more than one HDD q.v. RAID arrays. To keep the proof of 
concept software simple, further assumptions included the use of 8-bit ASCII (i.e. 
not UNICODE), 512 bytes to a sector and eight sectors to a cluster. It was fortunate 
that the MFTs of all HDDs analysed were formatted as such, although there was 
evidence of UNICODE. The HDD free space overwriting program did not explore 
all free space (e.g. within sector and cluster segments following the end of file 
marker but the way forward was pointed to. It is noted that such an overwriting 
program will destroy any evidence which may be a problem for computer forensics 
and law enforcement. Any development of this avenue should consider evidence 
preservation e.g. keep evidence of IP addresses accessed, mutexes used etc. Such an 
approach would need legal advice and guidance.
All programs are research, proof of concept programs and not all have been 
fully optimised. For example, the search programs read one sector at a time. This is 
less efficient than reading clusters or multiple clusters that make optimal use of the 
available hardware configuration. Directory walk software at the C level was used 
simply for programming ease. These should be changed to directly access the MFT. 
The driver to write directly to free areas of HDD would need to be called by a 
program passing to it the number of the sector to be overwritten and how (either the 
whole sector or after the end of file marker). This pair of programs would need to 
work with the Windows operating system to ensure that there are no sector access 
collisions.
Any implementation of the ideas provided in this thesis may need recoding 
from scratch.
No previous analysis of executable and .dll files could be found and this, 
together with the results raise the question: Why has this area of IT Security not been 
addressed?
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The scope of this thesis is that of malware on the HDD platters and excludes 
HDD firmware. Should an attack modify firmware in the way described earlier in 
this thesis, then this thesis is nugatory, even though malware is on the platter. This is 
an avenue of future research.
Further research should be an analysis of the executable of a single program 
compiled on different machine with different compilers. It is possible that such 
existence of
which may be incorporated into the categorisor and analyser program developed for 
this thesis.
Finally the subroutine program should be modified and completed to be able 
to identify little used Microsoft subroutines which may be Indicators of 
Compromise.
A further avenue of research is the Internet of Things (IoT). A world where 
all electronic devices are interconnected may provide security challenges. Such 
network-attached storage devices may include smart TVs, cars, refrigerators It is 
possible that not all devices will include automated update checks requiring consumers  
to download and install new firmware may be one task too many
Botnets may also make use of the IoT and with every device having an IP 
address this may get worse in the near-term.
This thesis has demonstrated that malware, or at least Indicators of 
Compromise, may be found by analysing the Windows OS at the file level. On eight 
HDDs provided by an organisation, all were found to have Indicators of 
Compromise. On a malware corpus of 228 files know to be associated with malware 
two thirds were identified. This is comparable with commercial AV companies.  One 
does not have to find all malware just what is necessary and sufficient to meet the 
An overwrite of the whole HDD and reload of the OS is possibly enough to 
satisfy most victims. A pristine HDD with OS reload should satisfy most of the rest. 
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HDDs are relatively inexpensive now that this may the most cost-effective solution. 
Any HDDs may be destroyed or analysed for the greater good.
Finally, the philosophical view, concepts and ideas in this thesis are fully 
transferrable to other operating systems.
10.4 Concluding Remarks
This thesis has produced a comprehensive white paper and academic 
discussion of where APTs lie on windows-based systems and used this create and 
build generic views of where APTs lie on Windows based systems using the 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain. It has satisfied the thesis Aims and Objectives. It 
has produced a suite of software and suggested lines of further research to treat APTs 
on Windows based IT systems in such a way that the malware deployed is negated. 
This has been done using a file-based analysis including Attributes by Design and 
Attributes by Discovery. Finally, it has increased the cost of doing business for 
APTs, for example by overwriting unused disc space so APTs cannot place malware 
there and by severing the malware mechanisms of action.
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Source:  (Netmarketshare, 2019a)
B-1
B.
This section describes the facilitating steps necessary for testing device driver 
software in the Windows kernel. Depending on how much of the software is already 
speed this process could take up to 3 
hours plus fault resolution time. A knowledge of Operating systems and the 
Windows kernel is desirable. The developer will need administrator access on a host 
machine to install on a virtual machine (VM) and will need to ensure that the 
hardware of the machine on which the software is to be run is sufficient.
Install the latest version of Visual Studio with Windows Driver Kit (WDK
and SDK) and qspectre libraries. The latter may be done by the Virtual Studio 
Installation software. 
Obtain a Windows .iso file with associated product key;
Obtain Windows VMware VM software. Create a virtual machine using the 
Windows .iso file. Defaults (e.g. 60GB disc) are acceptable. Ensure bi-directional 
copy is enabled.
Obtain a driver loader. A commercial one is available or one can be written 
in four short lines (see below). Should the commercial loader be used ensure that the 
correct hardware is selected (for example, for Windows 7 x64 and above use: 
myfolder -> kit -> WLH -> AMD64 FRE). Drag and drop the loader into the 
virtual machine.
Download to Virtualkd windbg for debugging. Click the download button 
and follow the download instructions at the bottom of the page. Drag and drop 
virtualkd into the VM.
Restart the VM. Run VMinstall from the target folder. Follow the 
instructions. The VM will re-boot. Select the VM with signature disabled. From the 
VM monitor select the debugger path (there should be a windbg.exe default). Select 
debugger windows should popup. Select Debug -> Go and the VM should resume 
booting;
B-2
Configure the VM. In VM Machine Settings add a serial port. Use a named 
pipe e.g. \\.\pipe\MyPipe. (\\.\pipe\ is compulsory. Add your own pipe name after 
->
Advanced Options, Select, Debug, COM2, Baud Rate 11520. On the VM search for 
-> Ports (COM & LPT). 
Restart;
In the host machine debugger File -> Kernel Debug COM. Select Baud 
Rate as 11520. Check Pipe box and change Port to the pipe name in the previous step 
(in this case \\.\pipe\MyPipe.
Write batch with the two BCD edit commands (Examples here and here) and 
include as the this command line:
REG ADD 
"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Debug Print Filter " /v DEFAULT /t REG_DWORD /d 0xf
Write and compile the driver the host machine. File -> New Project ->
Installed -> Visual C++ -> Legacy -> Empty WDM Driver. Create a project name. 
When project has v=been created right click in Solution Explorer project name ->
add -> new item. Select C++ and change file extension from .cpp to .c. Write code. 
In Solution Explorer project name -> property -> Properties Configuration 
Manager. Choose the platform for your host machine. Configuration Properties ->
Warnings Level 1. Linker - -> OS to VM OS. 
Select Target Platform. Inf2Cat -> Use Local time. Now compile (Build) the 
solution.
Drag and drop into the VM and use the Loader (commercial or otherwise) to 
run the driver. Debug information should appear in the debugger window.
Troubleshooting
The debugger may hang adding symbols may help:
B-3
SRV*c:\MyServerSymbols*https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Ensure compatibility between COM ports
Three YouTube videos
Windows Kernel Programming Tutorial 1 - Setting up Environment - Part 1
Windows Kernel Programming Tutorial 2 - Setting up Environment - Part 2
Windows Kernel Programming Tutorial 3 - Writing a simple driver (Good for Visual
Studio setup)
Kernel Debugging with windbg - How to start Windows Kernel live debugging
Two YouTube background videos
Windows Driver Development Tutorial 1 Introduction
Windows Driver Development Tutorial 2 - How Our Driver Works
BCD batch
bcdedit /debug on
bcdedit /dbgsettings serial debugport:2 baudrate:115200
REG ADD
"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Debug Print Filter " /v DEFAULT /t REG_DWORD /d 0xf
Bespoke driver loader batch








0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 0 0 6C 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
64 F4 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 47 E8 3 3A 21 0 3A 76 
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304 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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400 17 2 53 19 45 13 1 41 1 52 17 1D 0 4F 1D 43 
416 C 16 11 7 17 16 65 69 A 4F 45 D 1B 2 13 1F 
432 67 3B 53 49 10 4F 0 19 1 16 1A 1D 2 64 D 7 
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REDIST_MUTEX_CHEC X
SACCUPDATER_MUTEX X X
IEXPLORE_MUTEX   
_AABBCCDDEEFF (TrendMicro, 2002)
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MUTEX1212 (Totalhash, 2020) X
MS_ZJM_000001_MUTEX X
POEVTINFMUTEX X























# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual




#      102.54.94.97     rhino.acme.com          # source server
#       38.25.63.10     x.acme.com              # x client host
# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
# 127.0.0.1       localhost
# ::1 localhost
127.0.0.1       www.facebook.co.uk
127.0.0.1       www.facebook.com
127.0.0.1       www.youtube.com
127.0.0.1       prod.reuters.tv
127.0.0.1       queso-cdn.prod.reuters.tv
127.0.0.1       player.brightcove.net
E-2
127.0.0.1       sadmin.brightcove.net
127.0.0.1       static.independent.co.uk
127.0.0.1       sb.scorecard.research.com
127.0.0.1 googletagmanager.com
127.0.0.1       static.chartbeat.com
127.0.0.1       ads.rubiconproject.com
127.0.0.1       ads.yahoo.com
127.0.0.1       c.amazon-adsystem.com
#
127.0.0.1       www.yandex.ru
127.0.0.1       www.optimizely.com
127.0.0.1       www.caslemedia.com
127.0.0.1       www.doubleverify.com
127.0.0.1       www.adnxs.com
127.0.0.1       www.skimresources.com
127.0.0.1       www.lkqd.net
127.0.0.1       www.tealiumiq.com
127.0.0.1       www.pubwise.io
127.0.0.1       www.google-analytics.com
127.0.0.1       www.doubleclick.net
127.0.0.1       www.quantserve.com
127.0.0.1       www.rubiconproject.com
127.0.0.1       www.omtrdc.net
127.0.0.1       www.openx.net
127.0.0.1       www.googlesyndication.com
127.0.0.1       www.bing.com
127.0.0.1 www.moatads.com
127.0.0.1       www.adsafeprotected.com
127.0.0.1       www.baidu.com
E-3
127.0.0.1       www.parsely.com
127.0.0.1       www.bluekai.com
127.0.0.1       www.pubmatic.com
127.0.0.1       www.2o7.net
127.0.0.1       www.criteo.com
127.0.0.1 www.cloudfront.net
127.0.0.1       www.googleadservices.com
127.0.0.1       www.cnzz.com
127.0.0.1       www.krxd.net































Runs of Unused Clusters (Zeros)



















Runs of Used Clusters (Ones)
F-2


















Runs of Used Clusters (Ones)
G-1
G.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
0 4 8 12 20 32 52 84 136 220 101 66 167 233 145 123 13 
1 136 149 30 179 209 133 87 220 52 17 69 86 155 241 141 127 
2 13 140 153 38 191 229 165 139 49 188 237 170 152 67 219 31 
3 250 26 21 47 68 115 183 43 226 14 240 254 239 238 222 205 
4 172 122 39 161 200 106 51 157 208 110 63 173 236 154 135 34 
5 169 203 117 65 182 247 174 166 85 251 81 77 158 235 138 118 
6 1 119 120 239 104 88 192 25 217 242 204 191 140 76 216 37 
7 253 35 33 68 101 169 15 184 199 128 72 200 17 217 234 196 
8 175 116 36 152 188 85 18 103 121 224 90 59 149 208 102 55 
9 157 212 114 71 185 1 186 187 118 50 168 218 131 94 225 64 
10 34 98 132 230 107 82 189 16 205 221 171 137 53 190 243 178 
11 166 89 0 89 89 178 12 190 202 137 84 221 50 16 66 82 
12 148 230 123 98 221 64 30 94 124 218 87 50 137 187 69 1 
13 70 71 141 212 98 55 153 208 106 59 165 224 134 103 237 85 
14 67 152 219 116 80 196 21 217 238 200 183 128 56 184 240 169 
15 154 68 222 35 2 37 39 76 115 191 51 242 38 25 63 88 
16 151 239 135 119 254 118 117 235 97 77 174 251 170 166 81 247 
17 73 65 138 203 86 34 120 154 19 173 192 110 47 157 204 106 
18 55 161 216 122 83 205 33 238 16 254 15 14 29 43 72 115 
19 187 47 234 26 5 31 36 67 103 170 18 188 206 139 90 229 
20 64 38 102 140 242 127 114 241 100 86 186 17 203 220 168 133 
21 46 179 225 149 119 13 132 145 22 167 189 101 35 136 171 52 



























// Block Websites based on Filter in the variable "urllist"
var urllist = ['*://*.co.uk/*', '*://*.com/*'];
function blocksite(details) {
return {redirectUrl: browser.runtime.getURL('/siteblkr.html')};
//   return {cancel: true}
;
}














<span>This website has been blocked<br /></span>
<span>Please contact SysAdmin<br /></span>
</div>
<div class="spacer"></div>
</body>
</html>
